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Abstract 
 
One of the main aims of financial liberalisation was to increase banking 
sector competition. Different policies were prescribed for this with one of 
the ultimate objectives being that banks would be able to lend without any 
constraint. If banks are able to lend their deposits fully then there will be 
no excess liquidity in the banking sector; even a significant increase of 
lending will imply reduction in excess liquidity. However, it is observed 
that although the process of financial liberalisation started around the 
early 1990s for most of the developing economies, still there is substantial 
excess liquidity problem in the banking sector in these countries, including 
Bangladesh. This study examined the possible reasons for excess liquidity 
and lending in Bangladesh using bank-level data of 37 banks for the period 
of 1997-2011 applying panel estimation methods. The first empirical 
chapter analysed how financial liberalisation affected the excess liquidity 
situation in banks. The second chapter examined how excess liquidity was 
related with business cycle and the recent financial crisis. The final 
empirical chapter looked at how financial liberalisation was related to 
lending. One key contribution of this study is that it applied an index of 
financial liberalisation to identify the process and its effect more 
comprehensively. Another important contribution of this research is to see 
if there were any definite patterns for different bank typologies. To 
address this, four bank-specific characteristics of ownership, size, mode of 
operation and age were used. Financial liberalisation was found to have 
significant positive relationship with excess liquidity as well as for lending 
for all types of banks. It was also observed that business cycle had a 
significant positive impact on excess liquidity. However less significant 
relationship between the financial crisis and excess liquidity showed the 
resilience of the banking sector in Bangladesh during the crisis. When bank-
specific characteristics were analysed, the results showed that public banks 
had higher growth of excess liquidity and lower lending than private banks 
and new banks had lower growth of excess liquidity and higher lending than 
old banks. No definite differences could be observed between Islamic and 
conventional banks. It was also observed that public banks acted less 
procyclically than the private banks while large and new banks acted more 
procyclically than their counterparts. For the recent financial crisis, it is 
concluded that large and new banks had more excess liquidity than their 
counterparts while other typologies were found to be indifferent. Analysis 
of significant positive impact of financial liberalisation on both lending and 
excess liquidity suggested that prudent lending by banks to avoid loan 
default in the face of increased risk was a key for this parallel movement. 
Differences in interest rate according to bank-specific characteristics are 
found to be influential for the significant variations according to bank 
typologies.  
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CHAPTER 1 
BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The setting of financial prices by central banks, especially in developing 
countries, was a fairly common practice in the 1950s and 1960s. The 
soundness of this approach was challenged by Goldsmith (1969) in the late 
1960s, and by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) in the early 1970s. They 
ascribed the poor performance of investment and growth in developing 
countries to interest rate ceilings, high reserve requirements and 
quantitative restrictions in the credit allocation mechanism.  
 
According to them, these restrictions were sources of ‘financial 
repression’, the main symptoms of which were low savings, credit rationing 
and low investment. They argued that financial repression would restrain 
savings by deliberately maintaining interest rates below their natural level. 
As a result, growth would remain below its potential even when investment 
opportunities are abound (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; Fry, 1989). In 
summary, the low rates of savings and investment that characterised 
developing economies are assumed to be the results of government 
intervention in the financial sector.  
 
They proposed the theory of financial liberalisation, also known as the 
McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis, according to which investment and savings are 
repressed by a combination of controlled and low interest rates, 
insufficient competition, high reserve requirements and government 
allocation of credit. So the countries needed to deregulate interest rates, 
lower the reserve requirements, dismantle any credit allocation schemes 
and privatise as well as liberalise bank licensing in order to increase 
competition. The rise of interest rates would then increase the incentive to 
save and the resulting higher financial savings would lead to an 
augmentation of investment levels. The increase in interest rates should 
also weed out less productive investment, thereby leading to an increase in 
19 
 
the quality of investment. Judicious private bankers, without the 
constraints of credit controls, would allocate funds to the most productive 
users. Furthermore, increased competition would lower the spread 
between savings and loan rates, thereby increasing the efficiency of the 
financial system.  
 
Therefore, according to this, there would be a higher rate of savings, which 
would generate more investment and stimulate economic growth, which in 
turn would augment savings, thereby creating a virtuous circle. However, 
the key is to ensure that interest rates are market-determined as well as 
banks are privately owned and operated so that bankers can make 
decisions without political constraints. Moreover, sufficient number of bank 
licenses must be made available to enhance competition while avoiding too 
much deposit insurance and its associated problems of moral hazard 
(encouraging risky behaviour) and adverse selection (leading to poorly run 
banks). 
 
1.2 MOTIVATION FOR THIS STUDY 
As mentioned above, one of the expected outcomes of financial 
liberalisation is a reduction in the level of excess liquidity. However, even 
a cursory glance at media reports on banking would tell one that often one 
can find significant levels of excess liquidity to exist. This is disturbing, 
particularly when it coexists with an unmet demand for loans.   
 
Therefore, it is interesting to study the dynamics of excess liquidity. Why 
does is exist? Has financial liberalisation been able to have any impact on 
it? What are the effects of other factors? Which of them are significant? 
What effect has the recent financial crisis had on excess liquidity in banks? 
Similarly, what are the effects of business cycle etc.? 
 
Furthermore, as it will be discussed in greater detail in the literature 
survey, after periods of extensive cross-country studies, a new approach 
that has been introduced, but yet to be applied in great detail is that of 
bank-level studies. These allow a closer look at how different types of 
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banks respond to a variety of factors. No such study exists for Bangladesh, 
and such studies are still to address the issue of excess liquidity. How do 
different banks behave regarding excess liquidity? Do they show any 
differences? What policy measures could be introduced to address the issue 
and in that case what aspects of bank typology should policymakers take 
into consideration? 
 
1.2.1 Different Strands of Studies 
Over the years from when the financial liberalisation hypothesis was first 
proposed, hundreds of empirical studies have been done on this topic. The 
nature of these studies evolved over time with initial studies focusing on 
the effects of financial repression followed by studies that examined 
possible impacts of financial liberalisation while probable destabilising 
implications of this process were analysed later on. A very eloquent 
discussion on this can be found in the work of Gemech and Struthers 
(2003).  
 
The main strand of studies on the impact of financial liberalisation was 
mainly done on its relationship with economic growth. From the early 
1990s, empirical studies using large cross-section datasets with a particular 
focus on the empirics of the finance–growth relationship started. A detailed 
discussion of this cannot be presented here since it is not the aim of this 
study but the following papers, among others, contain comprehensive 
reviews on this aspect: King and Levine (1993), Hermes and Lensink (1996), 
Arestis and Demetriades (1997), Levine (1997), Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(2001), World Bank (2001), Green and Kirkpatrick (2002), Goodhart (2004), 
Mavrotas and Son (2006) and Mavrotas (2008).  
 
Another strand of literature on the effects of financial liberalisation 
examined the follow-up link between financial liberalisation and poverty 
reduction. Research on this area increased even more with the emergence 
of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Among others, the works of 
Beck et al. (2004), Honohan (2004), Green et al. (2005) and Claessens and 
Feijen (2006) shed important light on this area.  
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Researchers also started examining the impact of financial liberalisation 
through different possible channels rather than looking at its direct impact 
on economic growth and poverty. It was observed that financial 
liberalisation works through increased savings with a positive correlation by 
means of interest rate and thereby increasing investment to foster 
economic growth (Levine, 1997). Although the conclusion in this regard is 
still inconclusive1, there is a better consensus from the empirical studies on 
the point that economic growth is positively related with moderately 
positive real interest rate (Roubini and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Bandiera et al., 
2000). 
 
Institutional factors are also identified as one of the reasons for positively 
helping the impact of financial liberalisation (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2003). It is 
observed that good and well-functioning institutions are a key for 
sustainable growth (Levine, 2003; Rodrik et al., 2004; Acemoglu et al., 
2005).  
 
1.2.2 Alternative Possible Scenarios of the Impacts of Financial 
Liberalisation 
Financial liberalisation started in the late 1980s and in the early 1990s 
around the world. The process of financial liberalisation is a multi-
dimensional and multi-faceted process, sometimes involving reversals 
(Bandiera et al., 2000). Importance of country-specific studies was also 
mentioned since they can be very useful tool to examine the effect of 
financial liberalisation in depth (Guha-Khasnobis and Mavrotas, 2008).  
 
One important area of the effect of financial liberalisation is bank lending. 
From the discussion above, particularly in section 1.1, it can be observed 
that one of the main aims of financial liberalisation was to increase the 
banking sector competition. To attain this objective, countries will 
deregulate interest rates, privatise and liberalise bank licensing, lower the 
reserve requirements and dismantle any credit allocation schemes. 
Moreover, astute private bankers, without the constraints of credit 
                                               
1 See Fry, 1997, for a survey. 
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controls, will allocate funds to the most productive users. These two 
together will mean that banks will be able to lend more. Banks’ ability to 
supply more credit should imply that, keeping other things constant, there 
will be significantly less or no excess liquidity in the banking sectors. In 
other words, financial liberalisation should be able to sufficiently increase 
lending to reduce or remove excess liquidity problem.  
 
In this regard, possible effects of financial liberalisation can be classified 
into various groups. One possible effect describes the positive impacts of 
financial liberalisation on banking and how it can increase lending and 
banking profitability. While the other scenario describes the probable 
negative effect that financial liberalisation brings with it. Another 
possibility states an in-between scenario where banks will be inclined to 
lend more because of financial liberalisation but at the same time will take 
into consideration the risks involved in it due to increased fragility 
associated with the banking sector with this process. Therefore, banks will 
only lend when they receive a minimum rate that will compensate risks and 
other costs.  
 
According to the first possibility, banking profitability increases in the short 
run after the financial liberalisation. This is mainly due to the fact that 
liberalisation includes the process of financial opening which ultimately 
accumulates liquidity and thereby favours investment. Another reason for 
increased profitability of the banking sector is attributed to reduced 
control and supervision. This enables banks to lend in more risky projects 
with higher returns.   
 
The second possibility is that financial liberalisation can also lead to 
banking fragility. The process of higher profit and return gradually involve 
banks in lending to more risky projects, obviously with higher returns, but 
also with probability of higher default. In addition, banks may also depend 
on speculation when lending due to asymmetric information. Moreover, 
there can be lack of proper institutional framework. All these together can 
lead to deterioration of the financial situation of banks and lead to banking 
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fragility. This is evident from the experiences of both developed and 
developing countries (Caprio and Kliengebiel, 1995; Lindgren et al., 1996). 
This highlights the importance of analysing the benefits of liberalisation 
carefully against the cost of the fragility and uncertainty that may come 
along with this process. This has also led to the advocacy of some sort of 
regulation in economies, particularly where the liberalisation is premature 
(Caprio and Summers, 1993; Stiglitz, 1994).  
 
Another alternative probability, proposed by Khemraj (2010), suggested 
that in a relatively normal circumstance, there can still be excess liquidity 
problem if banks decide to lend only when they receive a minimum interest 
rate. This minimum rate should at least compensate the risks involved, 
marginal transaction costs and the rate of return on a safe foreign asset. If 
the borrower is unwilling or unable to take loan at this rate, then banks 
will accumulate excess liquidity. On the other hand, banks can also 
increase their lending rate to avoid risky loans. Thus, in the loan market, 
loans and this non-remunerative excess liquidity can be perfect 
substitutes2. It would be interesting to see which of these above possible 
excess liquidity scenarios of the impact of financial liberalisation hold for 
the banking sector in Bangladesh.  
 
1.2.3 Excess Liquidity and Lending 
Banks need to keep some part of their deposits as a reserve in the central 
bank. In Bangladesh, this is called the cash reserve ratio (CRR). The 
Bangladesh Bank (BB) which is the central bank of Bangladesh, has set a 
percentage of demand and time liabilities which all banks need to keep 
avoiding any sudden cash shortage. This is called statutory liquidity reserve 
(SLR) which also includes the CRR. If banks hold more reserve than the SLR, 
then it is said that banks have excess liquidity. The opportunity cost of 
holding reserves at the central bank, where they earn very little or no 
interest, increases the economic cost of funds above the recorded interest 
expenses that banks tend to shift to its customers. In a study on CEMAC 
                                               
2 This is observed to be reliable in an oligopolistic loan market following the industrial 
organisation banking model of Klein (1971) and Freixas and Rochet (1999). 
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(Communaute Economique et Monetaire de l’Afrique Centrale, which 
represents Central African Economic and Monetary Community) countries, 
Saxegaard (2006) observed that there are no remunerative alternatives for 
excess liquidity. 
 
Bank lending and excess liquidity are two very closely related aspects 
(Alper et al., 2012) of the banking sector. Heeboll-Christensen (2011) used 
the US data from 1987 to 2010 and found that “mechanisms of credit 
growth and excess liquidity are found to be closely related.” 
 
Given deposit, ܦ , the amount ܦ(1 − ܵܮܴ)  is available for 
lending/investment. If the actual lending is ܮ, one may write: 
 ܧܮ = ܦ(1 − ܵܮܴ) − ܮ  (1.1) 
 
Therefore generally it may be said that higher lending implies lower excess 
liquidity.  However, when one looks at how excess liquidity changes over 
time with lending, one needs to take into account the fact that the deposit 
is also changing over time.  Thus taking differences: 
 ∆ܧܮ = ∆ܦ(1 − ܵܮܴ) − ∆ܮ (1.2) 
 i.e.ܧܮ௧ − ܧܮ௧ିଵ = (ܦ௧ − ܦ௧ିଵ)(1 − ܵܮܴ) − (ܮ௧ − ܮ௧ିଵ) (1.3) 
 
where, for simplicity it has been assumed that SLR does not change. It 
should be obvious that if lending does not in(de)crease by the same  
amount as the in(de)crease in deposit the excess liquidity will in(de)crease. 
However, it is quite possible that lending increases but cannot keep pace 
with the increase of deposit. In this case excess liquidity will also increase. 
This is why empirical studies have found mixed relationships between 
lending and excess liquidity.   
 
Therefore, relationship between lending and deposit can lead to various 
possible relationships between lending and excess liquidity. The 
relationship is not so simple when deposit also increases. It will reverse 
depending on whether growth in lending is larger or smaller than deposit 
increase. There is difference of opinion about whether deposit is required 
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for lending. While the neoclassical view states that deposit is required for 
lending, according to the post-Keynesian view, deposit is not a prerequisite 
for lending. Assuming that all possibilities can occur, all the different 
situations are discussed here. When lending increases more than deposit 
increase (it can happen when deposit is not a prerequisite for lending or 
when banks have liquid funds frm previous periods), then excess liquidity 
will fall, implying negative relationship. But if increase in lending is less 
than increase in deposit, then excess liquidity will rise (irrespective of 
whether deposit is a prerequisite or not). Thus, among the two scenarios of 
lending rise, the first scenario of (∆ܮ ↑> ∆ܦ ↑) will lead to a negative 
relationship between lending and excess liquidity while the second scenario 
(∆ܮ ↑< ∆ܦ ↑)  will lead to a positive relationship between the two. The 
third scenario of fall in lending will lead to increase in excess liquidity 
(again irrespective of whether deposit is a prerequisite for it). For 
Bangladesh, the second scenario is observed to be true where lending 
increased less than deposit increase during the study period of 1997-2011.  
 
For Fiji, Jayaraman and Choong (2012) found that excess liquidity and 
lending were inversely related. The Bank of England also noted that the 
available excess liquidity could be used to support lending (The Telegraph, 
26 June 2013). Heider et al. (2009) described similar relationships but from 
the alternative perspective as they concluded that illiquidity can reduce 
the amount of lending. Saxegaard (2006) observed that excess liquidity in 
the case of Sub-Saharan Africa could be due to deficient lending.   
 
However, the above relationship where excess liquidity can act as an 
increased amount of lending or vice versa is not always true. It has been 
found that in Liberia, many banks have excess liquidity although there is 
huge unmet demand for loans. Similar findings were also observed for 
Bangladesh, where businessmen struggled to get loan but banks were 
flooded with excess liquidity. Former President of the Federation of 
Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FBCCI) Hossain 
commented that though all the credit demand is not fulfilled, there is 
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excess liquidity. He stated, “Though the BB3 says there is no liquidity crisis, 
as a borrower I face it” (The Daily Star, 21 June 2011). Similarly, Pontes 
and Murta (2012) observed for Cape Verde that although there was excess 
liquidity in the economy, still the lending rate was high, which should have 
been low with high excess liquidity.  
 
Of the above two paragraphs, the first one clearly shows how lending is 
expected and generally observed to be inversely related with excess 
liquidity while the second paragraph suggests that despite possibly being 
related they may not always follow a certain pattern of negative 
relationship. Hence, the aim of this work is to study excess liquidity and its 
relationship with financial liberalisation at bank-level. Relationship of 
excess liquidity with business cycle and the recent financial crisis will also 
be seen. Finally, the relationship between lending and financial 
liberalisation will be examined to have a better understanding of the 
overall situation.  
 
Normally one would expect any funds available to banks will be lent for 
profit. However, as exemplified in the thesis, excess liquidity seems to be a 
widely observed phenomenon even where the demand for lending is unmet. 
Financial liberalisation, for example, would be considered a factor that 
facilitates lending. Part of the motivation of this study is to understand the 
banks’ behaviour regarding excess liquidity. What factors affect their 
lending pattern and hence excess liquidity? How do they respond to policy 
actions such as financial liberalisation, or other external factors such 
financial crises, business cycles etc.? How do these responses vary across 
the various types of banks that exist? These are some of the questions that 
are addressed in this work (and again analysed in Section 7.2 of the 
concluding chapter). 
 
1.2.4 Practical Experiences of Excess Liquidity in Different Countries  
Excess liquidity in Bangladesh is a constant phenomenon and frequently 
mentioned by the central bank as well as by different businessmen and also 
                                               
3  Bangladesh Bank, the central bank of Bangladesh. 
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reported in various newspapers. One senior official of the central bank 
stated that, “banks in Bangladesh are flooded with excess liquidity” 
(Reuters, Dhaka, 12 April 2009). This phenomenon is not only true overall, 
but also true across banks. In the BB Annual Report (2009), it is written 
that, “all the banks had excess liquidity.”  
 
A detailed discussion of the excess liquidity situation in Bangladesh is 
presented in Chapter 2 but it should be mentioned here thatBangladesh 
experienced a dramatic rise in excess liquidity over the last 25 years both 
in nominal and in real terms. Moreover, an increasing trend can be 
observed even when it is expressed as a ratio of required liquid assets.  
 
Excess liquidity is a problem not only in Bangladesh but also in many other 
countries. Therefore, a detailed analysis of the situation in Bangladesh will 
shed important light on the issues causing excess liquidity and how to deal 
with it in Bangladesh as well as for other countries facing the similar 
problem.  
 
Researchers have found that excess liquidity is present in many countries. 
For example, different studies on Africa and Caribbean countries have 
observed persistent excess liquidity problem. Among others, Saxegaard 
(2006) observed it for the CEMAC region, Nigeria and Uganda; Fielding and 
Shortland (2005) found it for Egypt; while Khemraj (2006) had similar 
observations for the Caribbean country of Guyana.  
 
Similarly, it is also observed for the Asian countries where Agenor et al. 
(2004) found this existent in Thailand, Eggertsson and Ostry (2005) in 
Japan, Zhang and Pang (2008) in China. For the South Asian countries, 
Mohan (2006) observed it for India while Majumder (2007) along with 
Bhattacharya and Khan (2009) found it for Bangladesh.  
 
It is obvious from the studies above that excess liquidity still remains a 
major problem for most, if not all, of the developing economies. The 
situation is also observed in the developed countries (e.g. Eggertsson and 
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Ostry, 2005; observed it for Japan) but since this study is related to a 
developing economy and also because of similarities of the fact that 
financial liberalisation was carried out in these countries, the literature 
discussed were mainly those that focused on developing economies.  
 
1.3 EMPIRICAL CHAPTERS OF THE THESIS 
There will be three empirical chapters in this thesis. The first chapter will 
discuss the relationship between financial liberalisation and excess liquidity 
while the second will examine how excess liquidity is related with business 
cycle and the recent financial crisis. The link between lending and financial 
liberalisation will be analysed in the final empirical chapter.  
 
1.3.1 Financial Liberalisation and Excess Liquidity 
Most of the studies on the excess liquidity problem were done on a specific 
country (e.g. Agenor et al., 2004; Fielding and Shortland, 2005; Aikaeli, 
2006; Chen, 2008; Khemraj, 2008; Zhang, 2009; Yang, 2010). Only a few 
studies (Saxegaard, 2006; Khemraj, 2010) examined this problem at a 
cross-country level. These cross-country level studies were generally done 
on Africa. According to our knowledge, there has been no study on excess 
liquidity carried out at bank-level. In this respect, a study at bank-level 
specifically on an Asian country like Bangladesh can shed important light 
for the persistent excess liquidity in this region. It can also help in giving 
further insight on excess liquidity prevailing in similar developing countries.  
 
Therefore, the first empirical chapter of this study will aim to see the 
probable effect of the possible determinants used in earlier studies of 
excess liquidity along with an attempt to examine some additional 
concepts. This will enable to explain better the stubbornly high excess 
liquidity in these countries even after the financial liberalisation took place 
and the possible reasoning for this excessive liquidity. An index of financial 
liberalisation will be applied which is crucial due to the fact that the 
process of financial liberalisation is a multi-faceted process (Bandiera et 
al., 2000). This will help in avoiding misleading results when a dummy 
variable or only a single variable is used to represent this versatile process. 
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Various bank-typologies will be applied to see if there are any differences 
in excess liquidity according to bank-specific characteristics of ownership, 
size, mode of operation and age.Thus the main questions that will be 
examined in this study are as follows: (i) what is/are the reason(s) for the 
prevalent excess liquidity even after the financial liberalisation took place? 
(ii) how is financial liberalisation related with the excess liquidity situation 
for the economy of Bangladesh? (iii) is it only due to the usual and 
traditional factors that are discussed in different previous studies or is 
there any other factor(s) which is/are normally ignored in the studies of 
excess liquidity or is it a combination of both of these factors? (iv) what is 
the relationship between excess liquidity and financial liberalisation for 
different bank typologies?  
 
1.3.2 Business Cycle, the Financial Crisis and Excess Liquidity 
There have been several studies on the lending behaviour with differences 
in bank ownerships in terms of business cycle. It has been observed that 
public banks have a different lending pattern than private banks over the 
business cycle with the general trend of public banks behaving procyclically. 
But sometimes they behave counter-cyclically while sometimes they are 
also found to behave acyclically. However, there is a gap in the existing 
literature of studies on how other bank-specific characteristics play a role 
in lending. Moreover, there was no study according to our knowledge on 
business cycle and excess liquidity. Based on the earlier discussion on 
relationship between lending and excess liquidity, this study will analyse 
the difference in bank excess liquidity related to business cycle using some 
additional typologies of banking. This will include bank size (based on bank 
assets), banking mode of operation (Islamic versus conventional banks) and 
bank age (based on year of establishment) in addition to bank ownership 
(public versus private banks).4 
 
Another interesting and related topic which may also affect lending 
behavior of banks is crisis time. Generally it is observed that public banks 
                                               
4Another classification of ownership based on whether a bank is domestic or foreign. This 
is due to the inavailablity of data in Bankscope for foreign banks in Bangladesh. Bankscope 
authority was also contacted in this regard. 
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are less efficient than private banks in non-crisis times. Nevertheless, 
during the recent financial crisis of 2008-09, public banks were found to 
play a positive role for the economy by either acting counter-cyclically or 
less procyclically than private banks.  
 
The objective of the second empirical chapter (Chapter 5) will be to fill 
these gaps in this strand of literature with the main contributions 
including: (i) examining the relationship between business cycle and excess 
liquidity using bank-level data; (ii) investigating if there were any 
differences in the relationship between business cycle and excess liquidity 
according to bank typologies; (iii) examining the relationship between the 
financial crisis and excess liquidity using bank-level data; (iv) investigating 
if there were any differences in the relationship of the financial crisis and 
excess liquidity according to bank typologies.  
 
1.3.3 Financial Liberalisation and Lending 
In relation to lending, the following three aspects of financial liberalisation 
can be identified: (i) it reduces credit constraints of households engaged in 
smoothing consumption when income growth is expected; (ii) it reduces 
deposits required of first-time buyers of housing; and (iii) it increases the 
availability of collateral-backed loans for households which already possess 
collateral.  
 
Most of the earlier works on lending were at an aggregate level. This was 
mainly due to the fact that data were not easily available at disaggregated 
levels (Gattin-Turkalj et al., 2007). Lack of sufficiently long historical data 
at sector level was another reason for the lack of these types of studies (De 
Nederlandsche Bank, 2000). It is also suggested that with more data 
availability, future area of research should focus on breakdown (Calza et 
al., 2001).  
 
The related works between financial liberalisation and lending can be 
broadly divided into three categories. The first category of studies tried to 
investigate the effect of the financial liberalisation on lending but they 
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were done at an aggregate level and not at bank-level (Boissey et al., 2005; 
Egert et al., 2006). The second category of works used bank-level data to 
see the effect of some other phenomenon on lending pattern. For instance, 
Cull and Peria (2012) used bank-level data for some countries in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America but their main aim was to see if the lending 
changed along with the process of the financial crisis of 2008-09. The third 
category of research used some classifications of banking to see how they 
are related to changes in the monetary policy. For example, Lang and 
Krznar (2004) used the bank characteristics of ownership, capitalisation, 
liquidity and size typologies of the banks to see how they differ in their 
reaction to changes in the monetary policy in Croatia. 
 
The aim of this work is to fill some of the gaps in the existing literature of 
the above categories of studies and conduct a comprehensive study on bank 
lending across banks applying different bank-specific characteristics to see 
how they affected the lending pattern of the banking sector. The process 
of the financial liberalisation will also be included to examine its effect on 
these relationships.  
 
The main objectives of this chapter of the thesis will be as follows: 
(i)examining the relationship between financial liberalisation and lending 
using bank-level data; (ii) investigating if there were any differences in the 
relationship between financial liberalisation and lending according to 
different bank typologies of ownership, size, mode of operation and age.  
 
1.4 DATA SOURCES  
The study will use bank-level data of 37 banks for the period of 1997 to 
2011. The main source of data in this study will be the Bankscope database 
which has data at bank-level. Some additional sources of data will also be 
used. These include various issues of the Bangladesh Bank Annual Report 
(the annual publication of the central bank in Bangladesh) and the 
Statistical Yearbook, published by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS). 
Moreover, data from international sources will also be taken which include 
the World Bank database of World Development Indicator (WDI), the 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) database of International Finance 
Statistics (IFS). Some data from other published sources will also be used.    
 
1.5 METHODOLOGY 
The methodological and analytical basis for this study will be drawn from 
the empirical literature focusing on financial liberalisation, excess liquidity 
and lending. Moreover, literature related to business cycle and financial 
crisis will also be studied. Descriptive statistics and econometric 
techniques will be used to derive the results in this study and panel 
estimation methods will be applied for estimations. Graphs and tables will 
be provided when necessary to illustrate data and results of this study.  
 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
This study is organised into seven chapters. Chapter One, which is this 
chapter, provides introductory background and motivation for this study. 
Chapter Two will give an overview of the banking sector in Bangladesh, 
specifically highlighting excess liquidity and lending situations.  
 
Chapter Three will make a review of the relevant literature. This will be 
done in two parts. In the first part, literature on excess liquidity will be 
provided and in the second part, the review will discuss the determinants 
of lending studied in various earlier works. Both theoretical and empirical 
studies will be taken into account. This is very important as this will 
ultimately help to specify the standard control variables of this study.  
 
The relationship between excess liquidity and financial liberalisation in 
Bangladesh will be empirically examined in Chapter Four. This relationship 
will be investigated applying the standard control variables from earlier 
studies on excess liquidity. Moreover, some key variables of interest will 
also be investigated along with the reasoning for them to be included in 
this study. Due to the complex nature of financial liberalisation, an index 
of financial liberalisation will be used to comprehensively see the impact of 
this liberalisation process. As this study will be at bank-level, hence 
different bank-specific characteristics of ownership, size, mode of 
33 
 
operation and age will be included to see if there is any bank-level 
difference of excess liquidity according to these characteristics.  
 
Chapter Five will examine if and how the bank-specific characteristics, 
used in this study, differ in terms of business cycle. Moreover, the effect of 
business cycle on excess liquidity will also be examined. Since the period of 
this study covers the recent financial crisis, popularly known as the ‘Great 
Recession’, this chapter will also examine if and how this crisis impacted 
the excess liquidity situation in Bangladesh. Moreover, the diversity of this 
relationship in terms of ownership, size, mode of operation and age will 
also be examined.  
 
In the final empirical chapter (Chapter Six), lending pattern of the banking 
sector in Bangladesh will be investigated. Following a similar classification 
from the earlier empirical chapters, the effect of financial liberalisation 
will be seen on lending as well as if there were any significant variations 
across bank-typologies in the banking sector in Bangladesh.  
 
Chapter Seven will present the conclusions of the thesis. This will include 
the summary findings of the three empirical chapters, some policy 
recommendations and the concluding remarks.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE BANKING SECTOR IN BANGLADESH,  
EXCESS LIQUIDITY AND LENDING 
 
2.1 AN INTRODUCTION OF THE BANKING SECTOR IN BANGLADESH 
Bangladesh got independence on 16 December 1971. Soon after the 
independence, the government of Bangladesh established the central bank 
of Bangladesh, named the Bangladesh Bank5. Moreover, the government 
also nationalised all the domestic banks of that time6. The foreign banks 
were also permitted to continue and thus the banking sector of Bangladesh 
started its journey.  
 
2.1.1 Different Stages of the Banking Sector 
As mentioned above, the banking sector in Bangladesh began its journey 
with two Acts immediately after independence in 1971. One was related 
with the central bank while the other was related with the nationalisation 
of the domestic banks. Foreign banks were also permitted to continue their 
operation independently. The main reasonings for the nationalisation of all 
banks at that time were:  
a) Branch expansion for providing services to the rural people; 
b) Mobilisation of domestic savings, specially rural savings more 
effectively; 
c) Providing credit to the priority sector such as agriculture, small scale 
and cottage industries etc; 
d) Ensuring balanced regional development and removal of control on 
banks by few individuals.  
 
Later in the 1980s, the government decided to start privatising the 
commercial banking sector. As a result, there were some privatisations of 
the existing commercial banks while some new private commercial banks 
                                               
5According to the Bangladesh Bank Order, 1972 (P.O. No. 127 of 1972) with effect from 16 
December 1971. 
6By Presidential Order No. 26 titled Bangladesh Banks Nationalization Order, 1972. 
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were also established at that time. The first private commercial bank, The 
Arab Bangladesh Bank, was established in 1981-82.  
 
By the mid-1980s, the government made a committee named ‘Money, 
Banking and Credit’ headed by the then finance minister. It started 
implementing the financial liberalisation which was termed as the 
‘Financial Sector Reform Programme (FSRP)’. This process involved many 
steps that included classifying overdue loans, restructuring the state-owned 
commercial banks (SCBs)7 and private commercial banks (PCBs) as well as 
fixing the interest rates on deposits and advances (Task Force Report, 
1991).  
 
The objectives of these steps taken at that time were to increase market 
oriented incentive for priority sector lending, removing gradually the 
distortions in the interest rate structure with a view to improving the 
allocation of resources, adopting appropriate monetary tools to control 
inflation, establishing appropriate accounting policies and modes of 
recapitalisation, improving debt recovery process and strengthening the 
capital market. Along with these, they also brought together some manuals 
for operation and guidance of reporting system which were: lending risk 
analysis, financial spread sheet, performance planning system, large loan 
reporting system and new loan ledger card.  
 
When the FSRP was ending, the government formed another committee 
named ‘Banking Restructuring Committee (BRC)’ which suggested some 
further steps for improvement in the banking sector. These steps included 
an aggressive institutional renewal programme for Bangladesh Bank, 
fundamental reforms of SCBs, better internal governance both in SCBs and 
PCBs, penalties for imprudent lending, compliance with capital standards, 
hiring of auditors of valuation audits of SCBs, special recovery efforts, 
formation of a Bank Supervision Committee, strengthening the legal 
process and institution of expending recovery of debt.  
                                               
7 This type of bank is also called NCBs (nationalised commercial banks). Hence, NCBs and 
SCBs are used interchangeably.  
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They also took the following steps to improve the situation of the banking 
sector in Bangladesh:  
a) The amendment of Bangladesh Bank Order, 1972, to give Bangladesh 
Bank legal autonomy over its affairs;  
b) Reforms of supervision system of Bangladesh Bank to bring back 
financial discipline;  
c) Reforms of Bangladesh Banks (Nationalization) Order, 1972, to give 
autonomy to SCBs’ boards so that SCBs could run on commercial 
consideration;  
d) Deposit insurance scheme to protect depositors’ interest;  
e) Amendments to Bank Company Act, 1991, to effectively handle 
problem banks;  
f) Precluding crony (insider) lending and ensuring credit discipline.  
 
All these were done to attain two major goals. Firstly, to attain an 
effective legal system, good management and an effective central bank, 
which were the three pillars of banking. Secondly, to shift focus from the 
peripheral aspects of privatisation to the core aspects of dominance of 
market forces, competition among banks, financial discipline through broad 
based legal as well as regulatory base and operational efficiency.  
 
2.1.2 The Financial System in Bangladesh 
Before discussing in detail about the financial system in Bangladesh, a brief 
description of the central bank of Bangladesh (the Bangladesh Bank), is 
provided here. After independence, the Bangladesh Bank was established in 
1972. It had nine different branches around the country. Of them, two 
were in the capital, two were in the Rajshahi division and the rest were in 
the other five divisions.  
 
The rest of the banking system in Bangladesh is broadly divided into two 
broad categories: the scheduled banks and the non-scheduled banks. The 
scheduled banks worked according to the Bank Company Act 1991 
(amended in 2003). The non-scheduled banks cannot perform all the 
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functions of the scheduled banks and were set up for some specific 
purposes.  
 
2.1.3 The Scheduled Banks in Bangladesh 
The scheduled banks in Bangladesh can be broadly divided into four 
categories: the state-owned commercial banks, the development financial 
institutions (DFIs), the private commercial banks and the foreign 
commercial banks (FCBs). At the moment, there are 57 scheduled banks in 
Bangladesh. Of these, there are 4 SCBs, 5 DFIs, 42 PCBs of which 6 are Non 
Resident Bangladeshi (NRB) banks and 9 FCBs.  
 
State-owned Commercial Banks: After independence, the government of 
Bangladesh nationalised all the commercial banks, except the foreign 
banks. As a result, there were 6 SCBs at that time. They were: Sonali Bank, 
Rupali Bank, Agrani Bank, Janata Bank, Pubali Bank and Uttara Bank. When 
the government decided to start privatisation in the banking sector in the 
early 1980s, Pubali Bank and Uttara Bank were privatised in 1985. Then in 
1986, the government transformed Rupali Bank as a public limited 
company. In 2007, the government also made the remaining three banks, 
Sonali Bank, Agrani Bank and Janata Bank, as public limited company. As a 
result, currently there are 4 SCBs in Bangladesh, which are working as 
public limited companies.  
 
Development Financial Institutions: Like the commercial banks, two 
existing specialised banks were also nationalised. They were Bangladesh 
Krishi Bank and Bangladesh Shilpa Bank. The first one was established for 
the agricultural sector and the second one was for the industrial sector. 
These banks were also called specialised banks as they were established 
with specific objectives to attain. As Rajshahi Division was very prominent 
in agriculture but distantly located from the capital, the Bangladesh Krishi 
Bank was divided into two parts in 1987 to facilitate the agricultural 
activities in this region. As a result, the Rajshahi Krishi Unnayan Bank 
(RAKUB) was established to look after and develop the agricultural 
activities in the Rajshahi division while the Bangladesh Krishi Bank 
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monitored agriculture for other parts of the country. To look after and help 
promote the need of small and medium scale enterprises, the Bank of Small 
Industries and Commerce (BASIC) was established in 1988. Later on the 
government made it a specialised bank in 1993 and took control of it. In 
2010, the government merged the Bangladesh Shilpa Bank with the 
Bangladesh Shilpa Rin Sangstha (BSRS) and renamed it as the Bangladesh 
Development Bank Limited (BDBL).  
 
Private Commercial Banks: The PCBs started their operation in the early 
1980s as privatisation of the banking sector started through Nationalization 
(Amendment) Ordinance 1977. The Arab Bangladesh Bank was the first 
private commercial bank which was established in 1982. Soon after it, 
quite a few banks were established in the 1980s. These were IFIC Bank 
Limited, National Bank Limited, Islami Bank Limited, City Bank Limited, 
United Commercial Bank Limited and ICB (International Commercial Bank) 
Islami Bank Limited. Along with these, two of the nationalised banks, 
Uttara Bank Limited and Pubali Bank Limited, were privatised in 1983. The 
main aims were to stop the continuous loss of these public enterprises, 
increasing competition, improving their efficiency as well as customer 
service and thereby increasing the flow of credit to all sectors of the 
economy.  
 
In the second stage, some more private commercial banks were established 
between 1990 and 2000. This was the period when different measures of 
the financial liberalisation were taking place. During this period, a very 
large number of banks, 18 to be precise, were established. These are also 
called the ‘Second Generation Banks’.  
 
In the third stage (after 2000), some more banks were established. These 
are called the ‘Third Generation Banks’. These banks used more of modern 
technologies like online banking, debit and credit cards and ATM 
(automated teller machine) booths which was also followed by ‘Second 
Generation’ and other banks (more detail on all these banks along with 
year of their establishment are provided in the appendix). Recently, 10 
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more banks were established after a long interval. Of these, 6 were PCBs, 3 
were NRBs and 1 was a specialised bank.  
 
Foreign Commercial Banks: The foreign banks were always allowed to 
operate in Bangladesh. Even when the government decided to nationalise 
all the commercial banks, they only did it for the domestic banks. The 
foreign banks were allowed to carry on their activities as independent 
institutions. Currently there are 9 FCBs in Bangladesh. These are: City Bank 
NA, HSBC, Standard Chartered Bank, Commercial Bank of Ceylon, State 
Bank of India, Habib Bank Limited, National Bank of Pakistan, Woori Bank 
and Bank Al-Falah.  
 
2.1.4 Growth of the Banking Sector in Bangladesh 
The banking sector in Bangladesh achieved a very steady and robust growth 
over the years ranging from its increase in terms of assets to number of 
branches and as well as in terms of amount of deposit and lending. 
Recently, some new banks have been given permission to start their 
operation for further growth of this sector and meet the increasing 
demand.  
 
Bank Asset: Banking sector in Bangladesh went through a very rapid growth 
from various directions.  
 
Figure 2.1: Bank assets (in billion taka) 
 
Source: Bangladesh Bank Annual Report, various issues. 
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Total asset was 1280.31 billion taka in 2001. It then almost doubled and 
reached 2406.7 billion taka in 2007. In the next 5 years, it almost tripled 
and reached a mammoth 7030.7 billion taka.  
 
On the basis of the traditional classification of banks (i.e. SCBs, DFIs, PCBs 
and FCBs), a shift in the percentage of assets can be observed between the 
SCBs and the PCBs while it remained much more stable for the FCBs. In 
2002, the asset of the DFIs as a ratio of total assets was 11.47 while it was 
6.8 for FCB. The highest ratio in 2002 was for the SCBs with 45.56 per cent. 
The PCBs had a share of 36.16 per cent.  
 
Figure 2.2: Bank asset as a ratio of total asset (in per cent) 
 
Source: Bangladesh Bank Annual Report, various issues. 
 
Over the next ten years, PCBs achieved significant growth and their share 
of assets rose from 36.16 per cent to 62.18 in 2012. The share of the FCBs 
almost remained stagnant, marginally increasing from 6.28 to 6.80 per cent 
in this period. Both the SCBs and the DFIs experienced significant decline 
and reduced to almost half of their shares of 2002. The SCBs share fell to 
26.06 from 45.56 while the share of DFIs reduced to 5.48 from 11.47 in 
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Number of Branches: The banking sector also achieved significant progress 
in establishing new branches all around the country. This is shown below.  
 
Figure 2.3: Number of bank branches  
 
Source: Bangladesh Bank Annual Report, various issues. 
 
It can be seen that number of branches increased steadily, particularly 
from 2005. This not only helped in reaching more people who were not 
previously under the coverage of banking facilities but also increased 
competition among the banks in places where there were not enough 
branches previously. The number of bank branches was 6271 in 2001. It 
then increased to 6562 in 2007. In the next 5 years it increased and 
reached 8322. 
 
Deposit: The amount of deposit also went through sharp increase in the 
last few years. In 2001, the amount of bank deposit was 956.28 billion taka. 
By 2007, it increased and almost doubled to reach 1860.6 billion taka. In 
the next 5 years, it almost tripled to 5396.0 billion taka. It can be noticed 
that the rate of change in the deposit was quite similar to the rate of 
change in assets. Following the traditional classification, it could be 
observed that there was a shift towards private banks in terms of deposits. 
In 2002, the deposit as a ratio of the total deposit for the SCBs was 50.32 
per cent in 2002 but fell to 25.50 by the year 2012. The deposit of the DFIs 
as a ratio of total deposits gradually decreased in this period from 5.82 to 
4.80. For the FCBs, it was 7.02 in 2002 and became 6.10 in 2012. On the 
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contrary, the PCBs experienced significant growth rising from a share of 
36.84 in 2002 to 63.60 per cent in 2012. 
 
Figure 2.4: Bank deposit as a ratio of total deposit (in per cent) 
 
Source: Bangladesh Bank Annual Report, various issues. 
 
Lending: Lending by banks, which was a key for increased investment, and 
thereby growth, not only increased at gross level but it also rose as a ratio 
of gross domestic product (GDP). This was estimated as domestic credit 
provided by financial sector (% of GDP).  
 
Figure 2.5: Bank lending as a ratio of GDP 
 
Source: Bangladesh Bank Annual Report, various issues. 
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This ratio was 29.94 per cent in 1997. In the next five years, it increased 
dramatically to 50.44 per cent. The growth slowed down a bit but 
continued and by the year 2007, it reached 58.21 per cent. This growth 
picked up again in 2012 and became 68.98 per cent.  
 
Recent Approvals for New Banks: There was a recent surge of approvals 
for banks in Bangladesh. From 2012 onwards, 10 new banks were given 
approval. This made the total number of banks reaching 57. The main aim 
of these new approvals was aimed at strengthening the financial inclusion 
of the unbanked people in the country. The previous time before this when 
bank licenses was approved happened in 2000-01. Hence, expansion in this 
sector was needed to address the current increased demand, particularly in 
the face of the continuous economic growth that Bangladesh achieved over 
the years as well as fulfilling the future banking requirements.  
 
These new approvals were also required since population per branch was 
21065 and the ratio of loan accounts per 1000 adults was only 42 (as of 
2012). The situation was better in the neighbouring countries of India (with 
a population of 14485 per branch and 124 loan accounts per 1000 adults) 
and Pakistan (20340 and 47 respectively). Furthermore, a recent survey by 
the Institute of Microfinance (InM) observed that only 45 per cent of the 
surveyed people (based on nearly 9000 households) had access to banks and 
micro-finance institutions (MFIs) for loans8. 
 
The newly established banks consisted of one specialised bank and nine 
commercial banks, of which six were PCBs and the remaining three were 
NRB banks. A brief description about these new banks, established from 
2012 onwards, is given below. However, they were not included in this 
study due to their data unavailability for this study period.  
 
Remittance was a major source of foreign exchange earnings and need 
special attention. To address this, the Probashi Kallyan Bank, was 
                                               
8 The central bank also took other measures to bring unbanked people under banking 
facilities. One of these initiatives was to provide banking account facility with a very 
nominal amount of deposit.  
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established to facilitate the financial transactions of the migrants. This 
specialised bank is particularly related to remittance transfer, migration 
and investment opportunities.  
 
The newly established six PCBs were Union Bank Limited, Modhumoti Bank 
Limited, Farmers Bank Limited, Meghna Bank Limited, Midland Bank 
Limited and South Bangla Agriculture and Commerce Bank Limited while 
the three new NRBs are NRB Commercial Bank Limited, NRB Bank Limited 
and NRB Global Bank Limited.  
 
It was made mandatory that these new banks would have to deposit 4 
billion taka to the central bank of their paid-up capital before starting 
their operation. Moreover, they need to maintain the 1:1 ratio when 
opening branches in rural and urban areas. This was mainly to reach the 
unbanked people who were mostly located in rural areas.  
 
The NRBs will also need to deposit 4 billion taka to the central bank of 
paid-up capital. Of these, 50 per cent will be from their sponsors while the 
rest will be from the public offerings. Moreover, each shareholder must 
hold at least shares worth 100 million taka while the maximum stake of 
bank’s total paid-up capital for a shareholder can be 10 per cent.  
 
2.2 EXCESS LIQUIDITY IN BANGLADESH: SOME STYLISED FACTS 
Excess liquidity in Bangladesh was a constant phenomenon. This was 
mentioned by the central bank, businessmen and was also reported in 
newspapers. In the Bangladesh Bank Annual Report 2008-09, it was written 
that, “Liquidity indicators measured as percentage (BB) of demand and 
time liabilities (excluding inter-bank items) of the banks indicate that all 
the banks had excess liquidity.” 
 
When a bank holds reserves over and above the level sufficient to finance 
its statutory required minimum reserves, deposit outflows and short-term 
maturing obligations, it is reckoned as holding excess liquidity. The 
opportunity cost of holding reserves at the central bank increases the 
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economic cost of funds above the recorded interest expenses that banks 
tend to shift to customers. 
 
If banks hold more reserve than the SLR, then it is said that banks have 
excess liquidity. The data of nominal excess liquidity, real excess liquidity 
and excess liquidity as a percentage of required liquid assets are given in 
Figures 2.6 and 2.7. The real excess liquidity and excess liquidity as a 
percentage of required liquid assets are given to have a real view of the 
excess liquidity scenario in the economy.  
 
It can be observed from Figure 2.6 that excess liquidity (EL) in nominal 
terms did not change much around the late 1980s and early 1990s. Then it 
experienced significant rise followed by a stable condition over the next 
few years (particularly from 1994 to 1998). It then started to rise again and 
continued with some exception (e.g. 2001, 2005 and 2006). It increased 
dramatically in 2009 to reach an all time high.  
 
Figure 2.6: EL in nominal and real term (in billion taka) 
  
Source: Based on various issues of Bangladesh Bank Annual Reports and author’s own 
calculation. 
 
The real excess liquidity of Bangladesh also saw a dramatic rise in the last 
25 years. It was 18.71 billion taka in 1987. Then it fell over the next 3 years 
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It hovered around 20 billion taka till 1997. Then it increased till 2004 with 
the exception of 2001. Though it fluctuated in the next few years but it 
crossed the 100 billion mark in 2007 and reached a record high in 2009, 
reaching a mammoth 267.09 billion taka. This came with a big jump in the 
year 2009.  
 
Even when excess liquidity data was given in real terms, it could be argued 
that the rise in excess liquidity was due to increase in number of banks and 
their branches leading to a rise in the total amount of deposit. To address 
this, another figure is presented where excess liquidity is expressed as a 
percentage of the required liquid assets, SLR.  
 
It can be observed that changes in excess liquidity (as % of required liquid 
assets) also followed an increasing pattern like nominal and real excess 
liquidity though to a lesser extent. Although it went through fluctuations 
but there was a growing trend in the long-run.  
 
Figure 2.7: Excess liquidity as a ratio of required liquid assets (SLR) 
 
Source: Based on various issues of Bangladesh Bank Annual Reports and author’s own 
calculation. 
 
Excess liquidity as a percentage of the required liquid assets was 34.4 in 
1987. It then fell in the next few years but then increased with some 
fluctuations after 1991. From 1999, even with some fluctuation, the ratio 
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substantially increased. It reached a huge 81.66 in 2009 which was also the 
year when the amount of excess liquidity was all time high for Bangladesh. 
But after 2009, it started falling again. Even after significant decrease in 
the next two years, it was still quite high at 51.24 in June 2011.  
 
The continuous rise of excess liquidity, as observed above, puts forward 
the need for a study which can explain the reasons for it. This can be due 
to factors that have been used in earlier studies of excess liquidity or can 
be some other factors or it can be a combination of both. Nevertheless, it 
is worth an effort to see why excess liquidity is so high and still increasing 
in Bangladesh. 
 
One point that needs to be noted is that excess liquidity fell before the 
financial liberalisation programme (which was initiated in Bangladesh in 
the early 1980s) but surprisingly it increased, with some exceptions, after 
it. As mentioned before, the excess liquidity reached a record high of 
267.09 billion taka (in real terms) in 2009.  
 
Trying to explain the reason for this very high excess liquidity in 2009 it 
was mentioned that “Bankers and experts attribute the build-up of the 
excess liquidity in the banking system to poor investment situation, mainly 
triggered by the on-going global meltdown” (The Financial Express, 5 
August, 2009). A similar notion was mentioned in another newspaper, 
“Economists and bankers think the investment flow is not picking up 
because of the ongoing global recession” (The Daily Star, 13 July 2009). 
 
According to former BB Chief Economist and currently Director General of 
the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) Mujeri: 
“Credit to the private sector has declined in recent months due 
mainly to lower import orders for capital machinery as well as 
falling trend of major commodities prices in the global market” 
(The Financial Express, 5 August  2009). 
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All possible reasons of this disproportionate excess liquidity in 2009 were 
summarised very nicely by Bhattacharya and Khan (2009) in the following 
words:  
“The excess liquidity situation has been compounded by several 
factors. Firstly, this fall in investment demand has been 
exacerbated by import and export slowdown as a large share of 
the bank credit in Bangladesh goes towards Letter of Credit 
(L/C) opening. Further, fall in prices of majority of commodities 
in the global market implies lower money demand for financing 
imports. Secondly, because of the financial crisis the business 
community has been prone to taking conservative steps with 
regard to business decisions. This is evident through the decline 
of L/C opening for capital machineries. Thirdly, credit 
requirement of the government for financing of fiscal deficit has 
also been moderate.” 
 
2.2.1 Excess Liquidity Situation According to Traditional Classification of 
Banks 
With the recent establishment of 10 new banks, there are 57 scheduled 
banks in Bangladesh. However, the description below is only for 47 
scheduled banks as data for the new ones are not available for the period 
under discussion. These 47 banks are generally divided into the following 
four groups: nationalised, specialised, private and foreign.  
 
The Islami banks maintain lower SLR instead of the existing one for the 
conventional scheduled banks because of insufficient availability of Shariah 
based approved securities. In other words, the Islami banks cannot 
purchase treasury bills and bonds that involve receipt of interest, as the 
Shariah rules ban payment or receipt of interest by any individual or 
institution. The specialised banks (except BASIC Bank Limited) are 
exempted from maintaining SLR fully because they were established for 
specific objectives like agricultural or industrial development.  
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According to the Bangladesh Bank Annual Report of 2010-11:  
“the commercial banks’ demand and time liabilities are at 
present subject to a statutory liquidity requirement (SLR) of 19.0 
percent inclusive of average 6.0 percent (at least 5.5 percent in 
any day) cash reserve ratio (CRR) on bi-weekly basis. The CRR is 
to be kept with the BB and the remainder as qualifying secured 
assets under the SLR, either in cash or in Government securities. 
SLR for the banks operating under the Islamic Shariah is 11.5 
percent. The specialised banks (except Basic Bank Ltd.) are 
exempted from maintaining the SLR. Liquidity indicators 
measured as percentage of demand and time liabilities 
(excluding inter-bank items).” 
 
Excess liquidity situation for banks are given in the following table: 
 
Table 2.1: Excess liquidity according to different types of banks (in per 
cent) 
Year NCBs DFIs PCBs FCBs 
1997 2.7 9.7 6.0 11.2 
1998 4.4 9.2 6.7 19.9 
1999 5.2 8.7 8.0 31.4 
2000 6.5 9.9 6.8 14.8 
2001 5.7 8.9 6.2 14.3 
2002 7.3 6.9 8.5 21.8 
2003 8.4 5.8 9.8 21.9 
2004 6.8 4.7 8.8 21.9 
2005 2.0 6.2 5.1 23.6 
2006 2.1 3.8 5.6 16.4 
2007 6.9 5.6 6.4 11.2 
2008 14.9 4.9 4.7 13.3 
2009 17.6 7.1 5.3 21.8 
2010 8.2 2.3 4.6 13.2 
Source: Bangladesh Bank Annual Report, various issues. 
NCBs = Nationalised commercial banks, DFIs = State-owned development financial 
institutions, PCBs = Private commercial banks, FCBs = Foreign commercial banks. 
 
For the nationalised commercial banks, the excess liquidity in per cent was 
only 2.7 in 1997. With few exceptions, it gradually increased to 8.2 per 
cent in 2010. It reached its peak of 17.6 per cent in 2009. 
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For the specialised banks, the situation was almost the opposite. It had 9.7 
per cent excess liquidity in 1997 and then gradually decreased to 2.3 per 
cent in 2010. In case of the private commercial banks, it could be seen that 
excess liquidity hovered around 6 per cent for most of the years.  
 
Figure 2.8: Excess liquidity according to different types of banks (in per 
cent) 
 
Source: Based on Table 2.1.  
 
The scenario of excess liquidity in the foreign commercial banks had always 
been different. It remained very high in relation to other types of banks 
except in 2008 (when excess liquidity in NCBs were highest).  
 
2.3 CREDIT IN BANGLADESH: SOME STYLISED FACTS 
Credit in Bangladesh went through a very steady growth. It is worthwhile to 
have a look at the lending pattern from different angles. Therefore, a brief 
description is presented here both at aggregate and disaggregate levels. 
Domestic bank credit is discussed first for total, public and private sector. 
Then bank advances classified by major economic purpose are described.  
 
2.3.1 Domestic Credit at Public and Private Sectors 
Total domestic credit was 53.09 billion taka in 1997, increased to 101.40 in 
the next five years, doubled to 204.27 in 2007 and rose to 433.53 in 2011.  
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Figure 2.9: Total domestic credit (in billion taka) 
 Source: Bangladesh Bank Annual Report, various issues. 
 
Gross credit to the private sector in 1997 was 38.95 billion taka, rose to 
73.56 in 2002, more than doubled in the next five years reaching 150.77 
and the growth continued reaching 340.71 by 2011. Credit to the public 
sector followed a similar trend and reached 92.81 billion taka in 2011 from 
14.14 in 1997. Of the credit to the public sector, net credit to government 
increased sharply from 8.02 billion taka in 1997 to 73.44 in 2011 while 
credit to other public sector rose from 6.12 in 1997 to 19.38 billion taka in 
2011.  
 
Total credit, credit to the private sector and credit to the public sector 
increased by around eight-fold during this 15 year period with credit to the 
private sector increasing slightly more than the public sector. However, 
within the public sector, net credit to government increased by more than 
nine-fold while credit to other public sector only tripled during this time.  
 
2.3.2 Bank Advances by Economic Purposes 
Trade was and still remains as the highest area of bank advances over the 
years. It received 12.08 billion taka in 1997, which almost doubled in the 
next five years. By 2007, it reached 48.62 billion and in 2011, it received 
121.68 billion taka. The second highest area of bank advance was 
manufacturing (excluding the working capital financing). It received 11.17 
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billion taka in 1997, increased to 17.85 in 2002, almost doubled in the next 
five years. By 2011, it reached 70.05 billion taka.  
 
The third major area of bank advance in 1997 was agriculture (including 
forestry and fisheries). It received 6.74 in 1997 which rose to 9.65 in 2002. 
It remained stagnant in the next five years receiving 10.90 in 2007. 
However, this sector experienced significant increase reaching 19.65 in 
2011. Working capital for manufacturing was the fourth highest area of 
receiving credit in 1997 (4.95). However, it rose dramatically over the 
years and surpassed the advance received by agriculture (including forestry 
and fisheries) in the next five years. The growth continued and reached 
28.51 in 2007. By the year 2011, it received 47.06 billion taka.  
 
Figure 2.10: Bank advances by economic purposes (in per cent) 
 
Source: Bangladesh Bank Annual Report, various issues. 
Note: Manufacturing is estimated excluding working capital financing (WCF) which is given 
separately. Agriculture is estimated including forestry & fisheries. 
 
It can be observed from the graph above that among the major sectors, 
trade, working capital financing and others grew in terms of percentage 
while agriculture and manufacturing (excluding WCF) fell. The growth in 
the ‘others’ category can be mainly attributed to the growth in the 
construction sector which was a mere 2.42 billion taka in 1997 but rose 
rapidly to reach a significant amount of 24.19 in 2011, thus even surpassing 
the advances made to the agricultural sector. Overall, this showed a 
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structural shift away from agriculture. This is a noteworthy change for a 
country where most of the people are still reliant on agriculture for 
employment.  
 
2.3.3 Ratio of NPL to Total Loans by Different Types of Banks 
In Figure 2.11, the data for ratio of gross non-performing loans (NPL) to 
total loans are provided. It showed the ratio for different types of banks.  
 
Figure 2.11: Ratio of gross NPL to total loans by type of banks (in per 
cent)  
 
Source: Bangladesh Bank Annual Report, various issues. 
 
A similar trend of decrease can be observed for almost all types of banks 
except the foreign ones which were very low in the beginning and it 
remained so throughout. For the nationalised banks, it decreased from 
36.60 per cent in 1997 to 15.70 in 2010.  
 
For the DFIs, it fell from a huge 65.70 per cent to 24.20 during this period. 
The decrease for the PCBs was the most dramatic as it fell by almost ten 
times from 31.40 per cent in 1997 to only 3.20 per cent in 2010. As 
mentioned before, it was always low for the foreign banks with the highest 
of only 4.10 per cent in 1998. 
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APPENDIX 2.1: Generation of PCBs in Bangladesh 
Table 2A.1: Generation of PCBs in Bangladesh 
Sl. 
No.  
Name of PCB  Year of 
Foundation/ 
Denationalisation* 
Generation of 
Banking Sector 
1 Arab Bangladesh Bank Limited  1982 First 
2 IFIC Bank Limited  1983 First 
3 Uttara Bank Limited  1983* First 
4 Pubali Bank Limited  1983* First 
5 National Bank Limited  1983 First 
6 Islami Bank Bangladesh 
Limited  
1983 First 
7 The City Bank Limited  1983 First 
8 United Commercial Bank 
Limited 
1983 First 
9 ICB Islami Bank Limited  1987 First 
10 Eastern Bank Limited  1992 Second 
11 NCC Bank Limited  1993 Second 
12 Prime Bank Limited  1995 Second 
13 Dhaka Bank Limited  1995 Second 
14 Al-Arafah Islami Bank Limited  1995 Second 
15 Southeast Bank Limited  1995 Second 
16 Social Islami Bank Ltd  1995 Second 
17 Dutch-Bangla Bank Limited  1996 Second 
18 Trust Bank Limited  1999 Second 
19 Bank Asia Limited  1999 Second 
20 EXIM Bank Limited  1999 Second 
21 First Security Islami Bank  1999 Second 
22 Mutual Trust Bank  1999 Second 
23 Mercantile Bank Limited  1999 Second 
24 ONE Bank Limited  1999 Second 
25 The Premier Bank Limited  1999 Second 
26 Standard Bank Limited  1999 Second 
27 Bangladesh Commerce Bank  1999 Second 
28 BRAC Bank Limited  2001 Third 
29 Jamuna Bank Limited  2001 Third 
30 Shahjalal Islami Bank Limited  2001 Third 
Source: Bangladesh Bank Annual Report, various issues. 
*Uttara Bank and Pubali Bank were denationalised to operate as private commercial bank  
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APPENDIX 2.2: Banking structure in Bangladesh 
Table 2A.2: Banking structure in Bangladesh 
Bank 
Types 
Number 
of 
Banks 
Number 
of 
Branches 
% of 
Branches 
Total 
Assets 
(Crore 
Tk.) 
% of 
Industry 
Assets 
Deposits 
(Crore 
Tk.) 
% of 
Deposits 
SCBs  4 3437 43.17 1629.2 27.8 1235.6 27.4 
DFIs  4 1406 17.66 328.8 5.6 214.4 4.8 
PCBs  30 3055 38.37 3524.2 60.0 2787.5 61.8 
FCBs  9 63 0.79 385.4 6.6 272.2 6.0 
Total  47 7961 100.00 5867.6 100.00 4509.7 100.00 
Source: Bangladesh Bank Annual Report 2012-13. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In spite of efforts to liberalise and modernise financial institutions, markets 
and instruments in less-developed countries (LDCs), the banking sector 
remained the most important source of financing in these economies and it 
is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future (Stiglitz, 1989; Singh, 1997). 
Hence, the investment choice of banks could either contain role of finance 
in growth or enhance that role. Thus, it was very important to analyse the 
situation of excess liquidity in the banking system and also the reasons 
behind it. 
 
As discussed before, one of the main aims of financial liberalisation was to 
increase the banking sector competition. For this, countries would 
deregulate interest rates, privatise and liberalise bank licensing (in order 
to increase competition), lower the reserve requirements and dismantle 
any credit allocation schemes. Moreover, discerning private bankers, 
without the constraints of credit controls, would allocate funds to the most 
productive users.  
 
Allocation of short- and long-term credit was also mentioned as one of the 
channels between financial development and economic growth (Das and 
Guha-Khasnobis, 2008; Yucel, 2009). These two together should mean that 
banks would be able to lend more. It may be expected that ability of banks 
to give more credit would imply that there would be less excess liquidity in 
the banking sectors. In other words, financial liberalisation should reduce 
the excess liquidity problem.  
 
However, the practical experience of different developing economies 
around the world told a different story. In many less developed countries 
banks hold large quantities of excess liquidity in their asset portfolio, a 
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large part of which was non-remunerated (Fielding and Shortland, 2005; 
Khemraj, 2006; Saxegard, 2006).  
 
As described in Section 1.2.4, it was observed that various countries still 
suffered from the problem of excess liquidity. For example, it was present 
in the African countries (Fielding and Shortland, 2005; Gulde et al., 2006; 
Khemraj, 2006; Saxegaard, 2006). Similarly, it was also observed that this 
problem was present in China (Chen, 2008; Zhang, 2009; Yang, 2010) and 
also in some other Asian countries (Agenor et al., 2004; Mohan, 2006; 
Majumder, 2007; Zhang and Pang, 2008; Bhattacharya and Khan, 2009). 
Holding huge amount of liquidity implied banks were trading off possible 
profits with enormous risks related to existing vulnerable investment 
avenues. 
 
There was a difference of opinion among the economists on whether excess 
liquidity was good for the economy or not. According to some economists, 
excess liquidity was somewhat desired (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; 
Calomiris and Wilson, 1996; Ramos, 1996). This strand of argument 
considered accumulation of excess reserves as protective liquidity. On the 
other hand, some other economists viewed excess liquidity as an undesired 
phenomenon attributed to exogenous economic factors (Bernanke, 1983, 
1995; Ferderer and Zalewski, 1994).  
 
There was also disagreement on whether excess liquidity was a demand or 
a supply side phenomenon. If there was lack of credit demand from the 
borrowers’ side, then it could be attributed to demand side. But if there 
was enough demand for credit (in other words, if the credit demand was 
not fulfilled) while the banks had excess liquidity, then it should be 
attributed to the supply side.  
 
Several authors had pointed to weak bank lending as one of the main 
reasons for the build-up of excess liquidity. Wyplosz (2005) and Gilmour 
(2005) identified weak bank lending, due to poor growth prospects, as the 
reason for the increase in excess reserves in the Eurozone. Saxegaard 
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(2006), on the other hand, found that weak loan demand (owing to high 
loan rates) accounted for the involuntary reserve accumulation in several 
African countries. 
 
However, in several other countries it was present side by side with 
unfulfilled credit demand. For instance, it was found that banks in 
Tanzania had excess liquidity though there was high private sector credit 
demand (Aikaeli, 2011).  This was supported by a World Bank study where 
it was mentioned that “excess liquidity can coexist with very limited 
investable funds” (Honohan and Beck, 2007). 
 
This also seemed to be generally the case for Bangladesh.  Though at times 
of financial crisis, lowering of investment rates could contribute to excess 
liquidity, generally excess liquidity existed alongside unment credit 
demands.  As already mentioned once, former President of the Federation 
of Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and Industry Hossain said, “Though 
the BB (Bangladesh Bank) says there is no liquidity crisis, as a borrower I 
face it” (The Daily Star, 21 June 2011). 
 
All these imply that excess liquidity in many countries was not due to lack 
of demand from the borrowers’ side but it was a situation arising from the 
supply side. The banks were lending less than the amount they could or 
were expected to lend due to some reasons other than the lack of demand. 
So, in this study, the excess liquidity situation will be examined to explore 
these possible factors.  
 
The literature review section is broadly divided into two categories. The 
first discusses the studies related to excess liquidity while the second part 
describes the empirical works on lending.  
 
3.2 DETERMINANTS OF EXCESS LIQUIDITY 
Earlier studies on excess liquidity used various factors as the determinants 
of excess liquidity. The most important explanatory variable of excess 
liquidity that emerged from the previous studies was reserve requirement. 
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In their study on Thailand, Agenor et al. (2004) included it as one of the 
independent variables and found it to be significant. Nyagetera (1997) also 
agreed that reserve requirements play an important role in withdrawing or 
enhancing liquidity in the banking system in Tanzania. In a separate 
research, Aikaeli (2011) also studied excess liquidity problem for Tanzania 
and found that along with other variables, the rate of required reserves 
was also responsible for accumulation of excess liquidity in commercial 
banks.  
 
Chirwa and Michila (2004) mentioned that banks in many developing 
countries were still subject to high liquidity reserve requirements even 
after financial liberalisation. In sub-Saharan Africa, Seck and Nil (1993) 
underscored the role of high reserve requirements, which acted as an 
implicit financial tax by keeping interest rates high. While reserve 
requirements may be designed with the aim of protecting depositors, the 
availability of a pool of resources allowed for financing high fiscal deficits 
through the implicit financial tax, thereby creating an environment that 
could promote high inflation and persistent high intermediation margins. 
The opportunity cost of holding reserves at the central bank, where they 
generally would earn less interest than lending, increased the economic 
cost of funds above the recorded interest expenses that banks tend to shift 
to customers.  
 
Other things being equal one would expect that an increase in lending rate 
of the commercial banks would reduce lending and contribute towards 
increasing excess reserves. This was observed in the study of Saxegaard 
(2006) for sub-Saharan African countries. High lending interest rates, 
whether caused by inefficiency or lack of competition, increased 
borrower’s costs. By pricing the safer borrowers out of the market, high 
interest rates could increase the risk of lending, making banks less willing 
to lend and potentially resulting in credit rationing leading to high bank 
liquidity. This was also mentioned in the work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
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Another important factor that was found to be related with excess liquidity 
was deposit volatility. Agenor et al. (2004) found that deposit volatility 
was one of the main factors that could explain the excess liquidity problem 
for the economy of Thailand. Larsen (1951) also identified volatility as a 
probable reason for excess liquidity. According to him, liquidity preference 
of banks was affected by the formation of public expectations. To analyse 
banks’ demand for liquidity, volatility of depositors’ cash preference 
should thus be taken into consideration. Saxegaard (2006) observed that 
currency withdrawal volatility9, which was very similar to deposit volatility, 
could influence the excess liquidity situation.  
 
Barajas et al. (2000) found evidence of a positive and significant 
relationship between interest rate spread (IRS) and liquidity reserves in 
the Colombian banking system. Brock and Rojas-Suarez (2000) and Saunders 
and Schumacher (2000) observed that reserve requirement could have an 
influence on the spread as they found evidence that suggested reserve 
requirements acted as a tax on banks that translates into higher spreads in 
a number of Latin American and developed countries.  
 
Different authors observed that sometime banks kept excess reserve than 
required in case of emergency. Mishkin (2001) explained that banks kept 
excess reserves as an insurance against the costs associated with deposit 
outflows. According to him, the higher the costs associated with deposits 
outflow the more the excess reserves banks wanted to hold. This cost was 
called the penalty rate and was generally proxied by either the discount 
rate or the money market rate (Agenor et al. 2004; Aikaeli, 2006; 
Saxegaard, 2006; Khemraj, 2010).  
 
In a Bank of International Settlement (BIS) paper by McCauley and Zukunft 
(2008) on the economy of Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, it was 
observed that excess liquidity was due to weak credit growth in relation 
                                               
9 Here the currency withdrawal volatility does not refer to ‘capital flight’ but is referring 
to volatility in the depositors’ behaviour in withdrawing their deposits from banks. 
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to domestic deposit growth. They measured this as a ratio of loan to 
deposit.  
 
One important factor that may cause excess liquidity and was used in some 
of the earlier studies was excess savings. Chen (2008) considered five 
indicators of excess liquidity on China. One of the determinants was excess 
savings resulting from the poor social security network. This was supported 
by some other studies where it was observed that one of the causes of 
excess liquidity was the high saving ratio (Gu and Zhang, 2006; Wang, 2006; 
McKinnon, 2006, 2007; Han and Chen, 2007; Roubini, 2007; Xia and Chen, 
2007; Zheng and Yi, 2007). Jiao and Ma (2007), in their study of the excess 
liquidity problem for the economy of China, used a slightly different 
concept of savings where the variable they used was low consumption rate 
paired with high savings rate.  
 
Though Jiao and Ma (2007) studied the excess liquidity problem for the 
economy of China using low consumption rate paired with high savings rate, 
Qing (2006) used only the low consumption spending as an independent 
variable to see its impact on excess liquidity in the economy. He observed 
that low consumer spending resulted in large amounts of funds in the 
banking system and thereby increased liquidity. 
 
Two similar concepts of risks were used in different papers which were 
very similar to each other. These were: the liquidity risk and the credit 
risk. Agenor et al. (2004) used the concept of liquidity risk in their study 
on Thailand while Aikaeli (2006) used credit risk as one of the variables 
and found that credit risks were responsible for accumulation of excess 
liquidity in commercial banks in Tanzania. Changes in the demand for cash 
could be a proxy for this and the authors used the measure of deviation of 
output from trend for it.  
 
Many studies identified different external factors as reasons for excess 
liquidity. Chen (2008), in a study on China, considered foreign exchange 
system as one of the indicators of excess liquidity. This was supported by 
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some other studies where it was observed that one of the causes of excess 
liquidity was the foreign currency exchange system (Gu and Zhang, 2006; 
Wang, 2006; McKinnon, 2006, 2007; Han and Chen, 2007; Roubini, 2007; Xia 
and Chen, 2007; Zheng and Yi, 2007). Khemraj (2006) identified several 
possible determinants of excess liquidity. One of these was unsterilised 
foreign exchange market interventions. He explained that sterilisation 
involved simultaneously selling Treasury bills to mop up the liquidity 
injected when the central bank buys foreign currencies from the foreign 
exchange market. If there was total sterilisation then one could observe a 
sterilisation coefficient of –1 while partial sterilisation was represented by 
a coefficient value of between 0 and –1.  
 
Bakani (2012), in his BIS paper, found that recent increase in foreign 
exchange reserve was the main reason for excess liquidity in Papua New 
Guinea. Jiao and Ma (2007) also observed that the continued growth of 
foreign exchange reserve was one of the reasons for the excess liquidity 
problem for the economy of China. 
 
Another external factor used by authors was export. Jiao and Ma (2007) 
used rapid rise in exports as one of the factors of excess liquidity and found 
that it actually affected the excess liquidity. Similarly, Qing (2006) 
observed that rapid growth of exports and investment could be a factor of 
excess liquidity, especially if the consumption growth was way behind the 
speed of investment and export. 
 
Foreign aid was another external factor which was identified as a probable 
factor leading to excess reserves. Gilmour (2005) argued that a significant 
part of the increase in aid inflows in the early part of this century were 
saved and channeled into excess reserves in Ethiopia. Saxegaard (2006) also 
observed that excess liquidity could be due to variables such as foreign aid 
which could account for the involuntary reserve accumulation in several 
African countries. 
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Saxegaard (2006) mentioned that oil revenues could account for the 
involuntary reserve accumulation. He found it to be true for some of the 
African countries and this view was supported by one of the IMF (2005) 
studies where they reported that in the case of Equatorial Guinea, large oil 
inflows were associated with increase in excess liquidity.  
 
Among other external factors, Bakani (2012) pointed towards the private 
foreign direct investment as one of the reasons for excess liquidity in 
Papua New Guinea while Khemraj (2006) identified remittance as one of 
the possible determinants of excess liquidity as it could cause a build-up of 
deposits (and reserves) as people convert foreign currency into local 
currency. 
 
There was also an indication in the literature that excess liquidity may vary 
during periods of stress relative to normal situations, leading to greater 
asset price volatility during the former and so disrupting liquidity targets 
(Cohen and Shin, 2003).  Morrison (1966) did a study on demand for excess 
reserves in both panic and non-panic periods of banks. He concluded that 
excess reserves were held as a buffer to avoid asset transaction costs 
emanating from unforeseen transitory deposit shocks. This sort of excess 
liquidity could also be interpreted as an insurance against deposit outflows. 
Al-Hamidy (2013) found for the economy of Saudi Arabia that turbulent 
international markets slowed down domestic credit growth and increased 
excess liquidity.  
 
Fielding and Shortland (2005) estimated a time-series model of excess 
liquidity for the Egyptian banking sector and found that though financial 
liberalisation and financial stability were found to have reduced excess 
liquidity, these effects were offset by an increase in the number of violent 
political incidents. They concluded that one of the reasons for excess 
liquidity in Egypt was political instability. 
 
Supply of credit or loan is expected to be related with excess liquidity 
since an increase in the supply of credit from the banking sector should 
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mean that there would be less excess liquidity in the banking sector. Thus 
excess liquidity could be taken as the other side of the coin of credit supply 
and the factors that may affect the supply of credit could also be the 
factors of excess liquidity. In this regard, the study of Andrianova et al. 
(2010) could be helpful. They mentioned moral hazard (strategic loan 
defaults) and adverse selection (lack of good projects) as two of the factors 
that could affect the loan supply. Thus two very similar factors could be 
used to explain the liquidity problem: one related to weak contract 
enforcement and rule of law and the other related to weak and uncertain 
economic growth. As both could lead to loan default, therefore impaired 
loan was included in this analysis to see if these factors actually played any 
role in the excess liquidity problem in Bangladesh. 
 
Business cycle can have an effect on the excess liquidity situation of the 
banks through its effect on lending. During economic boom, it was 
expected that there will be an increase in demand for loans. Moreover, the 
probability of loan default was expected to decrease during this time as a 
result of borrowers doing well during this period. These will make banks 
become softer in lending which may reduce the excess liquidity situation. 
During the bust or economic downturn, banks would become stricter as the 
probability of loan default increased. Moreover, investors also became 
more careful in investing at this time and, and as a result, may end up 
having higher amount of deposit in banks. Therefore, an inverse 
relationship was expected to prevail between business cycle and excess 
liquidity which meant that during the boom period of the business cycle, 
there would be less excess liquidity while during the bust period, excess 
liquidity will be more (Ruckes, 2004).  
 
Although there were many works on business cycle and lending (particularly 
using the bank ownership characteristics), but studies on the relationship 
between business cycle and excess liquidity were very scarce. Most of the 
studies on business cycle and lending were done at cross-country levels. 
From these studies, it was generally observed that different types of banks 
had different lending pattern over the business cycle. 
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Davydov (2013) observed that private banks’ lending pattern was generally 
procyclical. The author observed that when public banks lending was also 
procyclical, they were less procyclical than private banks in most cases. In 
some cases, it was observed that lending of public banks could even be 
counter-cyclical (Bertay et al., 2012). Some of the earlier studies found 
mixed results for different countries or regions (Cull and Peria, 2012) while 
some others did not find any significant difference in lending between 
these two types of banks (Iannotta, et al., 2011). Thus it could be 
concluded from these above mentioned works that the lending behaviour of 
banks according to ownership was not same in all cases and varies where in 
some cases they were procyclical, in some cases they were counter-cyclical 
while in some cases they were acyclical.  
 
This view of dissimilarity in lending according to ownership was also 
supported by various country-level studies. For example, Berger et al. 
(2008) observed it for Argentina, Lin and Zhang (2009) found this for China, 
and Omran (2007) witnessed it for Egypt.  
 
In some cases, it was observed that public banks and private banks were 
almost equally efficient (Beck et al., 2005; Kraft et al., 2006). In another 
study, Micco et al. (2007) observed that this feature of higher efficiency of 
private banks was truer for developing countries than in the developed 
countries. Davydov (2013) stated three possible reasons for the 
comparative inefficiency of the public banks. They were: (i) political 
interference, that deviate them from the profit maximisation aims; (ii) 
incentives structure for managers were weaker than the private banks; and 
(iii) inferior incentives for owners leading to poor monitoring.  
 
However, it may be noted that the idea of comparing public and private 
banks in terms of efficiency or profitability was rather misleading since 
public banks had many other agenda along with the agendum of 
profitability and hence pursuing solely the profit objective was not their 
aim (UNCTAD, 2008). To attain these other objectives, the public banks 
needed to compromise with the objective of profit maximisation to a 
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certain degree and became less profitable than their counterparts. 
Therefore less profitability of public banks did not necessarily imply that 
they were less efficient. 
 
Another interesting and related topic which may also affect the lending 
behaviour of banks was crisis time. The financial crisis and business cycle 
could be closely related due to the fact that if the downturn or recession of 
the business cycle goes on for a long time, it could lead to crisis. This 
reasoning was supported by Bordo et al. (2001): “crises are an intrinsic part 
of the business cycle and result from shocks to economic fundamentals.” 
 
Similar to the difference in bank lending in terms of ownership during 
business cycle, it was also observed that banks lend differently according 
to ownership during crisis time. In different cross-country studies on non-
crisis times, it was commonly found that public banks were less efficient 
and sometime led to lower financial development than private banks (Barth 
et al., 2004; Bonin et al., 2005; Duprey, 2013).10 
 
However, during the recent financial crisis of 2008-09, the public banks 
played a positive role for the economy by generally acting counter-
cyclically (Allen et al., 2013) or less procyclically (Fungacova et al., 2013). 
This was crucial and helped the economy to stabilise as the domestic 
private banks acted procyclically (Kowalewski and Rybinski, 2011; Cull and 
Peria, 2012). This was also true for earlier financial crises in Asia and Latin 
America in the 1990s (Hawkins and Mihaljek, 2001).  
 
Micco and Panizza (2006), in their study of 179 countries, mentioned four 
possible reasons why public banks stabilised credit: (i) public banks do it as 
part of their objectives, (ii) with possibilities of bank failures, people  
generally considered public banks to be a safer place and hence these 
banks  end up having a better deposit base during the crisis which led them 
to a better position for smoothing credit, (iii) public bank managers could 
                                               
10In some cases, it was also observed that this feature of higher efficiency of private banks 
was truer for developing countries than the developed countries.  
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be lazy due to lack of having a proper set of incentives, (iv) in election 
years, politicians could try to influence public bank lending. 
 
Studies on financial crisis and excess liquidity could be broadly divided into 
two categories. One group analysed how excess liquidity acted as one of 
the factors for the financial crisis (Palma, 2009; Acharya and Naqvi, 2012; 
Brana et al., 2012) while the other group discussed how financial crisis 
could affect excess liquidity.  
 
One of the possible effects of financial crisis was that it increased 
uncertainty and riskiness in the economy. This made lending riskier for the 
banks. Therefore, banks lent less and thereby the excess liquidity situation 
increased. For example, Agenor et al. (2004) observed this for Thailand 
while Ashcraft et al. (2011) found it for US. Montoro and Moreno (2011) 
found similar results for Peru. In another study, Murta and Garcia (2010) 
examined excess liquidity for banks in the Euro area.  
 
The most direct empirical study till now, to our knowledge, that examined 
the effect of the recent financial crisis on the excess liquidity situation of 
banking sector was carried out by Pontes and Murta (2012). They studied 
this relationship for the African economy of Cape Verde. Their results 
suggested that the crisis decreased the excess liquidity in the economy. 
The possible reasons included the extreme dependence of the economy on 
the external economy (especially remittance) as well as the 
underdevelopment of the financial markets.  
 
3.3 DETERMINANTS OF LENDING 
Different studies used different sets of explanatory variables. Some of 
them were more common while others were used less frequently across 
studies. The three most common explanatory variables used in the earlier 
studies were: economic growth, interest rate and the lagged dependent 
variable.11 
                                               
11The definition of these variables and their measurement are given in detail in Appendix 
6.1. 
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It was expected that if there was economic growth, there would be higher 
demand for investment and also increased demand for loan. This was 
mainly due to the fact of favourable economic conditions. Therefore, 
economic growth should affect lending positively. This was also observed in 
earlier empirical studies (Cottarelli et al., 2003; Kiss et al., 2006; Kraft, 
2006; Gattin-Turkalj et al., 2007; Brissimis et al., 2014). To capture 
economic growth, real GDP was used in this study.  
 
The rate of interest was another variable that had been frequently used in 
studies of lending. It was expected to have a negative relationship with 
lending since lower interest rate should increase the demand for credit and 
vice versa (Egert et al., 2006). In this study, to capture the effect of 
interest rate, interest rate was taken in real terms, which was calculated 
by deducting the current inflation from the nominal interest rate. This was 
done to reflect the true effect. To convert interest rate into real terms, 
both consumer price index (CPI) and GDP deflator were used.12 
 
Lagged Dependent Variable was also applied in earlier studies. It was 
found to have a positive effect on lending (e.g. Gattin-Turkalj et al., 2007). 
Hence, this variable was included in this study to capture and account for 
the persistence of lending from the earlier period.  
 
Since financial liberalisation took place in most of the economies around 
the 1990s, the impact of this process was part of some of the recent 
studies on lending. As the liberalisation process was initiated at the 
backdrop of the financial repression and was proposed to remove various 
credit restrictions to ensure the free flow of credit, it was expected that 
there will be a positive relationship between liberalisation and lending.  
 
Different bank-specific characteristics could play a role in lending. These 
include bank ownership, size, mode of operation and age.13 Summarily it 
can be said that there could be differences in the lending behaviour of 
                                               
12 Results using the real interest rate using CPI are presented in the main text while that 
using the other measure of real interest rate are given in Appendix 6.3. 
13These characteristics are discussed in detail in Sections 4.3 and 6.2. 
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banks according to these characteristics and it would be interesting and 
worthwhile to see if and how these characteristics significantly differed 
lending of banks.   
 
It was generally believed that the availability of bank lending depends, in 
addition to the traditional factors, on the process of financial 
liberalisation. With the process of liberalisation, banks would be able to 
lend more due to the fact that entry into the banking sector would be 
easier. Furthermore, the expansion of the banking sector would also 
increase the credit supply and reduce the lending rate (Boissay et al., 
2005; de Haas and van Horen, 2010). 
 
However, the process of liberalisation could also increase the interest rate 
volatility and asset prices. This rise in asset and property prices could also 
trigger a temporary unwarranted credit boom (Bandiera et al., 2000). 
Furthermore, competition among banks could increase as a result of the 
liberalisation process which may end up in a situation where banks lend 
imprudently (Caprio et al., 2006). But imprudent lending could be due to 
outright managerial failure also (Honohan, 1997). Therefore, the overall 
impact of financial liberalisation on credit mainly leant towards the fact 
that lending would increase. This positive relationship between 
liberalisation and lending was also supported by earlier empirical works 
(Cottarelli et al., 2003; Gattin-Turkalj et al., 2007)14.  
 
Since it was a continuous and multi-faceted process (Bandiera et al., 2000), 
the results could be misleading if a binary dummy variable was used to 
represent this versatile process. Therefore, to address the process in a 
more comprehensive way, an index of financial liberalisation was used by 
Abiad et al. (2010). Although most studies either used a binary dummy or a 
single indicator of liberalisation, the use of an index to appropriately 
capture the process of liberalisation was not uncommon. For example, 
                                               
14 Although many earlier studies observed that even with the financial liberalisation, credit 
for firms remained a major problem and this was true for many developing countries 
around the world. For a comprehensive survey, see the works of Aryeetey et al. (1997) and 
Nissanke (2001), among others. 
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Cottarelli et al. (2003) also applied a similar index in their study of CEEC 
countries. In this study an index motivated by that of Abiad et al. (2010) 
was used. 
 
The earlier related works on lending could be broadly divided into three 
categories. The first category of these studies investigated the effect of 
financial liberalisation on lending. These were done at an aggregate level 
and not across banks (Boissey et al., 2005; Egert et al., 2006).  
 
The second category of research used some classifications of banking to see 
how they were related to the changes in the monetary policy. For example, 
Lang and Krznar (2004) used the bank characteristics of ownership, 
capitalisation, liquidity and size to see how they differed in their reaction 
to changes in the monetary policy in Croatia. But they did not see how the 
process of financial liberalisation affected lending according to these 
characteristics. 
 
The third category of works, which was analogous to this study, used bank-
level data to see the effect of some other phenomena (than financial 
liberalisation) on lending. For instance, Cull and Peria (2012) used bank-
level data for some countries in Eastern Europe and Latin America but their 
main aim was to see if lending changed along with the process of the 
financial crisis of 2008-09.  
 
There were quite a few studies on European Countries. Among the recent 
cross-country studies on lending, Brzoza-Brzezina (2005) studied the new 
European Union (EU) countries and found that lending generally increased 
across countries. However, the degree differed from country to country 
with Hungary and Poland experiencing a very strong growth as well as 
Ireland and Portugal. Similar observations of differing degree of changes 
were observed by Egert et al. (2006) in their study of 11 Central and East 
European (CEE) countries. They observed that while some countries 
experienced steady growth (e.g. Estonia and Latvia), some others 
experienced growth after initial slowdown (e.g. Hungary and Croatia) while 
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some others experienced almost steady decline (e.g. Czech Republic and 
Bulgaria).  
 
For example, Calza et al. (2001) studied the lending pattern of the Euro 
area while Cottarelli et al. (2003) studied the Central and East European 
Countries (CEEC). They observed that although lending as a ratio of GDP 
increased in most of the countries (e.g. Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland and 
Slovania) but it declined for some other countries (e.g. Czech Republic, 
Slovak Republic and Macedonia). This sort of mixed findings was also 
supported by, among others, Schadler et al. (2004) and Kiss et al. (2006). In 
another work by IMF (2004) on some of the European countries, excessive 
growth in credit was recognised. It was observed that Bulgaria, Romania 
and Ukraine experienced very high credit growth. The paper observed that 
although increase in lending was a good sign but excessive credit growth 
could be a matter of concern. 
 
In a study of 16 industrialised countries across regions, Hofmann (2001) 
observed that credit as a ratio of GDP increased in most of the countries. 
The author also observed that growth in credit and economic growth moved 
very closely with each other, supporting procyclicality of financial 
development. In another IMF (2004) study, it was observed that although 
lending increased across countries and regions, it increased more in 
Southeast Asian countries.   
 
The analysis of the effect of the liberalisation process on lending pattern in 
Bangladesh started almost immediately after the liberalisation process 
started in this country. Khan (1993) observed that banks were not able to 
allocate credit efficiently, mainly due to the problem of imperfect 
information. However, he also pointed out that it “might be too early to 
determine the benefit of the liberalisation.” In another study, Ahmed 
(1995) observed mixed implications of the liberalisation on the banking 
sector in Bangladesh. Khan et al. (2011) observed that lending in 
Bangladesh increased for all the banks since the financial liberalisation 
started. They examined lending by traditional categories of banking data as 
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was generally available in Bangladesh. According to this, the scheduled 
banks were classified into SCBs, DFIs, PCBs and FCBs. They also analysed 
lending according to sectors and found that loans were gradually moving 
from agriculture towards industrial sector.  
 
One important point to note was that almost all studies on Bangladesh 
were either done at an aggregate level or when they were done at a 
disaggregated level, the banks were classified into the earlier mentioned 
categories of SCBs, DFI, PCBs and FCBs. This was done possibly because of 
easier data availability as the data were available in this format. However, 
these studies missed out the possible effects of different bank-specific 
characteristics which may have an impact on the lending behaviour of 
banks. Therefore, to investigate if these characteristics significantly (or 
insignificantly) affected lending of banks, it was crucially important to 
include these characteristics and study them accordingly. This was 
attempted in this bank-level study for the banks in Bangladesh.  
 
3.4 METHODOLOGY 
In this section, some of the methodologies applied in earlier studies on 
excess liquidity and lending are discussed. In the first part, the works on 
excess liquidity are discussed followed by studies on lending in the second 
part. Furthermore, some of the important equations in the earlier studies 
on excess liquidity and lending are described in the appendix of this 
chapter.  
 
Various estimation methods were employed by different authors in their 
works. Most of them used system GMM (generalised method of moments) 
for its overall superiority over other panel estimators. However, different 
other methods were also applied by some authors. The methods used in 
these studies and their rationale are briefly described in the following 
paragraphs.   
 
When the country-specific studies were considered, it was found that 
different methods were used in different studies. Lin et al. (2012) used the 
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GMM method for Japan in their study of lending and financial crisis. 
According to them, the reason for using the Arrellano-Bond (1991) GMM 
estimator was that it allowed for more flexibility in specifying which 
variables were to be taken as endogenous or truly exogenous and to assign 
appropriate instruments to endogenous variables. Moreover, the qualities 
of all the designations could be tested by different standard tests and it 
could be evaluated whether the variables of interest were independent of 
the error term. The Arrellano-Bond (1991) method also enabled to take into 
account the possible autocorrelation in the dependent variables. 
 
Fungacova et al. (2013) used the maximum likelihood (ML) estimation 
method to see the relationship between lending and financial crisis in 
Russia for the stochastic frontier model. According to them, this method 
helped in capturing the time dimensionality by estimating the model in a 
series of pooled cross-sections, rather than a panel, because it was 
important that all model parameters, including residual distributions, could 
change over time.  
 
To investigate if bank ownership exerted an impact on credit supply during 
the financial crisis, they added dummy variables for state ownership and 
foreign ownership to the frontier model as these variables were always 
viewed relative to domestic private ownership. Further, they included 
interaction between ownership and time dummy variables for each quarter 
of the sample period. Moreover, they also stated that the respective 
parameters of the time variable effects of state and foreign ownership 
indicated the difference in the change of the proportionality factor of 
state-controlled and foreign banks relative to private banks in time.  
 
Two-step Generalised Method of Moments was applied by Chen and Liu 
(2013) for Taiwan in their study of lending and political consideration. They 
used it because their econometric methodology depended crucially on the 
validity of the instruments, which could be evaluated with Sargan's test of 
overidentifying restrictions. Another advantage of this was that it addresses 
the problem of potential endogeneity when instruments were lagged values 
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of the dependent variable in levels and in differences, and lagged values of 
other regressors (that could potentially suffer from endogeneity). 
 
They also stated that the dynamic panel model technique, the GMM model, 
was particularly well-suited to handling short macro panels with 
endogenous variables and was also helpful in amending the bias induced by 
omitted variables in cross-sectional estimates and the inconsistency caused 
by endogeneity. The dynamic GMM technique also allowed controlling for 
the endogeneity bias induced by reverse causality running from dependent 
variable to political effects and other explanatory variables.  
 
Pontes and Murta (2012) used two-stage least squares (2SLS) method along 
with tests of unit root and cointegration to see how the financial crisis 
affected the excess liquidity situation in Cape Verde. Their reasoning was 
that several empirical studies (e.g. Saxegaard, 2006) have recognised the 
presence of endogeneity of the majority of the explanatory variables. In 
this type of scenario, the ordinary least squares (OLS) method was not 
adequate. Therefore they used the 2SLS method.  
 
Akinboade and Makina (2009) used vector autoregressive (VAR) method in 
their study on South Africa on business cycle and lending because the VAR 
methodology allowed all variables to be endogenously determined and had 
the advantage of fully capturing the interactions between banking sector 
specific and macroeconomic variables. 
 
Among the cross-country studies for example, Allen et al. (2013) used 
system GMM panel estimator in addition to fixed effects (FE) and random 
effects (RE) in their study on differences in lending according to ownership 
in times of crisis for central and eastern European countries. They used 
system GMM to avoid any possible inconsistency due to the potential 
correlation between the lagged dependent variable and panel level effects.  
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Duprey (2013) used fixed effects method first and then for robustness 
applied system GMM methodology in his study on 93 countries of 459 banks 
for the period of 1990 to 2010. Bertay et al. (2012) also used two-step GMM 
estimation and the Windmeijer (2005) correction in their study for the 
period 1999 to 2010 on 1633 banks of 111 countries, to control for the 
possible endogeneity problem of GDP growth.  
 
Ferri et al. (2013) used the Arellano-Bond type difference GMM estimator 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991) in their study on the European countries for the 
period 1999-2011. They used Arellano-Bond type difference GMM estimator 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991) because of the lagged dependent variable and 
heteroscedasticity present in the data. According to them, the Arellano-
Bond type difference GMM estimator ensured efficiency and consistency of 
their estimates provided that instruments were adequately chosen. They 
employed the Hansen test (1982) to examine the validity of the 
instruments. The Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions had the null 
hypothesis that instruments were exogenous. A rejection of this null 
hypothesis implied that the instruments were not satisfying the 
orthogonality conditions required for their employment. A further test was 
the Arellano-Bond tests of autocorrelation of errors, with a null hypothesis 
no autocorrelation in differenced residuals. Specifically, the second order 
test, AR(2) was more relevant and would be better if the null hypothesis 
was rejected.  
 
Similarly, the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions and the Arellano-
Bond test for error autocorrelation were applied by Bertay et al. (2012) and 
Ferri et al. (2013) while Allen et al. (2013) used the Sargan test along with 
the Arellano-Bond test for error autocorrelation. 
 
 
 
  
76 
 
APPENDIX 3.1: Some key estimated equations 
Some key estimated equations on excess liquidity 
In this small space, it is very difficult to include all the estimated equations 
from previous studies. However, some of the key equations on excess 
liquidity and lending are stated in the following pages.  
  
Among the studies on excess liquidity, Agenor et al. (2004) used the 
following equation: 
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Here, excess liquidity was the dependent variable. The explanatory 
variables included the required reserve, cash to deposit ratio, discount rate 
and deviation of output from trend.  
 
In another study on excess liquidity, Aikaeli (2011) estimated the equation 
below: 
ܮܼ = ߙ + ߚଵܮܺଵ + ߚଶܮܺଶ + ߚଷܮܺଷ + ߚସܮܺସ + ݒ௧ 
Here, the explanatory variables were required reserve, cash trend 
deviation, borrowing rate and loans return deviation.  
 
Fielding and Shortland (2005), in their study on Egypt, utilised the 
subsequent equation: 
∆ ln(ܴ)௧ = ߚ଴ + ∅. ݐ + ߠ. ܴܧܨܱܴܯ௧
+ ෍ ߚ௜ . ∆ ln(ܴ)௧ି௜
௜ୀ்ோ
௜ୀଵ
+ ෍ ߛ௜ . ln(ܻ)௧ି௜ +
௜ୀ்௦
௜ୀ଴
෍ ߜ௜. ∆ ln(ܾ)௧ି௜ +
௜ୀ்௕
௜ୀ଴
෍ ߦ௜ . ∆ݎ௧ି௜
௜ୀ்௥
௜ୀ଴
+ ෍ ߟ௜ . ∆ ln(ݒ)௧ି௜ + ߚ
∗. ∆ ln(ܴ)௧ି௜
௜ୀ்௩
௜ୀ଴
+ ߛ∗. ln(ܻ)௧ିଵ + ߟ
∗. ln(ݒ)௧ିଵ
+ ߝ௧  
Where, the logarithm of the reserve assets ratio, ln(ܴ), depended on the 
following variables of ܴܧܨܱܴܯ, ln(ݕ) , ܦ ln(ܾ) , ݎ and ln(ݒ). Here, ܴܧܨܱܴܯ 
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was a dummy for the post-reform period (1991 onwards), ln(ݕ)was the 
logarithm of real GDP, ܦ ln(ܾ)  was the rate of parallel exchange rate 
depreciation, ݎ was the central bank discount rate and ln(ݒ) was the index 
of political violence.  
 
In a study on the economy of Thailand, Saxegaard (2006) applied the 
following two regressions:  
ܺଵ = {ܴܴ, ܸܱܮ௒ , ܸܱܮ஼஽ ܸܱܮ௉ௌ , ܸܱܮீை௏ , ܱܴܲܶ, ܻ, ݎ஽} 
ܺଶ = {ܦܧ ௉ܲௌ , ܦܧܲீ , ܥܴܧܦ௉ௌ, ܥܴܧܦீ , ܤܱܰܦ, ܣܫܦ, ܱܫܮ, ܱܲܫܮ, ݎ௅} 
In this study, the independent variables included required reserve, 
standard deviation (SD) of output gap, SD of cash-deposit ratio, discount 
rate, output gap, private credit and government credit.  
 
In a separate study by Khemraj (2006), the equation applied was as follows: 
݁ݎ௧ = ∝଴  +  ෍ ∝௜ ݂ݔ௧ି௜
௡
௜ୀ଴
+ ෍ ∝௝ ∆݅ݎ௧ି௝
௣
௝ୀ଴
+  ෍ ∝௞ ݒ݋݈݂݁ݎ௧ି௞
௤
௞ୀ଴
+ ෍ ∝௟ ݁ݎ௧ି௟
௠
௟ୀଵ
+  ߝ௧ 
Here, the dependent variable was excess reserve (denoted by ݁ݎ). The 
explanatory variables were foreign exchange market surplus or deficit (݂ݔ), 
the change in the level of the central bank’s international reserves (∆݅ݎ) 
and the volatility of the Guyana dollar-US dollar nominal exchange rate 
(ݒ݋݈݂݁ݎ). 
 
Pontes and Murta (2012) applied the following equation: 
ܧܮ௧ = ߙଵ + ߙଶܴ஽௧ + +ߙଷܸܱܮ௉ௌ௧ + ߙସܸܱܮ஼௧ + ߙହܦܧ ௉ܲௌ௧ + ߙ଺ܦܧܲீ ை௏௧
+ ߙ଻ܥܴܧܦ௧ + ߙ଼ܤܱܰܦீை௏௧ + ߙଽܫܴ௧ + ߙଵ଴ܥܴܫܵܫܵ௧ 
Where, the dependent variable ܧܮ was the ratio between excess reserves 
and bank’s total assets. The exogenous variables represented the 
precautionary and involuntary factors.  
 
Bank of Cape Verde’s (BCV’s) lending rate was given by ܴ஽. To include the 
role of uncertainty, deposit volatility was used and was computed as the 
moving average of the standard deviation of private sector deposits divided 
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by the moving average of this variable, ܸܱܮ௉ௌ. The variable ܸܱܮ஼  was the 
indicator of the volatility of the preference of the public by currency in 
circulation and was equal to the moving average of the SD of the ratio 
currency in circulation/deposits divided by moving average of this ratio. 
 
Some key estimated equations on lending 
In the study on business cycle, Duprey (2013) used the following equation: 
݃ܮ݋ܽ݊௜,௧ = ߚଵ ∗ ܯܽܿݎ݋ܵℎ݋ܿ݇௖,௧ + ߚଶ ∗ ܯܽܿݎ݋ܵℎ݋ܿ݇௖,௧ ∗ ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ௜ + ߚଷ ∗ ܲݑܾ݈݅ ௜ܿ
+ ߚସ ∗ ܯܽܿݎ݋ܵℎ݋ܿ݇௖,௧ ∗ ܨ݋ݎ݁݅݃݊௜ + ߚହ ∗ ܨ݋ݎ݁݅݃݊௜ + ߚ଺ ∗ ௜ܺ ௖,௧ିଵ⁄
+ ݒ௜,௧ 
Where, ݅ stood for bank, ݐ for year and ܿ for country. Public (resp. Foreign) 
was a dummy variable which took 1 if the bank was considered as public 
(resp. foreign).  
 
In antoher study, Cull and Peria (2012) applied the following similar 
equation: 
∆ܮ௜,௧,௝ = ܨ݋ݎ݁݅݃݊௜,௧,௝ + ܩ݋ݒ݁ݎ݊݉݁݊ݐ௜,௧,௝ + ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ_2008௜,௧,௝ + ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ_2009௜,௧,௝
+ ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ_2008௜,௧,௝ × ܨ݋ݎ݁݅݃݊௜,௧,௝
+ ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ_2008௜,௧,௝ × ܩ݋ݒ݁ݎ݊݉݁݊ݐ௜,௧,௝
+ ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ_2009௜,௧,௝ × ܨ݋ݎ݁݅݃݊௜,௧,௝
+ ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ_2009௜,௧,௝ × ܩ݋ݒ݁ݎ݊݉݁݊ݐ௜,௧,௝ + ௜ܺ,௧,௝ + ߙ௝ + ݑ௜,௧,௝ 
Where, ∆ܮ௜,௧,௝ was the growth of total gross loans (or of corporate, 
consumer, or residential mortgage loans) for bank ݅ at time ݐ in country ݆. 
 
Iannotta et al. (2011), in their study on some of the European banks, 
estimated the following OLS regression: 
ܮܱܣܰܵܥܪܩ௜,௧ = ݂൫ܧܮܧܥܶܫܱ ௜ܰ,௧ , ܩ݋ ௜ܾ,௧
× ܧܮܧܥܶܫܱ ௜ܰ,௧ , ܩܦܲܥܩܪ௜,௧ , ܣܥܥܱܷܰܶܫܰܩ௜,௧ିଵ) + ߝ௜,௧ 
Here, ܮܱܣܰܵܥܪܩ – the dependent variable – was the change in bank ݅’s 
total loans in year ݐ, normalised by total assets from the previous year, 
that was (ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽܮ݋ܽ݊ݏ௧ − ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽܮ݋ܽ݊ݏ௧ିଵ. Annual GDP growth rate (ܩܦܲܥܪܩ) 
was to control for demand-side effects on loans. ܣܿܿ݋ݑ݊ݐ݅݊݃  was a set of 
bank-specific variables reflecting factors that affect a bank’s loans growth, 
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namely, (i) ܵܫܼܧ௧ିଵ, the log of total assets as of year ݐ − 1; (ii) ܮܱܣܰܵ௧ିଵ, 
the ratio of loans to total earning assets as of year ݐ −  1, (iii)ܦܧܱܲܵܫܶܵ௧ିଵ, 
the ratio of retail deposits to total funding as of year ݐ − 1  and 
(iv)CAPITAL௧ିଵ, total equity divided by total assets as of year ݐ − 1. Lagged 
values for all four variables were used in this study to avoid endogeneity 
problems. 
 
Micco et al. (2006) used the following equation to examine whether 
elections affected the relationship of bank ownership and performance: 
ܲܧܴܨ௜,௝,௧ = ߟ௝,௧ + ܷܲܤ௜,௝,௧൫∝ଵ+∝ଶ ܩܴܱܹܶܪ௝,௧ +∝ଷ ܧܮܧܥ ௝ܶ,௧൯
+ ܨܱܴ௜,௝,௧൫ߚଵ + ߚଶܩܴܱܹܶܪ௝,௧൯ + ܺ௜,௝,௧ߛ , + ߝ௜,௝,௧ 
Where, ܩܴܱܹܶܪ௝,௧  was a variable that measured real GDP growth in 
country ݆ and year ݐ and ܧܮܧܥ ୨ܶ,୲ was a dummy variable that took value of 
1 when country ݆  was in an election year and 0 otherwise (presidential 
elections and legislative elections in countries with parliamentary systems). 
 
Brzoza-Brzezina (2005) used the following equation: 
݈௧ − ߚ଴ − ߚଵݕ௧ − ߚଶݎ௧ = 0 
Where ݈ stood for the log of real loans, ݕ for the log of real GDP and ݎ for 
the real rate of interest. 
 
Calza et al. (2001) used the following regression: 
(݈݋ܽ݊ݏ − ݌)௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ. ݕ௧ + ߚଶ. ܴ௧ + ߚଷ. ߨ௧ 
where loans, ݌ and ݕ in the above equation respectively denoted logs of 
nominal loans to the private sector, the GDP deflator and real GDP; the 
nominal composite lending rate was represented by ܴ while ߨ stood for the 
annualised quarterly inflation rate and was equivalent to ߂݌ ∗ 4. Loans to 
private sector were deflated by the GDP deflator. This was done to address 
the theoretically plausible hypothesis where it was expected that nominal 
loans were homogeneous with respect to prices in the long-run. 
 
Egert et al. (2006) used the following equation: 
ܥ௉ = ݂(ܥܣܲܫܶܣ, ܥீ , ݅௟௘௡ௗ௜௡௚ , ݌௉௉ூ , ݏ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀) 
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In this equation, ܥ௉ was bank credit to the private sector expressed as a 
share of GDP. Robustness of the variables included in the equation was 
affected by the use of alternative measures often used in the literature 
(e.g. replacing GDP per capita by real GDP growth or long-term lending 
rates by short-term lending rates). These alternative variables were 
subsequently introduced one by one in the baseline specification.  
 
Cottarelli et al. (2003) used the following equation:  
ܤܥܲ ௜ܵ௧ = ߙ଴ + ߙଵ ∗ ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿܦܾ݁ݐ ௜ܻ௧ + ߙଶ ∗ ܮ݋݃(ܩܦܲܲܥ)௜௧ + ߙଷ ∗ (1 − ܪ݅݃ℎܫ݂݈݊)
∗ ൬
1
ܫ݂݈݊ܶℎݎ݁ݏℎ݋݈݀
൰ + ߙସ ∗ ܪ݅݃ℎܫ݂݈݊ ∗ ൬
1
ܫ݂݈݊௜௧
−
1
ܫ݂݈݊ܶℎݎ݁ݏℎ݋݈݀
൰
+ ߙହ ∗ ܮܾ݅ܫ݊݀݁ݔ௜௧ + ߙ଺ ∗ ܣܿܿ݋ݑ݊ݐ݅݊ ௜݃ + ߙ଻ ∗ ܧ݊ݐݎݕܴ݁ݏݐݎ݅ܿݐ݅݋݊ݏ௜
+ ߙ଼ ∗ ܩ݁ݎ݉ܽ݊ܮ݈ܱ݁݃ܽݎ݅݃݅݊௜ + ℇ௜௧ 
Here, ܤܥܲ ௜ܵ௧ was bank credit to the private sector as a ratio to GDP. In this 
paper, the RE estimator was preferred to the FE estimator as Hausman 
specification test did not reject the hypothesis of no correlation between 
the errors and the regressor.15 
 
Kiss et al. (2006) applied the following regression: 
∆ܿ௜௧ = ∅௜൫ܿ௜,௧ିଵ − ܿ௜̅,௧ିଵ൯ + ෍ ߛ௜௝∆ܿ௜,௧ି௝
௠ିଵ
௝ୀଵ
+ ෍ ߜ௜௝∆ ௜݂,௧ି௝ + ߙ௜ + ݑ௜௧
௡ିଵ
௝ୀ଴
 
ܿ௜̅௧ = ߚ′ ௜݂௧ 
where ܿ and ܿ̅  stand for the actual and equilibrium credit/GDP ratio, 
respectively, ݂ was the vector of explanatory variables and ߙ௜ was an 
unexplained country-specific effect which could correlate with the other 
explanatory variables. The sign of ߶ was expected to be negative, meaning 
that lower than equilibrium credit stock induces credit growth in the next 
period. 
 
 
  
                                               
15 See pp. 57-59 of Cottarelli et al. (2003) for further details.  
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APPENDIX 3.2: Summative table of some of the key findings 
 
Table 3A.1: Summative table of some of the key findings 
Authors Country Dependent 
Variable 
Explanatory Variables 
Khemraj 
(2006)  
Guyana Excess 
reserve 
fx, Δir and ert-1 (one period lag of er) 
were significant while volfer was not 
significant. 
Agenor et 
al. (2004) 
 
Thailand Excess 
liquidity 
ln(RR/D) had a negative impact, the 
volatility of ln(C/D), tended to 
increase, the volatility of Y/YT, was 
showing mixed results, the cyclical 
component of output, as measured by 
ln(Y/YT), had a positive effect on the 
demand for excess liquid assets in all 
three regressions; the effect of an 
increase in the penalty rate, r, was to 
increase ln(EL/D) in the first and third 
cases; when the Hodrick–Prescott filter 
was used, the penalty rate had a 
perverse effect. The foreign exposure 
variable had the expected sign in the 
first two regressions. Finally, the 
effect of lagged EL/D was significant. 
Aikaeli 
(2006) 
Tanzania Excess 
liquidity 
In the long-run, a rise in the rate of 
required reserves (x1) by 1 per cent 
lowered excess liquidity by about 6 
per cent, while one per cent surge in 
volatility of cash preference (x2), the 
bank borrowing rate (x3) and variations 
of loans return (x4) increased excess 
liquidity respectively by about 9 per 
cent, 0.2 per cent and 1.1 per cent. 
Saxegaard 
(2006) 
CEMAC 
countries 
Excess 
liquidity 
Surprisingly, increasing volatility of 
government deposits appeared to 
lower excess liquidity. This result 
proved to be remarkably robust across 
different specifications and to changes 
in the sample period. Not only was this 
counterintuitive, but also contrary to 
statements made by officials at the 
regional central bank regarding the 
cause for the increase in excess 
reserves in the CEMAC region. 
Increases in private sector and 
government deposits both appeared to 
increase excess reserves whereas 
increase in credit to the private sector 
and the public sector lowered excess 
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Authors Country Dependent 
Variable 
Explanatory Variables 
liquidity. There was a significant 
positive effect on excess liquidity from 
increases in the aid to GDP ratio. 
Surprisingly, however, there was no 
direct effect from changes in the oil 
price. 
Saxegaard 
(2006) 
Nigeria Excess 
liquidity 
Increase in the required reserve ratio 
was predicted to reduce excess 
reserves. Furthermore, the estimated 
model predicted that banks would 
demand more excess liquidity if the 
ratio of demand deposits to time and 
saving deposits increased. Finally, the 
liquidity risk, measured by the 
volatility of the cash to deposit ratio, 
led to an increase in demand for 
excess reserves. A net increase in 
government deposits had the effect of 
raising excess liquidity. An increase in 
the lending rate reduced the demand 
for loans in the private sector and 
leads to an increase in excess 
liquidity. Finally, the increases in the 
ratio of oil exports to GDP were 
important for the build-up of 
involuntary excess liquidity. 
Saxegaard 
(2006) 
Uganda Excess 
liquidity 
Volatility in the output gap was 
important although this was wrongly 
signed, relative to prior beliefs. 
Government deposits and lending to 
the government were important 
determinants. Also observed a 
significant effect from lending to the 
private sector. 
Pontes 
and Murta 
(2012)  
Cape 
Verde 
Excess 
liquidity 
Credit, government bond, 
international reserve and the financial 
crisis had significant impact while 
some other important variables (e.g. 
required reserve, deposit volatility and 
deposits of both sectors were found to 
be insignificant).  
Cottarelli 
et al. 
(2003) 
CEEC and 
Balkans 
Lending Economic growth was positively 
related while interest rate was found 
negative. The liberalisation index was 
found to be positively related while 
inflation value, although significant, 
was almost zero.  
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Authors Country Dependent 
Variable 
Explanatory Variables 
Kiss et al. 
(2006) 
CEEC 
countries 
Lending In this study, economic growth was 
found to be positively related (1 per 
cent increase in PPP-based per capita 
GDP leading to a 0.5 per cent increase 
in the credit/GDP ratio). Moreover, 
real interest rate (RIR) and inflation 
(CPI) were negatively related with 
lending (where 1 percentage point 
decreased the credit/GDP ratio by 
around 2 per cent. 
Gattin-
Turkalj et 
al. (2007) 
Croatia Lending It was observed from this study that 
economic growth was positively 
related while interest rate was 
negatively related. However, the 
coefficients were slightly higher than 
most of the studies which could be due 
to the nature of the data (as the 
growth rates were yearly rather than 
quarterly).  
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CHAPTER 4 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION AND 
EXCESS LIQUIDITY AT BANK-LEVEL 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Although there was no specific study on the relationship between financial 
liberalisation and excess liquidity at bank-level according to our 
knowledge, there were many works on excess liquidity at an aggregate 
level. These were discussed earlier in detail in Chapter 3. From all these 
works, it could be observed that these countries were still experiencing 
significant amount of excess liquidity and it remained one of the focal 
problems for most, if not all, of these developing economies. 
 
To have an idea about the excess liquidity situation in Bangladesh, data of 
nominal excess liquidity, real excess liquidity and excess liquidity as a 
percentage of required liquid assets are given in Table 4.116. It could be 
observed from the table that excess liquidity in nominal terms has 
increased substantially. Since increase in the nominal excess liquidity could 
in some part be attributed to inflation, therefore, excess liquidity data was 
also provided in real terms. This helped in seeing the actual change and 
trend of excess liquidity free from the effect of inflation. It could be seen 
that real excess liquidity also increased over time.  
 
Excess liquidity as a percentage of the required liquid assets (statutory 
liquidity ratio, SLR) provided the relative excess liquidity situation for the 
period of 1987-2011. The continuous overall increase of this ratio implied 
that the rise in excess liquidity was not due to increase in the number of 
banks or the number of branches because when the number of branches 
increase then the amount of deposits also increase. As a result of which the 
total amount of excess liquidity in the country might increase in absolute 
terms. But when excess liquidity is taken as a ratio of required reserve, 
then it will truly show the condition and trend of excess liquidity after 
                                               
16 This was also provided earlier graphically in Figure 2.6. 
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nullifying the effects of bank, branch or deposit increase. Increase in all 
these types of excess liquidity justified the need for an overall analysis of 
this increasing trend of excess liquidity in Bangladesh. This study aimed at 
identifying factors which caused excess liquidity to increase even after the 
financial liberalisation. 
 
Table 4.1: Nominal EL, real EL and EL-SLR ratio in Bangladesh 
Year 
 
EL in nominal term 
(in billion taka) 
EL in real term 
(in billion taka) 
EL as a % of SLR 
1987 8.60 18.71 34.40 
1988 4.75 9.67 12.69 
1989 2.36 4.43 5.40 
1990 1.08 1.92 2.23 
1991 3.50 5.83 6.85 
1992 8.43 13.63 16.42 
1993 7.01 11.30 12.25 
1994 23.93 37.18 37.00 
1995 17.23 24.94 24.78 
1996 13.32 18.49 16.63 
1997 17.09 23.02 19.24 
1998 19.73 25.24 20.24 
1999 33.35 40.77 31.84 
2000 53.44 64.14 42.77 
2001 44.62 52.72 30.96 
2002 65.87 75.42 40.56 
2003 79.71 87.31 42.66 
2004 117.54 123.51 69.40 
2005 109.42 109.42 55.74 
2006 95.91 91.20 37.53 
2007 142.79 127.14 46.72 
2008 129.89 106.31 36.70 
2009 347.62 267.09 81.66 
2010 344.99 248.96 65.47 
2011 340.71 231.22 51.24 
Sources: Bangladesh Bank Annual Reports, various issues. 
The nominal excess liquidity data were deflated with the GDP deflator (which was taken 
from IFS Annual Series, June 2012) and then multiplied by 100 to obtain the series of real 
excess liquidity. The base year is 2005. 
 
4.2 MOTIVATION OF THIS CHAPTER 
4.2.1 How Financial Liberalisation Can Reduce the Problem of Excess 
Liquidity 
As described in Section 1.1, it could be observed that one of the main aims 
of the financial liberalisation was to increase the banking sector 
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competition. For this, these countries needed to deregulate interest rates, 
privatise and liberalise bank licensing in order to increase competition, 
lower the reserve requirements and dismantle any credit allocation 
schemes (Goldsmith, 1969; McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). Moreover, 
judicious private bankers, without the constraints of credit controls, would 
allocate funds to the most productive users. These two together would lead 
banks to lend more. Banks’ ability to give more credit would also imply 
that there would be less liquidity in the banking sectors. In other words, 
the financial liberalisation should substantially reduce the excess liquidity 
situation.  
 
4.2.2 Why Financial Liberalisation May Not Reduce the Problem of 
Excess Liquidity and Rather Increase It 
It needs to be taken into account that the process of financial liberalisation 
was not an isolated process or phenomenon but it rather came with many 
policies which have their own implications. It was observed by different 
studies that the process of financial liberalisation could make an economy 
more fragile and vulnerable because of its related policies. This fragility 
and vulnerability could also lead to possible banking crises if the 
institutions were not very strong (Detragiache and Demirguc-Kunt, 1998). 
Authors also found that the risk in the banking system increased after 
financial liberalisation (Fischer and Chenard, 1997). These could make the 
economy less stable and banks may feel more uncertain. If banks were not 
good at risk management in a more risky environment after the beginning 
of financial liberalisation, then they might not lend enough. For a similar 
reason, banks might also decide to keep their money in government bills 
and bonds as they were risk-free and in most cases had reasonably high 
rates of return. Banks also take note of the fact that due to the removal of 
the ceiling of the interest rate (and an increase in the rate thereby), safer 
borrowers apply less for loans and were replaced by the high-risk borrowers 
(Blanchard and Fischer, 1989). This either led banks to lend to “projects 
with lower probabilities of success but higher payoffs when successful” 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) or banks might decide not to go for lending for 
these risky projects and might end up having higher excess liquidity.  
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4.2.3 Stages and Sequencing of Financial Liberalisation 
It was also found that the effect of the financial liberalisation can have 
different impact on different countries depending on the stage of 
liberalisation (Bandiera et al., 2000). This is due to the fact that financial 
liberalisation is a continuous process and a country at its early stage may 
not have the same impact like a country that is at an advanced stage of the 
liberalisation.  
 
Sequencing of financial liberalisation can play a vital role in achieving the 
objectives of financial liberalisation. Moreover, institutional strength was 
critically important for the success of it. Caprio et al. (2006) mentioned, 
“institutional strengthening now widely accepted as being the pre-requisite 
of a successful liberalised financial sector.” If an economy was structurally 
weak then it was difficult to reap the benefits of financial liberalisation.  
 
4.2.4 Importance of Bank-level Study 
Another important contribution of this study was to see the relationship of 
excess liquidity and financial liberalisation using various bank-specific 
characteristics. While most of the studies on excess liquidity problem were 
done on a specific country at an aggregate level (e.g. Agenor et al., 2004; 
Fielding and Shortland, 2005; Chen, 2008; Zhang, 2009; Yang, 2010; 
Aikaeli, 2011), very few examined this at a cross-country level. Most of 
cross-country studies were done on Africa (Saxegaard, 2006; Khemraj, 
2010).  
 
According to our knowledge, there was no study on excess liquidity and 
financial liberalisation at bank-level. In this respect, a study at bank-level 
could provide important findings for the persistent excess liquidity. Bank-
level study could shed important light on how banks behaved in terms of 
excess liquidity at bank-level. The bank-level study allowed us to look for 
differences according to different typology of banks. Hence the evolving 
pattern of excess liquidity with the process of financial liberalisation could 
be seen more specifically for these different typologies.  
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The banks in Bangladesh have diverse characteristics and on the basis of 
various criteria, could be classified into different groups. Based on the 
existing literature, banks were classified according to ownership (whether 
owned by the government or privately), size (if they were large or small), 
mode of operation (whether Islamic or conventional/otherwise) and age 
(whether new or old). Using data at bank-level, this study attempted to 
investigate if banks behaved differently in terms of excess liquidity 
according to these characteristics17.  
 
This approach could shed important light on the behavioural and 
operational characteristics and effectiveness of the different types of 
banking system within a same country and how they adapted and 
benefitted from financial liberalisation. Antwi-Asare and Addison (2000) 
observed that bank-specific indicators could be important in showing the 
different effects of bank performance. These differences among them 
could have different effects of the financial liberalisation.  
 
It was generally observed that private banks were more efficient than 
public banks. In a study on Pakistan, the authors used the group-wise 
efficiency and found that as a group, the private domestic banks had 90.5 
per cent efficiency while the nationalised commercial banks had 70.5 per 
cent (Abbas and Malik, 2010). In another study on Ghana, it was found that 
the state-run banks were not prepared to take as much risk when lending 
as the private banks (Antwi-Asare and Addison, 2000). The authors 
observed that the performances of the private banks were higher than the 
state-owned banks in terms of profitability, intermediation and operations. 
However, the above view was not always found to be true. Das and Drine 
(2011) found that public sector banks were more efficient than the 
domestic private banks in India. 
 
                                               
17 In this study, the foreign commercial banks could not be included due to lack of bank-
level data for foreign banks operating in Bangladesh. Bureau van Dijk – producer of the 
Bankscope database, which is one of the most comprehensive database of banks operating 
throughout the world and is the main source of data for this study – was contacted directly 
but they confirmed that they did not have data at bank-level for foreign banks in 
Bangladesh. 
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Generally it was seen that new banks performed better in times of financial 
liberalisation. One possible reason, mentioned by Kraft and Tirtiroglu 
(1998), was that since they were not held back by overstaffing or bad loans. 
However, the empirical results did not always support this view and in 
some cases it was found that old banks performed better than the new 
banks. One possible explanation could be their advantage in terms of size 
and experience, helping them to work nearer to efficient scale and at a 
comparable or better level of managerial efficiency than the new banks 
(Kraft and Tirtiroglu, 1998). 
 
The possible effect of financial liberalisation on Islamic banking was still 
ambiguous. On one hand, there was perception that Islamic banks could not 
take full advantage of the financial liberalisation as they were 
comparatively small, narrow in focus and mostly vulnerable to financial 
shocks. On the other hand, it was also believed that Islamic banks were 
able to cope better with the vulnerability and the fragility caused by the 
financial liberalisation. So, whether financial liberalisation had a positive 
effect on Islamic banking remained inconclusive (Bashir, 2007).  
 
Inability to reach a definitive conclusion was also evident when the possible 
effect of financial liberalisation on bank size was analysed in the literature. 
Some argued that large banks performed better in times of financial 
liberalisation (Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Yildirim, 2002; Andries and 
Capraru, 2013). The main possible reason for this was the market power of 
‘larger banks’ and their ability to diversify credit risk in an uncertain 
macroeconomic environment (Yildirim, 2002). Nevertheless, some others 
had observed that smaller banks were more efficient than the larger ones 
(Leong and Dollery, 2002). This “could be due to their higher flexibility, 
which allowed them to adapt to changes in the banking industry brought 
about by the financial liberalisation programme” (Ataullah et al., 2004).   
 
Therefore, it would be interesting to see if these differences in 
characteristics in the banking sector had any effect on excess liquidity. 
Guha-Khasnobis and Mavrotas (2008) mentioned that country-specific 
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studies could be very useful for a more in-depth analysis. Therefore this 
study would analyse these aspects of ownership, size, mode of operation 
and age of the banking sector in Bangladesh.  
 
4.2.5 Contribution of this Chapter 
Financial liberalisation in Bangladesh was initiated in the early 1980s. But 
this was not a one-step process. Three distinct sectors were identified in 
which financial liberalisation took place. These were: (a) development of 
competitive banking sector and a viable rural financial system; (b) control 
over interest rate, exchange rate and capital flows; and (c) development of 
money and capital market. Financial liberalisation in these three sectors 
did not take place simultaneously. In fact, it was not until 1990 that the 
process of financial liberalisation started in the case of interest rates. This 
was observed with the departure of nominal interest rates and the interest 
rate spread from the regimentally fixed round values after 1990 (Hossain, 
1996). Regarding the interest rate liberalisation, Mujeri and Younus (2009) 
wrote:  
“Bangladesh began to implement financial sector reform 
measures in the 1980s and the interest rates were partially 
deregulated in November 1989 to introduce flexibility in 
determining deposit and lending rates. As a part of the 
process, Bangladesh Bank started to set the ceilings and the 
floors and individual banks were allowed to set their interest 
rates within the stipulated band. In April 1992, the interest 
rate bands for lending were removed for all sectors except 
agriculture, small industries and exports while, for deposits, 
the ceilings were removed but the floors were retained.” 
 
It could be observed from Table 4.1 that excess liquidity in Bangladesh had 
a general growing pattern over time. One point that needed to be noted 
was that excess liquidity fell before the financial liberalisation programme 
but it increased, with some exceptions, after the financial liberalisation. 
This put forward the need for a study which could explain the reasons for 
this continuous increasing trend. It could either be due to the financial 
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liberalisation itself or it could be because of the standard factors used in 
earlier studies of excess liquidity or could be a combination of both. 
Therefore, the standard variables along with financial liberalisation was 
applied in this study to see why excess liquidity was so high and still 
increasing in Bangladesh. 
 
As mentioned before, there was no study using bank-level data to directly 
look at the relationship between financial liberalisation and excess liquidity 
directly according to our knowledge. To fill this vacuum in the literature, 
bank-level data were used to examine how excess liquidity and the 
financial liberalisation were related.  
 
As the study period of this paper started after the financial liberalisation 
was initiated in Bangladesh, hence an index of financial liberalisation 
(introduced in Section 4.3.2.1) was used to properly capture the effect of it 
on excess liquidity. It not only allowed a quantitative study of their 
relationship but also helped in reaching towards a definitive conclusion 
about the continuous and ever growing debate of the effect of the financial 
liberalisation and attainment of its objectives.  
 
4.3 THE EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
4.3.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for this study was excess liquidity. This was 
measured using the liquid assets data from Bankscope.  It was calculated in 
Bankscope by summing up: trading securities and at fair value (FV) through 
income, loans and advances to banks, reverse repos and cash collateral and 
cash and due from banks. Then mandatory reserves included above were 
deducted.  Finally, growth of this was taken.  
 
4.3.2 Explanatory Variables 
One of the main variables of interest in this study was financial 
liberalisation. Other key variables of interest were the bank typology 
variables. These were included to see if there was any pattern among 
different types of banks in terms of excess liquidity due to financial 
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liberalisation. Moreover, the standard variables in the excess liquidity 
literature were also incorporated to see the direction and significance of 
their relationship. These standard variables included deposit volatility, 
interest rate, government bill and bond rate as well as the lagged 
dependent variable. The measurements of these determinants in the 
context of bank-level study of excess liquidity are discussed in the 
following pages.  
 
4.3.2.1 Standard Control Variables 
Deposit volatility: Liquidity preference of banks was affected by the public 
expectations formation. This was found to be related with excess liquidity. 
Agenor et al. (2004) found this as one of the main factors that could 
explain the excess liquidity problem for the economy of Thailand. Larsen 
(1951) also identified this as a probable reason for excess liquidity. 
According to him, liquidity preference of banks was affected by public 
expectations. To analyse demand for liquidity of banks, volatility of 
depositors’ cash preference should thus be taken into consideration. 
Saxegaard (2006) observed that currency withdrawal volatility, which was 
very similar to deposit volatility, could influence excess liquidity situation.  
 
From Bankscope, the data of total deposits or total customer deposits 
could represent the concept of deposit. These measures could also 
represent concepts like excess savings (that was used by Gu and Zhang, 
2006; Wang, 2006; McKinnon, 2006, 2007; Han and Chen, 2007; Roubini, 
2007; Xia and Chen, 2007; Zheng and Yi, 2007; Chen, 2008) and low 
consumer spending (which was used by Qing, 2006; Jiao and Ma, 2007). 
Moreover, deposit volatility also represented the liquidity risk (Agenor et 
al., 2004) since the volatility of deposit might force banks to keep more 
liquid assets than required due to the uncertainty involved.  
 
In this study, the volatility of deposit was measured by a 3-year period 
standard deviation of total deposit using the overlapping method. Reason 
for choosing the 3-year period was the short span of data availability as the 
maximum period of available data for each bank was 15 years. Through this 
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way, two observations were lost but still there were generally a series of 
13 years of data for each bank.  
 
Deposit rate: The deposit rate could affect the excess liquidity situation of 
the banks. If the deposit rate was high, people would be more interested in 
keeping their money in banks. Assuming everything else constant, this 
would lead to higher level of excess liquidity in the banking sector. Hence, 
it could be assumed that the deposit rate would be positively related with 
the excess liquidity situation of the banking sector. From Bankscope, the 
ratio of interest expense on customer deposits as a ratio of average 
customer deposits was taken to measure this variable.  
 
Impaired loans: One possible reason of high impaired loans was risky 
environment. If banks faced problem of loan default, then they would be 
less encouraged towards lending which will lead towards less allocation of 
credit. Hence, the amount of impaired loans could lead to higher excess 
liquidity. Impaired loans as a ratio of gross loans data from Bankscope was 
taken to measure this determinant. This measure might also represent 
factors like weak contract enforcement and rule of law as well as 
imprudent lending.  
 
Government bills and bonds: As discussed earlier, out of the total required 
reserve for each bank, some part was needed to be kept in cash. This was 
called the CRR. The rest could be put in cash or in government bills or 
bonds. Since these were risk free, so there was a tendency of banks to put 
part of their reserves in the government bills and bonds rather than opting 
for lending as that involved risk of default. The rate of these bills and 
bonds and their difference with the lending rate played a significant role 
on how much would be invested on these as well as the direction and 
significance of the relationship.  
 
In this respect, the spread between the treasury bill rate and the lending 
rate was applied to see how it affected the excess liquidity situation. This 
measure involved both the rates that banks consider and decide whether to 
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invest or keep as liquid assets. Treasury bill rate for the 91-day bills was 
used to represent the government bills and bonds. Then the lending rate 
was deducted from this rate for each individual bank. The lending rate was 
proxied by the ‘interest income/ average earning assets (%)’ measure from 
Bankscope.  
 
Lagged dependent variable: The lag of excess liquidity was used in some 
of the earlier studies of excess liquidity (e.g. Agenor et al., 2004; 
Saxegaard, 2006; Aikaeli, 2011). The reason for using this as one of the 
explanatory variables was that it takes into account both the 
contemporaneous and the lagged effects. Another argument for its 
inclusion was that the adjustments were unlikely to be instantaneous. 
Hence, one-year lag values of the dependent variable were taken as one of 
the explanatory variables.  
 
Some other variables: Some variables that were used in earlier studies but 
not included in this work due to their similarity with one of the 
independent variables or the dependent variable are described here. The 
rate of required reserve was observed as one of the important variables in 
earlier studies. However, since the dependent variable in its definition 
deducts the mandatory reserve, hence the required reserve variable was 
not included as one of the explanatory variables. The concepts of ‘excess 
savings’, ‘low consumer spending’ and ‘liquidity risk’ could be measured by 
the same measure of ‘deposit volatility’ concept while the concept of 
‘weak credit growth in relation to domestic deposit growth’ was very close 
to the concept of excess liquidity. Since deposit rate was used as an 
explanatory variable and lending rate was used to measure the spread from 
the treasury bill rate, so the ‘lending rate’ and ‘interest rate spread’ were 
not used separately. Different external factors like ‘foreign reserve’, 
‘export’, ‘foreign aid’, ‘oil revenue’, ‘foreign direct investment’, 
‘exchange rate’ and ‘remittance’ were described important in different 
earlier studies (e.g. Gilmour, 2005; IMF, 2005; Khemraj, 2006; Qing, 2006; 
Saxegaard, 2006; Jiao and Ma, 2007; Ma 2007; Bakani, 2012). At bank-level 
several of these are irrelevant. One measure that might be able to proxy 
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the variable of exchange rate was deposit rate since central bank could 
enforce a higher deposit rate for each bank to protect the economy from a 
weak exchange rate. Since deposit rate was used as one of the explanatory 
variables, exchange rate was not separately included in this study.  
 
4.3.2.2 Key Variables of Interest 
Financial liberalisation: In different works, financial liberalisation was 
represented by different variables or measures. Generally, easily available 
monetary aggregates such as M2 or M3 as a ratio of nominal GDP were 
widely used (Ang and McKibbin, 2007). Using dummy variable for financial 
liberalisation was also a very common practice. However, since financial 
liberalisation was a continuous process including many reversals, it was 
very difficult to capture this process with only a 0 or a 1. Moreover, it 
involved many processes together and also the process was an on-going 
one. Keeping this in mind, there has been a recent trend to build index of 
financial liberalisation where different processes of financial liberalisation 
were combined together and the magnitudes of those processes could also 
be incorporated (e.g. Williamson and Mahar, 1998; Bandiera and others, 
2000; Edison and Warnock, 2003; Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2003; Laeven, 
2003).  
 
In one of these new initiatives, Abiad et al. (2010) formed an index of 
financial liberalisation where they distinguished seven different dimensions 
of financial liberalisation. These dimensions were: credit controls and 
excessively high reserve requirements, interest rate controls, entry 
barriers, state ownership in the banking sector, capital account 
restrictions, prudential regulations and supervision of the banking sector 
and securities market policy (these seven dimensions are discussed in detail 
in Appendix 4.5). 
 
Following this, an index of financial liberalisation was constructed for 
Bangladesh for the period of 1997-2011.  In every dimension, one or more 
questions were used and they were coded afterwards to see the overall 
impact of the financial liberalisation. In the first dimension of ‘credit 
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controls and excessively high reserve requirements’, the questions were: 
1)Were reserve requirements restrictive? 2) Were there minimum amounts 
of credit that must be channeled to certain sectors? 3) Was any credit 
supplied to certain sectors at subsidised rates? 4) Were there in place 
ceilings on expansion of bank credit? 
 
In the second dimension of ‘interest rate liberalisation’, deposit rates and 
lending rates were separately considered. Factors included if both deposit 
interest rates and lending interest rates were determined at market rates 
or they were fixed within a band. 
 
‘Banking sector entry’, which was the third dimension, included the 
following four questions: 1) To what extent did the government allow 
foreign banks to enter into a domestic market? 2) Did the government allow 
the entry of new domestic banks? 3) Were there restrictions on branching? 
4) Did the government allow banks to engage in a wide range of activities? 
 
The fourth dimension of ‘capital account transactions’ included the 
questions of: 1) Was the exchange rate system unified? 2) Did a country set 
restrictions on capital inflow? 3) Did a country set restrictions on capital 
outflow?  
 
The fifth dimension of ‘privatisation’ examined the magnitude of 
privatisation of banks. ‘Securities markets’, which was the sixth dimension, 
included the following two questions: 1) Had the country taken measures to 
develop securities markets? 2) Was the country’s equity market open to 
foreign investors? 
 
The last dimension of this index was the ‘banking sector supervision’. This 
had four questions: 1) Had the country adopted a capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR) based on the Basel standard? 2) Was the banking supervisory agency 
independent from executives’ influence? 3) Did a banking supervisory 
agency conduct effective supervisions through on-site and off-site 
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examinations? 4) Did the country’s banking supervisory agency cover all 
financial institutions without exception? 
 
As could be noted from the different dimensions and sub-dimensions, some 
of these were quantitative while some were qualitative. For the 
quantitative ones, the published data sources were used. Regarding the 
qualitative ones, different information from various sources was used for 
this purpose. After collecting all the information and providing a 
quantitative value for each one irrespective of whether they were 
quantitative or qualitative, they were checked with the Abiad et al. 
database of Bangladesh for the period available (1997-2005). It was found 
that this new database generally conformed to the Abiad et al. (2010) 
database.  
 
One difference between the Abiad et al. (2010) index and financial 
liberalisation index measure of this study was that while Abiad et al. (2010) 
rescaled their dimensions in creating the final index, here the dimensions 
were not rescaled after summing up the values of each sub-dimension. The 
reason behind not rescaling was that this could suppress the effects of the 
process of financial liberalisation and then the estimates would not fully 
reflect the effects of this process. 
 
Bank typology: To see if there were any effect of different types of banks 
on excess liquidity due to the process of financial liberalisation, the banks 
in Bangladesh in this study were classified according to ownership (whether 
owned by the government or private), size (whether they have assets over 
$1 billion or not), mode of operation (whether run according to Islamic 
principles of banking or otherwise) and age (whether they were new or old). 
Although there was no universal definition for the classification of bank 
size, the rule followed in this study has also been used in many earlier 
studies (e.g. Cole et al., 2004) including works on Bangladesh (e.g. Cihak 
and Hesse, 2008). If (and when) banks have assets over $1 billion, the size 
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dummy was 1 and 0 otherwise18. There can be other approaches such as 
classifying them as big or small on the basis of data at the beginning of the 
sample, or at the end of the sample, or as averages over the entire sample. 
However, the approach taken in this study was more reflective of the 
actual situation as with this approach, there were some banks which have 
value of 0 in some years and 1 in some other years as they moved from 
small to large. For banks which remain either in the large or in the small 
category, have one static value (of either 0 or 1) for the whole study 
period. For the ownership dummy, the value of 1 was taken if the bank was 
owned by the state and 0 otherwise. For the dummy value for mode of 
operation, it was 1 if it operates according to the Islamic principles of 
banking and 0 otherwise19. For the age dummy the value was 1 if they were 
in the new category (established after 1990) and 0 otherwise. All these 
dummy values were multiplied by the financial liberalisation index value 
and these multiplied variables were used in the estimation. A table was 
given here based on the above characteristics.  
 
Earlier works on holding liquid assets started where the cost of having or 
holding liquid assets, which had lower return than other investments, was 
compared with the risks of running out (Baltensperger, 1980; Santomero, 
1984). This implied that if the risk of running out was higher, then banks 
would incur the cost of holding excess liquidity. Therefore, excess liquidity 
situation and decision of bank would depend on the opportunity cost of 
holding liquid assets. According to the newer generation of models, market 
imperfections play a key role for banks being unable to raise instantaneous 
and unlimited amounts of liquidity. These imperfections were generally 
referred to as moral hazard (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998) or adverse 
selection (Kiyotaki and Moore, 2008). Therefore, financially constrained 
banks would try to have more liquidity.  
 
                                               
18  Due to the growth of the banking sector, many banks moved from small to large 
category over the study period. Each bank was categorised accordingly by giving a value of 
0 when their assets was less than $1 billion while 1 when they cross this mark. 
19 There are some banks which had some branches or sections operating under Islamic 
principles of banking. In this study, only those banks were included under Islamic banking 
category which used Islamic principles of banking throughout.   
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Table 4.2: Bank classifications 
Sl. 
No. 
Name of bank Bank 
ownership 
Bank 
size 
Bank mode of 
operation 
Bank 
age 
Year 
of 
start 
1. AB Bank Private Small to 
Large 
Conventional Old 1982 
2. Agrani Bank Public Large Conventional Old 1971 
3. Al-Arafah 
Islami Bank 
Private Small to 
Large 
Islamic New 1995 
4. Bangladesh 
Commerce 
Bank 
Public Small Conventional New 1999 
5. Bangladesh 
Development 
Bank 
Public Small Conventional Old 1971 
6. Bangladesh 
Krishi Bank 
 Public Small to 
Large 
Conventional Old 1971 
7. Bank Asia Private Small to 
Large 
Conventional New 1999 
8.  BASIC Bank Public Small Conventional Old 1988 
9. BRAC Bank Private Small to 
Large 
Conventional New 2001 
10. City Bank Private Small to 
Large 
Conventional Old 1983 
11. Dhaka Bank Private Small to 
Large 
Conventional New 1995 
12. Dutch Bangla 
Bank 
Private Small to 
Large 
Conventional New 1996 
13. Eastern Bank Private Small to 
Large 
Conventional New 1992 
14. EXIM Bank Private Small to 
Large 
Islamic New 1999 
15. First Security 
Islami Bank 
Private Small to 
Large 
Islamic New 1999 
16. ICB Islamic 
Bank Limited 
Private Small Islamic Old 1987 
17. IFIC Bank Private Small to 
Large 
Conventional Old 1983 
18. Islami Bank 
Bangladesh 
Private Small to 
Large 
Islamic Old 1983 
19. Jamuna Bank Private Small to 
Large 
Conventional New 2001 
20. Janata Bank Public Large Conventional Old 1971 
21. Mercantile 
Bank 
Private Small to 
Large 
Conventional New 1999 
22. Mutual Trust 
Bank 
Private Small Conventional New 1999 
23. National Bank Private Small to 
Large 
Conventional Old 1983 
24. NCC Bank Private Small to 
Large 
Conventional New 1993 
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Sl. 
No. 
Name of bank Bank 
ownership 
Bank 
size 
Bank mode of 
operation 
Bank 
age 
Year 
of 
start 
25. One Bank Private Small Conventional Old 1999 
26. Premier Bank Private Small Conventional Old 1999 
27. Prime Bank 
Limited 
Private Small to 
Large 
Conventional Old 1995 
28. Pubali Bank Private Small to 
Large 
Conventional Old 1983
* 
29. Rupali Bank Public Small to 
Large 
Conventional Old 1971 
30. Shahjalal 
Islami Bank 
Private Small to 
Large 
Islamic Old 2001 
31. Social Islami 
Bank 
Private Small to 
Large 
Islamic Old 1995 
32. Sonali Bank Public Large Conventional Old 1971 
33. Southeast 
Bank 
Private Small to 
Large 
Conventional Old 1995 
34. Standard 
Bank 
Private Small Conventional Old 1999 
35. Trust Bank Private Small Conventional Old 1999 
36. United 
Commercial 
Bank 
Private Small to 
Large 
Conventional Old 1983 
37. Uttara Bank Private Small to 
Large 
Conventional Old 1983
* 
Source for size: Defined according to total asset data from Bankscope.  
Source for ownership, mode of operation and age: BB Annual Report, various issues. 
*Uttara Bank and Pubali Bank were denationalised to operate as Private Commercial Bank. 
Note: Small to Large means that asset of the bank was lower than $1 billion at the 
beginning but crossed the threshold at some point during this period. 
 
Earlier works on holding liquid assets started where the cost of having or 
holding liquid assets, which had lower return than other investments, was 
compared with the risks of running out (Baltensperger, 1980; Santomero, 
1984). This implied that if the risk of running out was higher, then banks 
would incur the cost of holding excess liquidity. Therefore, excess liquidity 
situation and decision of bank would depend on the opportunity cost of 
holding liquid assets. According to the newer generation of models, market 
imperfections play a key role for banks being unable to raise instantaneous 
and unlimited amounts of liquidity. These imperfections were generally 
referred to as moral hazard (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998) or adverse 
selection (Kiyotaki and Moore, 2008). Therefore, financially constrained 
banks would try to have more liquidity.  
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Based on these models, bank characteristics, such as bank size and 
ownership, could affect their ability to raise non-deposit forms of finance. 
For example, small banks had more difficulties in accessing capital markets 
while public banks were less liquidity-constrained than private banks, as 
public banks might have an implicit guarantee. This would affect the 
banks’ precautionary demand for liquidity buffers. 
 
Kashyap and Stein (1997) and Kashyap et al. (2002), using a large panel of 
US banks, found a strong effect of bank size on holdings of liquid assets 
with smaller banks being more liquid as they face constraints in accessing 
capital markets. Dinger (2009) also found that smaller Eastern European 
banks hold more liquidity. However, Aspachs et al. (2005) did not find any 
significant relationship between excess liquidity and bank size in their 
panel study of 57 UK resident banks. 
 
Bank age might also be related to performance, since bank production20 
might follow the ‘learning by doing’ hypothesis (Mester, 1996). This would 
imply that over time, performance of banks would improve as they would 
learn new things and would adapt to the changing environment more than 
before. However, it might also happen that efficient management might 
become less prominent at some stage and opt for a less proactive style, 
leading to a decrease in efficiency (Esho, 2001). If the latter effect 
dominates then the age variable should display a positive coefficient. 
 
Staikouras et al. (2007) found that the coefficient of the age variable was 
positive and statistically significant in all specifications, in contrast to the 
‘learning by doing’ hypothesis, as identified by Mester (1996), DeYoung and 
Hasan (1998) and Kraft and Tirtiroglu (1998). They also mentioned that 
older banks were mostly formerly state-owned. 
 
                                               
20Banks’ ability to ameliorate informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders 
and their ability to manage risks are the essence of bank production (Hughes and Mester, 
1998). These abilities are integral components of bank output and influence the 
managerial incentives to produce financial services prudently and efficiently. 
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Demetriades and Fielding (2009) found that, for very young banks, raising 
deposits was likely to be easier than identifying reliable borrowers. Older 
banks were likely to have more information so that their ability to screen 
borrowers was likely to be better than that of younger banks.  
 
DeYoung (1999) found that bank age influenced the risk of small-bank 
failure, especially if the banks were three to five years old because it took 
some time for profits to reach a sustainable levels. Amel and Prager (2013) 
measured this variable as the number of years since the bank opened. They 
found it negative and significant for most cases in the rural regions, but its 
sign varied over time in urban markets. 
 
It was observed in different studies that Islamic banks generally had less 
excess liquidity than the conventional banks (Gafoor, 1995; Siddiqui, 2013). 
Initially this was due to less people being attracted towards this new 
banking system to deposit money. On the other hand, Islamic banking 
system had fewer instruments than the conventional banking to lend money 
(Siddiqui, 2013). Over time, more people became interested in the Islamic 
system of banking and the difference between this type of banking with 
conventional banking reduced significantly. However, like the conventional 
banks, Islamic banks in Bangladesh were also suffering from this problem of 
excess liquidity.  
 
4.3.3 Variations According to Bank-specific Characteristics 
Two different strategies were applied here to see if there were any 
possible differences in excess liquidity according to bank-specific 
characteristics of ownership, size, mode of operation and age. Firstly, 
various graphs of the time-evolution of average excess liquidity were drawn 
splitting the data based on these characteristics. These were done 
separately as the characteristics were not exclusive from each other. 
Therefore, four separate graphs were drawn to see visually if there were 
any variations among them. Secondly, statistical tests were applied 
according to these characteristics to see if they differed from each other. 
These tests included both nonparametric and parametric tests.  
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4.3.3.1 Variations According to Graphs 
Figure 4.1 shows the excess liquidity for public and private banks.  
 
Figure 4.1: Excess liquidity according to ownership 
 
Sources: Author’s own calculation based on data from Bankscope and Bangladesh 
Economic Review, various issues. 
 
It could be seen from the figure that there were differences in excess 
liquidity between public and private banks. The gap increased in the late 
90’s but started converging from the early 2000. They remained quite close 
from 2005 onwards. It could also be observed that while the private banks 
experienced a fluctuating pattern, the public banks had a rather steady 
pattern over the period.  
 
Large and Small Banks 
Figure 4.2 shows if there was any difference between large and small 
banks. It could be seen from the figure that there was difference between 
large and small banks also and the trend was quite similar with the gap 
increasing in the late 90’s but starting to converge from the early 2000s. 
They remained quite close from 2005 onwards. It could also be observed 
that while the large banks experienced a fluctuating pattern, the small 
banks had a rather steady pattern over the period.  
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Figure 4.2: Excess liquidity according to size 
 
Sources: Author’s own calculation based on data from Bankscope and Bangladesh 
Economic Review, various issues. 
 
Islamic and Conventional Banks 
In contrast to the earlier two characteristics, Figure 4.3 showed that excess 
liquidity of Islamic banking and conventional bankingwasquite similar.  
 
Figure 4.3: Excess liquidity according to mode of operation 
 
Sources: Author’s own calculation based on data from Bankscope and Bangladesh 
Economic Review, various issues 
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over these years where increase and fall followed a very analogous pattern. 
However, the pattern of the conventional banks fluctuated less than that 
of the Islamic banks.  
 
New and Old Banks 
The characteristic of age seemed to follow a similar pattern of differences 
as were observed for ownership and size. Starting with a substantial gap at 
the beginning of the study period, the gap increased substantially. 
However, over the years it fell markedly and remained quite close from 
2005 onwards. It could also be observed that while the new banks 
experienced a fluctuating pattern, the old banks had a rather steady 
pattern over the period.  
 
Figure 4.4: Excess liquidity according to age 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on data from Bankscope and Bangladesh Economic 
Review, various issues. 
 
4.3.3.2 Statistical Tests for Difference among Bank Typologies 
Two types of statistical tests were carried out in addition to the graphical 
representation above. The first type of test was a non-parametric test 
while the second type of test was a parametric test. The non-parametric 
test applied was the Wilcoxon rank-sum test whereas t-test was applied as 
the parametric test.  
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The Wilcoxon rank-sum test, also called the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test, 
was a nonparametric test for assessing whether two samples of 
observations came from the same distribution. This was applied for two 
unmatched group of observations (Wilcoxon, 1945; Mann and Whitney, 
1947). The null was that the two populations had identical distribution 
functions against the alternative hypothesis was that the two distribution 
functions differed21.  
 
It is one of the most powerful nonparametric tests. This test does not 
require the assumption that the differences between the two samples be 
normally distributed. It was also frequently used as an alternative of the 
two sample t-test when the normality assumption was questionable 22 . 
Janusonis (2009) stated that Wilcoxon test should not be applied if one 
group had 3 and the other group had 3 or 4 cases and t-test was better with 
sample size of N = 3 or N = 4. Posten (1982) found that for sample sizes of 
as small as 5 per group, Wilcoxon test had the highest statistical power23.  
 
For the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, there were two independent random 
variables, ଵܺ and ܺଶ, and the following null hypothesis of ଵܺ~ ଵܺ was tested 
with a sample size of ݊ଵ  for ܺଵ  and ݊ଶ  for ܺଶ . In this test, the null 
hypothesis was that there was no difference between the two (unmatched) 
groups. If the null was rejected (when the probability was less than 10% or 
0.1), then it implied that there was significant difference between the 
groups.   
 
The results of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test across bank typologies were 
given below with the null hypothesis that there was no difference between 
two groups. Here, excess liquidity was the ranking variable.  
 
                                               
21 The Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) U-test was an extension of the Wilcoxon (1945) test 
that was developed for equal sample sizes.  
22 The following website contained further details: 
http://www.stats.gla.ac.uk/steps/glossary/nonparametric.html#wmwt 
23 For detailed discussion and comparision between these tests, see de Winter (2013). 
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The Wilcoxon rank-sum test results showed that the null of no difference 
for ownership typology was rejected implying that there was difference 
between public and private banks in terms of excess liquidity. Similar 
findings were observed for both size and age typology suggesting that there 
was variation between large and small banks as well as between new and 
old banks. However, the null for the mode of operation typology was not 
rejected implying that there was no significant difference between Islamic 
and conventional banks in terms of excess liquidity.  
 
Table 4.3: Wilcoxon rank-sum test results for bank typologies of 
ownership, size, mode of operation and age 
Typology Ownership observation rank 
sum 
expected H0: no 
difference 
between two 
(unmatched) 
groups 
Ownership 
 
Private 30 649 570 3.064 
(0.0022) Public 7 54 133 
Size Large 6 207 114 3.132 
(0.0017) Small 31 496 589 
Mode of 
operation 
Islamic 7 166 133 -1.280 
(0.2006) Conventional 30 537 570 
Age New  21 277 399 3.740 
(0.0002) Old 16 426 304 
 
The parametric tests applied here was the t-test. The results of the t-test 
conform to the findings of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, showing that there 
were differences for all the bank-specific characteristics except the mode 
of operation typology.  
 
The results of this test are provided here. The results showed that the 
coefficient of ownership, age and size were significant at 1% level while 
that of the mode of operation was not.  
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Table 4.4: t-test results for excess liquidity according to ownership, 
size, mode of operation and age 
Typology Coefficient Standard 
error 
z P > | z | 95% confidence 
interval 
Ownership 
 
-0.114 0.027 -4.23 0.000 -0.166 -0.061 
Size -0.108 0.030 -3.60 0.000 -0.167 -0.049 
Mode of 
operation 
0.049 0.033 1.49 0.137 -0.015 0.113 
Age 0.099 0.020 4.97 0.000 0.060 0.138 
 
 
4.4 METHODOLOGY 
This study used panel data. This type of data has three main advantages 
over cross-section data. Firstly, it can exploit both cross-section and time 
series variation in the data. Secondly, this technique can control for the 
presence of unobserved firm-specific factors (in this case, bank-specific 
factors). Finally, this approach can also address the problem of potential 
endogeneity of the regressors (Verbeek, 2004).  
 
In this panel data analysis, there might be unobserved bank-specific time-
invariant heterogeneity, which could bias the estimates if not properly 
accounted for. This was due to the fact that the error term might contain 
time varying bank-specific characteristics which might be correlated with 
banks’ liquidity ratios. Another issue was potential endogeneity of some of 
the explanatory variables.  
 
These concerns could be addressed with the GMM proposed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and recently extended by Blundell 
and Bond (2000) and Bond (2002). This method was particularly appropriate 
to address the dynamic panel bias that arised in the presence of lagged 
dependent variables in samples with a large number of groups (N) and a 
relatively small number of time periods (T), such as in this study. This 
method also helped to overcome the weak instrument problem (past 
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changes do contain information about current levels), and resulted in 
improvements in the efficiency of the estimates (Arellano and Bond, 1991; 
Roodman, 2006). 
 
Another advantage of this framework was that it helped to control for 
potential biases induced by endogeneity (the correlation between the 
lagged dependent variable and the error term) which was inherent in the 
specification because of the inclusion of lagged dependent variables as 
regressors.  
 
However, Roodman (2009) argued that the system GMM could generate 
moment conditions prolifically, in which case, too many instruments in the 
system GMM overfits endogenous variable and weakens the Hansen test of 
the instruments’ joint validity. Following Zulkefly et al. (2010), this study 
adopted two techniques to remedy the problem of instruments 
proliferation. First, not all available lags for instruments were used. 
Second, instruments were combined through addition into smaller sets by 
collapsing the block of the instrument matrix. This technique was also used 
by Calderon et al. (2002), Cardovic and Levine (2005) and Roodman (2009), 
among others.  
 
The study used two-step system GMM estimation. Zulkefly et al. (2010) 
argued that the success of the GMM estimator in producing unbiased, 
consistent and efficient results was highly dependent on the adoption of 
the appropriate instruments. Therefore, the following two specifications 
tests were conducted as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). Firstly, the Hansen test of 
overidentifying restrictions, which test the overall validity of the 
instruments by analysing the sample analogue of the moments conditions 
used in the estimation process. If the moment condition holds, then the 
instrument was valid and the model is correctly specified. Secondly, the 
nonserial correlation among the transformed error term was tested. The 
AR(2) test for serial correlation was used for this.  
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Duprey (2013) mentioned that system GMM also has, among others, the 
following advantages:  
(i) It can limit the number of missing observations by using the forward 
orthogonal deviation transform instead of the first difference 
transformation, and  
(ii) The use of the collapsed option was allowed which help to avoid the 
proliferation of instruments, as all available lags were used as 
internal instruments.  
 
The estimated equation in this study mainly stemmed from the earlier 
works of Agenor et al. (2004) and Saxegaard (2006). Additionally, financial 
liberalisation index was added to see how it was related with excess 
liquidity. Furthermore, interaction of bank typologies (BT) with the 
financial liberalisation variable was included to see if there was any 
difference in the behaviour of banks according to their characteristics. The 
main equation of excess liquidity to be estimated in this study can be 
simply written as:  
ܧܮ௜௧ = ߙ଴ + ߙଵܧܮ௜,௧ିଵ + ߚଵܦ ௜ܸ௧ + ߚଶܫܰ ௜ܶ௧ + ߚଷܶܤܴ௜௧ + ߚସܫܮ௜௧ + ߚହ(ܨܮ௧) +
ߚ଺(ܨܮ௧ × ܤ ௜ܶ௧) + ߝ௜௧   (4.1) 
The above equation explains effect at bank-level on excess liquidity where 
ܧܮ represented excess liquidity, ܦܸ was for deposit volatility, ܫܰܶ showed 
interest rate, government bill and bond was given by ܶܤܴ, impaired loan 
was represented by ܫܮ, ܨܮ expressed financial liberalisation index and BT 
showed different bank typologies (ownership, size, mode of operation and 
age). The interaction terms of FL and BT showed bank typologies based on 
bank-specific characteristics interacted with the financial liberalisation 
index. Banks were represented by subscript ݅ and ݐ was showing year.  
 
The above model can be rewritten in a panel data framework in matrix 
notation in the following way: 
 ݕ௜௧ = ߙ଴ + ߙଵݕ௜,௧ିଵ + ߚݔ′௜௧ + ߝ௜௧ (4.2) 
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Here excess liquidity was shown with vector ݕ and was denoted as ݕ௜௧ which 
implied excess liquidity of bank ݅  in year ݐ ; ߙଵ  was a parameter to be 
estimated with respect to the lagged dependent variable (excess liquidity); 
ݔ′௜௧ was a (1 × ݇) vector of regressors, ߚ was a (1 × ݇) vector of parameters 
to be estimated and ߝ௜௧ was the stochastic disturbance term.  
 
According to the literature, when numerous individual units were observed 
over time, specifying the stochastic nature of the disturbances became 
conceptually difficult (Nerlove, 1971). For example, some of the ‘omitted 
variables’ might reflect factors which were peculiar to both the individual 
banks as well as the time periods for which the observations were 
obtained. Others may reflect only those bank-specific differences which 
affect the observations for a given bank while some variables may 
represent factors which were peculiar to specific time periods (Owusu-
Gyapong, 1986).  
 
Nerlove (1971) observed that if these unobservable ‘other effects’ were not 
taken account of in the estimation process and ordinary least squares 
method was applied to equation (4.2), then the estimates of the ߚ’s in this 
equation might be both biased and inefficient. Therefore, equation (4.2) 
needed to be transformed to the following error component model to 
include these other causal variables: 
 ݕ௜௧ = ߙ଴ + ߙଵݕ௜,௧ିଵ + ߚݔ′௜௧ + ߝ௜௧ (4.3) 
where, 
 ߝ௜௧ = ߤ௜ + ݒ௜௧ = ݕ௜௧ − ߙ଴ − ߙଵݕ௜,௧ିଵ − ߚݔ′௜௧ (4.4) 
and,  
 ܧ[ߤ௜] = ܧ[ݒ௜௧] = ܧ[ߤ௜ + ݒ௜௧] = 0 (4.5) 
 
Here, ߤ௜ denote the unobservable individual specific effects and was time-
invariant, accounting for the special effects that were not included in the 
model – the fixed effects. The remainder disturbance varies with both 
individual and time – the idiosyncratic shock. The error of the model ߝ௜௧ 
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therefore becomes the sum of ߤ௜, the individual specific effects, and ݒ௜௧, 
the well-behaved error component. It was assumed that ߤ௜  and ݒ௜௧  were 
independent for each ݅ over all ݐ. 
 
Although there were various methods of estimation for panel data, over 
time it has been observed that the system Generalised Method of Moments 
(system GMM)24 was superior to the fixed effects and the random effects 
methods. There were some advantages of Generalised Method of Moments 
over other panel estimators for specific cases. Firstly, this method does not 
need distributional assumptions like normality. Secondly, 
heteroscedasticity of unknown form was allowed in this model. Thirdly, 
even if the model was not solvable analytically from the first order 
condition, still the method can estimate the parameters (Verbeek, 2004).  
 
From the above discussion, it could be concluded that the most appropriate 
method was system GMM for the type of model (dynamic with short time 
dimension) used in this study (Blundell and Bond, 1998). This method was 
also applied in several empirical studies of similar types. This included 
works of Cottarelli et al. (2003), IMF (2004) and Louzis et al. (2011).  
 
If the lagged dependent variable was included to account for dynamics in 
the process, then, methods like OLS, FE or Within Group (WG) estimators 
contained some limitations. If OLS was applied, then the estimator would 
be biased due to the presence of lagged dependent variables as one of the 
explanatory variables. The bank-specific effects could be accounted for by 
the FE or WG estimator but they would remain biased in the presence of 
lagged dependent variables. This study therefore used the system GMM 
estimator developed for dynamic panel data estimation25.  
 
                                               
24  System GMM is proposed and continuously developed with the pioneer works of 
Arelleano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998) and 
Blundell et al. (2000). 
25 For a more detailed description, see the works of Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell 
and Bond (1998), Baltagi (2001), Bond et al. (2001), Woolridge (2002) and Roodman 
(2009), among others.  
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The GMM estimator that combined the moment conditions for the 
differenced model with those for the levels model was called the SYSTEM 
estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998). It was shown to perform better (less 
bias and more precision), especially when the series were persistent. The 
system GMM was developed as a superior estimator as it controlled for the 
firm-specific effects as well as the bias caused by the inclusion of the 
lagged dependent variable. Moreover, system GMM combined the standard 
set of equations in first-differences with suitably lagged levels as 
instruments, with an additional set of equations in levels with suitably 
lagged first-differences as instruments. This was different from the first-
difference GMM approach discussed by Arellano and Bond (1991). In system 
GMM, the unobserved fixed effects (ߤ௜) were removed by taking first 
difference of equation (4.3) and obtaining the following equation: 
 
 ∆ݕ௜௧ = ∆ݕ௜,௧ିଵ + ߚ∆ݔ′௜௧ + ∆ݒ௜௧ (4.6) 
 
Additionally, the right hand side variables were instrumented using lagged 
values of regressors. The equations in first differencing (equation 4.6) and 
in levels (equation 4.3) were jointly estimated in a system of equations. It 
was assumed that the error term ݒ௜௧  was serially uncorrelated and the 
regressors ݔ௜௧  were endogenous. Therefore valid instruments for the 
equation in first difference were levels of series lagged two periods 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998).  
 
For diagnostic checks, the validity of the instruments was tested using the 
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. A test for the absence of serial 
correlation of the residuals was also applied using the tests of 
autocorrelation which was important due to the fact that the error term 
was not serially correlated.  
 
System GMM estimation could be based either on a one-step or a two-step 
estimator. The two-step estimator was asymptotically more efficient in 
presence of heteroscedasticity of the error term εit. However, Monte Carlo 
simulation showed that standard errors associated with the two-step 
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estimates were downward biased in small samples (Arellano and Bond, 
1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998).  
 
For this reason, the one-step system GMM estimator was believed to be 
more efficient when the errors were homoscedastic and not correlated 
over time. As a result, the one-step system GMM estimator, with standard 
errors corrected for heteroscedasticity, was preferred by researchers than 
the two-step system GMM estimator. But in a recent development by 
Windmeijer (2005), who devised a small-sample correction for the two-step 
standard errors, reported that the two-step system GMM perform somewhat 
better than one-step system GMM in estimating coefficients, with lower 
bias and standard errors. Moreover, the reported two-step standard errors 
were quite accurate with this correction. Consequently, the two-step 
estimation with corrected errors was considered to be modestly superior to 
robust one-step estimation and applied in this study.  
 
The data of this study comprised bank-level information of the banking 
sector in Bangladesh with annual data for the period of 1997-2011. STATA 
(version 13.1) was generally used for the estimation of applying system 
GMM to an original panel dataset of NT = 37  15 = 555 observations. The 
system GMM estimator was more suitable to datasets with small T and large 
N observations. Another advantage of the system GMM estimator was that it 
addresses the problem of possible unit root since it used first differenced 
models. As a result, if there was a problem of unit root, it would become 
stationary after first difference.  
 
4.5 SOURCES OF DATA 
This bank-level study had mainly used the Bankscope database. The 
treasury bill rate data was collected from various issues of annual reports 
published by the Bangladesh Bank. Some of them were also taken from the 
paper of Ahmed and Islam (2004).  
 
Although most of the banks had 15 years of data but there were some 
banks for which 15 years of data were not available. In some cases, there 
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was some missing years inside the series. Out of 38 banks (excluding the 
foreign banks), data were available in Bankscope for 37 banks. Due to data 
unavaility, data of 37 out of a possible 47 banks were taken in this study. 
However, it should be noted that the 37 banks included in the study 
represented the banking sector in Bangladesh very well since they 
accounted for more than 99 per cent of bank branches as well as more than 
90 per cent of assets and deposits of the 47 banks (Bangladesh Bank Annual 
Report, 2013). A more detailed discussion on these is provided in Appendix 
4.6 along with graphs and tables. A detailed description of data availability 
is provided in Appendix 4.1.  
 
Regarding the form of data, it was available in consolidated or 
unconsolidated26 or in both forms. For Bangladesh, it was available in both 
consolidated and unconsolidated forms for 18 banks, available only in 
unconsolidated forms for 16 banks and available only in consolidated forms 
for 3 banks. Since the unconsolidated data availability was greater, so most 
of the data were taken in unconsolidated forms. Consolidated forms were 
taken when only they were available and contained more data.  This was in 
line with the literature (Ehrmann et al., 2001; Cihak and Hesse, 2008)27.  
 
4.6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.6.1 Data 
To provide some basic idea, a correlation matrix is presented between the 
dependent variable and the explanatory variables in Table 4.5. The most 
important observation from this table was that the correlations among the 
right hand side regressors were low and therefore there was no concern of 
multicollinearity. 
                                               
26 According to Bankscope (2014), “A consolidated statement is the statement of a bank 
integrating the statements of its subsidiaries” while it defined unconsolidated statement 
as “A statement not integrating the possible subsidiaries of the concerned bank.” Althouth 
it was true that consolidated data could reflect activities in several countries if any bank 
operated across countries and was crucial to take into account in a study, but it was 
observed that most banks in Bangladesh do not operate abroad and the advantage of 
Bankscope database was that if any bank operated abroad, then their entities were given 
separately. 
27In their paper, Ehrmann et al. (2001) used consolidated data whenever available and 
unconsolidated data otherwise. 
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Table 4.5: Correlation matrix of excess liquidity and the dependent 
variables 
 Excess 
liquidity 
(EL) 
Lag of EL 
(LagEL) 
Deposit 
volatility 
(DV) 
Deposit 
rate (DR) 
Govt. 
bills & 
bonds 
(GBB) 
Impaired 
loans (IL) 
Financial 
liberalisa-
tion (FL) 
EL 1.0000 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Lag
EL 
-0.4830* 1.0000 --- --- --- --- --- 
DV 0.1901* -0.1595* 1.0000 --- --- --- --- 
DR -0.1731* 0.3176* 0.1338* 1.0000 --- --- --- 
GBB 0.0850 -0.0995* 0.4498* 0.2316* 1.0000 --- --- 
IL 0.1467* -0.3410* -0.2484* -0.5636* -0.2854* 1.0000 --- 
FL 0.1854* -0.2518* 0.1557* 0.0486 0.2426* -0.0993 1.0000 
* Significant at 5% level.  
 
4.6.2 Discussion of Results  
The excess liquidity of banks in Bangladesh was estimated applying the 
two-step system GMM. All the variables were taken in log form except the 
bank typology variables. Flexibility in taking both actual and log values of 
the explanatory variables were evident from earlier works (Levine et al., 
2000; Hauk Jr. and Wacziarg, 2009; Roodman, 2009; Jayasuriya and Burke, 
2013). The typology variables were not taken in a simple form but they 
were taken in an interaction form where each typology was multiplied by 
the financial liberalisation variable. 
 
From Table 4.6, it could be observed from the Hansen test that there was 
no identification problem. The Arellano-Bond (1991) test of 
autocorrelations showed, with the values of AR(2) test, that there was no 
problem of autocorrelation. The Wald test, which was equivalent to the F-
test, showed that the overall results were significant for all cases. 
 
The main variable of interest in this analysis was the variable of financial 
liberalisation. As discussed earlier, financial liberalisation could have both 
positive and negative effect on the excess liquidity situation in the banking 
sector.  
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Table 4.6: EL estimates applying two-step system GMM  
Variable Coefficient 
LagEL 0.766*** (0.107) 
DV 0.047** (0.019) 
DR 0.140** (0.060) 
IL 0.021* (0.012) 
FL 1.039** (0.507) 
Wald chi2 (7) 436.28 (0.000) 
Hansen Test 0.08 (0.779) 
Sargan Test 0.14 (0.708) 
Test for AR (1) errors -4.19 (0.000) 
Test for AR (2) errors -0.72 (0.470) 
No. of banks 37 
No. of observations 337 
Note 1: The FL variable here was constructed following the Abiad et al. index of financial 
liberalisation.  
Note 2: Standard errors were in parentheses to the right of the respective estimated 
coefficients. In the lower part of the table, the probability values were given in 
parentheses.  
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
The result showed that there was significant positive relationship between 
financial liberalisation and excess liquidity situation for the banking sector 
in Bangladesh. It was positive and significant (1.039).  
 
Deposit volatility was another important determinant as observed from 
earlier studies. This variable was generally found to be positively affecting 
the excess liquidity situation. Agenor et al. (2004), Larsen (1951) and 
Saxegaard (2006) also found similar results. This was also found significant 
in this study with a coefficient value of 0.047. 
 
Another explanatory variable that was found in the literature on excess 
liquidity was deposit rate28. This variable was also found to be significantly 
and positively related with a value of 0.140. This meant that with higher 
                                               
28 Islamic banks do not have any pre-announced interest rate as their rate of profit or loss 
is calculated after the period. Information of this rate is available for the Islamic banks 
along with other banks in Bankscope and is used in this study.  
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deposit rate, banks would have more deposit and with higher deposit rate, 
chances were that lending rates would be higher. In these circumstances, 
the demand for loans would be lower. As mentioned earlier, deposits would 
be high, implying overall higher amount of excess liquidity.  
 
Impaired loans variable, which represented risky environment in terms of 
loan default, was positive and significant. If banks feel that there is 
possibility of loan default, then they would be less interested in lending 
and thereby leading to higher amount of excess liquidity. The positive and 
significant value (0.021) for this variable justified the above view for the 
banking sector in Bangladesh. 
 
The results showed that the lagged dependent variable was significant. 
From the positive value of the coefficient, it can be concluded that the 
previous year’s excess liquidity significantly affected the present excess 
liquidity along with other explanatory variables which were found to be 
significant. 
 
Government bills and bonds could affect the excess liquidity situation 
positively if this rate was higher than the lending rate as banks would keep 
their funds in these bills. However, unlike in some other countries, this 
rate (proxied by the 91-day treasury bill rate) was lower than the lending 
rate in Bangladesh. This explained the insignificant (though negative) 
results of this variable for different regressions.  
 
One important feature of this study was the application of bank typology 
variable. Different bank typologies were used to see if there were any 
differences according to different bank-specific characteristics in terms of 
excess liquidity with the financial liberalisation. For this, interaction 
variables were taken where the financial liberalisation values were 
multiplied by the dummy values of bank typologies according to their 
definitions.  
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Table 4.7: EL estimates applying two-step system GMM with bank 
typologies 
Variable Ownership Size Mode of 
operation 
Age 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
LagEL 0.796*** 
(0.222) 
0.899*** 
(0.225) 
0.820*** 
(0.240) 
0.908*** 
(0.223) 
DV 0.054* (0.031) 0.071** 
(0.029) 
0.058* 
(0.032) 
0.080*** 
(0.029) 
DR 0.220** 
(0.106) 
0.250** 
(0.098) 
0.214** 
(0.098) 
0.248** 
(0.108) 
TBR 0.003 (0.022) -0.014 
(0.025) 
0.002 
(0.021) 
-0.005  
(0.024) 
IL 0.058** 
(0.029) 
0.067** 
(0.030) 
0.063* 
(0.032) 
0.069** 
(0.031) 
FL 1.170** 
(0.551) 
1.278** 
(0.621) 
1.147** 
(0.536) 
1.157** 
(0.576) 
Public* FL 0.241*(0.137) --- --- --- 
Large* FL --- 0.185 
(0.179) 
--- --- 
Islamic* FL --- --- 0.020 
(0.124) 
--- 
New* FL --- --- --- -1.272* 
(0.770) 
Wald chi2 (7) 94.45 (0.000) 91.35 
(0.000) 
81.21 
(0.000) 
105.59 
(0.000) 
Hansen Test 1.70 (0.637) 2.69 (0.442) 1.60 (0.658) 2.09 (0.553) 
Sargan Test 1.13 (0.770) 2.33 (0.507) 1.00 (0.802) 1.74 (0.628) 
Test for AR (1) 
errors 
-2.29 (0.022) -2.55 
(0.011) 
-2.24 
(0.025) 
-2.54 (0.011) 
Test for AR (2) 
errors 
0.20 (0.838) 0.26 (0.792) 0.22 (0.826) 0.32 (0.745) 
No. of banks 37 37 37 37 
No. of 
observations 
283 282 283 282 
Note 1: The FL variable here was constructed following the Abiad et al. index of financial 
liberalisation. The typology variables were taken in dummy form of 0-1 scale.  
Note 2: Robust standard errors were in parentheses to the right of the respective 
estimated coefficients. In the lower part of the table, the probability values were given in 
parentheses.  
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
For private banks, 1 per cent increase in financial liberalisation led to an 
increase of 1.170 while it was even higher for public banks (1.411). 
Similarly, small, conventional and old banks also experienced significant 
increase of 1.278, 1.147 and 1.157 respectively for a 1 per cent rise in 
financial liberalisation. New banks differed significantly from old banks and 
had lower percentage change (1.272) in excess liquidity. Large and Islamic 
banks did not experience significant difference to small and conventional 
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banks respectively. Overall, the results showed that excess liquidity 
increased for all banks which was in contrast to the theory forwarded by 
the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis where one of the aims of financial 
liberalisation hypothesis was to remove all shortcomings of lending and 
allocate credit freely which in turn should reduce excess liquidity29.  
 
The ‘ownership’ variable showed that the effect of financial liberalisation 
was higher for public banks than private banks. The state-owned banks 
having higher excess liquidity could be due to large number of staffs and 
lack of technological approach. However, excessive staff and lack of 
technological approach would have caused excess liquidity even without 
financial liberalisation. Therefore, a more plausible explanation of why 
public banks increased their excess liquidity more than other banks could 
be due to the fact that the financial liberalisation along with all its policies 
made the environment risky and uncertain. As observed by many studies 
before, public banks were usually less efficient than private ones and 
hence, they were less able to cope with this situation than their 
counterpart and therefore ended up having higher excess liquidity.  
 
The ‘age’ variable showed that the effect of financial liberalisation was 
lower for new banks than old banks. This meant that new banks coped with 
the risky environment better and thereby had less excess liquidity. This 
could be as a result of the higher efficiency of these banks due to their 
modern approach applying latest technologies of banking. Moreover, all the 
new banks had unique goal of profit maximisation while some of the old 
banks were public and had various social objectives to fulfil. The result did 
not show any significant pattern of difference of the effect of financial 
liberalisation for the remaining two typologies. These were: ‘mode of 
operation’ and ‘size’.  
 
 
                                               
29 Since bank typologies were taken in interaction form, hence, the coefficients of the FL, 
which were represented in different columns, showed the impact of private, conventional, 
small and old banks respectively. It could be observed that for all these banks, excess 
liquidity increased with the financial liberalisation. 
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4.6.3 Explanation of Results 
This study analysed the relationship between financial liberalisation and 
excess liquidity situation for the banking sector in Bangladesh using the 
two-step system GMM. The main aim of this study was to see how the 
process of financial liberalisation affected the excess liquidity situation in 
the banking sector in Bangladesh. Moreover, this study also attempted to 
see if there were any definite patterns between different types of banks in 
terms of excess liquidity as the financial liberalisation took place. To 
overcome the fact that the dataset started after the beginning of financial 
liberalisation in Bangladesh, an index of financial liberalisation was created. 
This not only helped to capture the different stages of financial 
liberalisation but also helped in analyzing how it affected the excess 
liquidity situation in Bangladesh.  
 
The ‘financial liberalisation’ variable had significant positive relationship 
with the excess liquidity for all types of banks. Increased uncertainty 
among the banks that this process brought along with it when it took place 
might have prevented lending from increasing enough to stop increase in 
excess liquidity or reduce it.  
 
As mentioned earlier, one significant feature of this study was that it used 
bank-level data. The advantage of this was that the bank-level data help in 
understanding better the differences at bank-level and also assists in 
identifying the differences across banks because it was easier to classify 
the banks according to different typology and examine the effect 
accordingly.  
 
Different classifications of banks showed that new banks had less growth of 
excess liquidity than the old banks indicating that they performed better in 
terms of managing risk and uncertainty brought along with the financial 
liberalisation. This result was in line with the work of Kraft and Tirtiroglu 
(1998).  
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Public banks were found to have higher growth of excess liquidity than the 
private banks indicating that they were not very efficient in lending 
operations which was consistent with earlier findings (Antwi-Asare and 
Addison, 2000; Abbas and Malik, 2010). However, it was important to 
remember that public banks do not follow the only objective of profit 
maximisation but they also needed to cater for different social needs as 
per the wish of the government. However, no definite patterns could be 
observed for Islamic or large banks. 
 
The results also showed that the relationships of the standard control 
variables of excess liquidity were generally consistent with the earlier 
studies of excess liquidity (e.g. Agenor et al., 2004; Saxegaard, 2006). The 
variables of deposit volatility, deposit rate and impaired loans were found 
to be significantly increasing the excess liquidity in the banking sector 
whereas the government bills and bonds and the lagged dependent 
variables were both showing insignificant relationship (the first one 
negative while the second one positive). As described before, the opposite 
and insignificant sign of the government bills and bonds was due to the 
particular scenario of Bangladesh where the lending rate has generally 
been higher than the treasury bill rate.  
 
4.6.3.1 Prudent Lending 
Prudent lending due to increased risk could lead banks to keep higher 
amount of excess liquidity. After financial liberalisation, with banks 
becoming more independent but at the same time having less support or 
backing from the government, banks needed to be more careful in all their 
operations including lending. It is also well-known that liberalisation could 
make the economy more vulnerable and fragile. The increased risk along 
with higher competition could lead banks toward improper lending and to 
higher default.  
 
Conversely, banks might become more prudent to survive in this new 
situation and lend carefully. This would lead toward lower NPL (as a ratio 
of total lending) but at the same time toward higher amount of excess 
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liquidity. This possibility was examined with the graph showing amount of 
NPL as a ratio of total lending.  
 
It could be observed that although this ratio experienced some increase at 
the beginning of this study period for a couple of years but then decreased 
continuously from 1999. This decline in the ratio justified the fact that 
banks have become more prudent in lending in the face of the more risky 
environment. 
 
Figure 4.5: NPL as a ratio of total loan 
 
Source: Bangladesh Bank Annual Report, various issues. 
 
4.6.3.2 Spread between Government Bill and Interest Rate 
Government bill and bond rate can also play a role for banks about whether 
to keep their reserve in this form to avoid risky lending. If the rate of 
government bills and bonds were higher than the lending rate then banks 
would be inclined more towards these options. If the rates of government 
bills and bonds were lower than the lending rate but were reasonably high, 
even then banks might still incline towards these options depending on 
other circumstances and earn interest since there was no risk involved.  
 
A close look at the government bill and bond rate (or the spread of it with 
the interest rate) overtime shed further light on this. Therefore, the spread 
is shown graphically in the following graph.   
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Figure 4.6: Lending rate and government bill rate spread 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on data from various issues of Bangladesh Bank 
Annual Report. 
 
The graph did not show any gradual increase overtime. Although it 
fluctuated significantly, overall it hovered around the same mark. This 
tendency alone may not justify banks moving towards government bills 
when there was higher return through lending. Nevertheless, higher risk in 
lending (due to increased interest rate) along with more prudent lending by 
banks could lead to a situation of high excess liquidity. In such a situation, 
banks might opt towards keeping more reserves in government bills as a 
second best option in terms of return but a more secured one, without the 
fear of default.  
 
4.6.3.3 Differences in Interest Rate 
Variations in interest rate according to different bank-specific 
characteristics can play a significant role in difference in excess liquidity. 
To analyse this, interest rates of banks were averaged for each typology. 
The higher the interest rate, it was expected that the less would be the 
demand for borrowing and hence higher excess liquidity. Therefore, it 
would be interesting to see if there were any differences in interest rates 
among the bank-specific characteristics. These are analysed in the 
following paragraphs.  
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Ownership Typology 
Interest rates for ownership typology showed that although they were very 
close at the beginning of the study period, they gradually diverged over 
time. There were years where there was convergence, still a substantial 
gap remained with the average interest rate of public banks were 
significantly higher than the private banks. This higher interest rate of 
public banks might be an explanation of why excess liquidity of public 
banks were negatively related with lending and positively related with 
excess liquidity as was found by this study.  
 
Figure 4.7: Interest rate according to ownership 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on Bankscope database.  
 
Size Typology 
Although gap between large and small banks could be observed in terms of 
interest rates, it could be seen that the gap was much smaller than 
ownership typology. This was one of the reasons why the size typology 
coefficient was not significant. This also implied that unless difference in 
interest rate according to a characteristic reach a certain level, the 
variation in lending will not be significantly affecting excess liquidity.  
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Figure 4.8: Interest rate according to size 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on Bankscope database.  
 
Mode of Operation Typology 
When Interest rates for mode of operation typology were analysed, it was 
observed that they had similar trends and not much gap existed between 
Islamic and conventional banks. Moreover, they experienced convergence 
in the latter period of study. This showed different pattern than the 
previous two typologies. Since no significant difference was found in this 
study for mode of operation typology, therefore, this graph further 
justified the fact that differences in interest rates played a crucial role in 
lending and thereby impacting excess liquidity. 
 
Figure 4.9: Interest rate according to mode of operation 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on Bankscope database.  
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Age Typology 
Figure 4.10: Interest rate according to age 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on Bankscope database.  
 
For age typology, interest rates were very close in 1997 but the gap 
increased dramatically in the next year and remained so with some more 
increase throughout the period of this study. Again the lower interest rate 
of new banks justified the finding and reasoning for higher lending of new 
banks than old banks and leading towards lower excess liquidity.  
 
4.7 CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
It can be concluded that this bank-level study on excess liquidity in 
Bangladesh has given further insight into the long and ongoing debate on 
financial liberalisation, its effectiveness and success. The results showed 
that along with the process of financial liberalisation, the excess liquidity 
situation in the banking sector increased indicating that it was unable to 
fully achieve one of its objectives of increasing credit supply well enough 
to reduce excess liquidity. The result was comprehensive in the sense that 
it used two different and wide-ranging measures of financial liberalisation 
with both providing similar conclusions as well as the findings were found 
to hold across different types of banks30. 
 
                                               
30  It should be noted that there may be difference between the short- and long-run 
effects. But T is not large enough in this study to investigate the presence of different 
effects for the short and the long-run. Therefore, this point is not investigated, 
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This study allowed one to frame specific policies and its implementations 
based on different bank-specific characteristics. One significant feature of 
this study was that it used bank-level data which helped in understanding 
better the differences at bank-level and to classify the banks according to 
different typology and examine the effect accordingly.  
 
For ownership typology, it was found that public banks had higher excess 
liquidity than private banks. Therefore, it is important that public banks 
step up their lending in normal times rather than using the advantage of 
government backing. On the other hand, careful attention is needed so 
that private banks do not lend injudiciously, which may look good in short-
run but can be detrimental in long-run due to the higher risk associated 
with imprudent lending.  
 
Similarly, for age typology, old banks were found to be having more excess 
liquidity than the new banks. Hence, old banks were needed to be 
encouraged to lend more using their advantages in lending towards large 
firms. Since Bangladesh is a country with many small firms, old banks were 
needed to concentrate in increasing their lending scope by raising lending 
to small firms and consumers. Specific targets should be set for these types 
of banks by the central bank in this regard as was done by the central bank 
in other cases (e.g., specific targets were set for agricultural lending by 
the central bank in Bangladesh). On the other hand, new banks should be 
monitored so that they do not overlend, particularly during the initial years 
to survive. An initial period of a few years of support may help these banks 
to lend more prudently and survive in this very competitive sector. 
 
This study observed no significant difference for mode of operation and 
size typologies. These results suggested that policies should be formulated 
and implemented on a priority basis where the characteristics of ownership 
and age need to be addressed first. This also supported the view that ‘one 
size fits all’ approach should be avoided and specific policies need to be 
formulated keeping in mind different bank-specific characteristics.  
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Although bank-level variations are observed, this does not mean that 
general policies are harmful and should not be taken. What this study 
points out is that only general policies are not enough and tailor-made 
policies for different bank characteristics based on the above findings can 
be very helpful in terms of effectiveness. Therefore, a multidimensional 
approach should be taken to get the maximum benefit or attainment of the 
objective since these characteristics were overlapping for banks. Moreover, 
special attention needs to be given for the variation in interest rates 
according to bank-specific characteristics. As observed from Figures 4.8 to 
4.11, rate of interest played an important role in lending and variation in 
interest rates had an impact to difference in lending. Therefore, steps 
need to be taken to address this variation and reduce it to a level so that 
lending does not differ much according to these bank-specific 
characteristics. 
 
The financial liberalisation index constructed and applied in this study 
showed that although liberalisation started in Bangladesh in the early 
1990s, it was still far from reaching its completion stage. Hence, it is very 
important that the remaining process is incorporated and accomplished 
with urgency so that maximum benefit from it can be achieved.  
 
Sequencing of liberalisation can also play a crucial role in achieving the 
benefit from this process. If a country is at its early stage, then it is very 
important to keep in mind this process of sequencing. But for countries 
where the process started long back and was in place for years, it might be 
useful to work on strengthening the institutional factors as a pre-requisite 
for the success of financial liberalisation (Caprio et al., 2006). 
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APPENDIX 4.1: Data availability of banks in Bankscope 
Table 4A.1: Data availability of banks in Bankscope 
No. Name Form available Form 
taken 
Period Total 
Year 
1 Sonali Bank Unconsolidated U 1997-2011 15 
2 Agrani Bank Unconsolidated U 1997-2011 15 
3 Rupali Bank Unconsolidated U 1997-2011 15 
4 Janata Bank Both (U & C) U 1997-2011 15 
5 United Commercial Bank  Both (U & C) U 1997-2011 15 
6 Mutual Trust Bank  Both (U & C) U 2000-2011 12 
7 BRAC Bank  Both (U & C) U 2001-2011 11 
8 Eastern Bank  Both (U & C) U 1997-2011 15 
9 Dutch Bangla Bank  Unconsolidated U 1997-2011 15 
10 Dhaka Bank Limited Both (U & C) C 1997-2011 15 
11 Islami Bank Bangladesh  Consolidated C 1997-2011 15 
12 Uttara Bank Limited Unconsolidated U 1997-2011 15 
13 Pubali Bank Limited Both (U & C) U 1997-2011 15 
14 IFIC Bank Limited Consolidated C 1997-2011 15 
15 National Bank Limited Both (U & C) C 1997-2011 15 
16 The City Bank Limited Both (U & C) U 1997-2011 15 
17 NCC Bank Limited Unconsolidated U 1997-2011 15 
18 Mercantile Bank Limited Unconsolidated U 1999-2011 13 
19 Prime Bank Limited Both (U & C) U 1997-2011 15 
20 Southeast Bank Limited Both (U & C) U 1997-2011 15 
21 Al-Arafah Islami Bank  Both (U & C) U 1997-2011 14* 
22 Social Islami Bank Ltd  Both (U & C) U 1998-2011 14 
23 Standard Bank Limited Consolidated C 1999-2011 13 
24 One Bank Limited Both (U & C) U 1999-2011 13 
25 First Security Islami Bank  Unconsolidated U 1999-2011 13 
26 The Premier Bank Limited Both (U & C) U 1999-2011 13 
27 Bank Asia Limited Both (U & C) U 1999-2011 13 
28 Trust Bank Limited Unconsolidated U 2000-2011 12 
29 Shahjalal Islami Bank Ltd  Unconsolidated U 2001-2011 11 
30 Jamuna Bank Limited Both (U & C) C 2001-2011 11 
31 ICB Islamic Bank Limited Unconsolidated U 1997-2011 12* 
32 AB Bank Both (U & C) U 1997-2011 15 
33 EXIM Bank Limited Unconsolidated U 1999-2011 13 
34 
Bangladesh Commerce 
Bank Limited 
Unconsolidated U 2000-2011 12 
35 Bangladesh Krishi Bank Unconsolidated U 1997-2011 15 
36 
Bangladesh Development 
Bank Ltd 
Unconsolidated U 1997-2009 12* 
37 BASIC Bank Limited  Unconsolidated U 1997-2011 15 
38 
Rajshahi Krishi Unnayan 
Bank 
Not available   No 
* One or more year(s) missing inside the period. 
U = Unconsolidated, C = Consolidated 
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APPENDIX 4.2: Variable definitions 
Table 4A.2: Variable definitions 
Variable Name 
 
Variable Definition 
 
Comment 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
   
Excess liquidity Liquid assets =summing up 
trading securities and at fair 
value through income + loans 
and advances to banks + 
reverse repos and cash 
collateral + cash and due from 
banks) -mandatory reserves 
included above.  
 
log value taken 
Explanatory 
Variables 
 
  
Lag of excess 
liquidity 
Lag of initial year data  log value of initial 
year data taken 
Financial 
liberalisation (FL) 
A composite index of seven 
indicators following Abiad et al. 
but constructed by authors 
Actual values taken 
first and then log 
values taken.  
   
Deposit volatility SD of total deposit (using 3-year 
overlapping SD estimation) 
log value taken 
Deposit rate Interest expense/ average 
interest-bearing liabilities 
log value taken 
Government bills 
and bonds 
(Treasury bill rate of 91-day) - 
(interest income/ average 
earning assets) 
log value taken 
Impaired loans Impaired loans / gross loans log value taken 
Ownership 
dummy with 
interaction 
FL* Public (1 if state-owned, 0 
otherwise) 
 
Size dummy with 
interaction 
FL* Large (1 if large, 0 
otherwise) 
 
Mode of 
operation dummy 
with interaction 
FL* Islamic (1 if Islamic, 0 
otherwise) 
 
Age dummy with 
interaction 
FL* New (1 if new {established 
after 1990}, 0 otherwise) 
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APPENDIX 4.3: Bank size classifications  
Table 4A.3: Bank size classifications 
Sl. No.  Name of PCB  Bank Size 
1 AB Bank Small to Large 
2 Agrani Bank Large 
3 Al-Arafah Islami Bank Small to Large 
4 Bangladesh Commerce Bank Small 
5 Bangladesh Development Bank Small 
6 Bangladesh Krishi Bank Small to Large 
7 Bank Asia Small to Large 
8  BASIC Bank Small  
9 BRAC Bank Small to Large 
10 City Bank Small to Large 
11 Dhaka Bank Small to Large 
12 Dutch Bangla Bank Small to Large 
13 Eastern Bank Small to Large 
14 EXIM Bank Small to Large 
15 First Security Islami Bank Small to Large 
16 ICB Islamic Bank Limited Small 
17 IFIC Bank Small to Large 
18 Islami Bank Bangladesh Small to Large 
19 Jamuna Bank Small to Large 
20 Janata Bank Large 
21 Mercantile Bank Small to Large 
22 Mutual Trust Bank Small 
23 National Bank Small to Large 
24 NCC Bank Small to Large 
25 One Bank Small 
26 Premier Bank Small 
27 Prime Bank Limited Small to Large 
28 Pubali Bank Small to Large 
29 Rupali Bank Small to Large 
30 Shahjalal Islami Bank Small to Large 
31 Social Islami Bank Small to Large 
32 Sonali Bank Large 
33 Southeast Bank Small to Large 
34 Standard Bank Small 
35 Trust Bank Small 
36 United Commercial Bank Small to Large 
37 Uttara Bank Small to Large 
Source: Defined according to total asset data from Bankscope.  
*Small to Large means that asset of the bank was lower than $1 billion at the beginning 
but crossed the threshold at some part during this period.  
 
 
 
 
133 
 
APPENDIX 4.4: Generation of PCBs in Bangladesh 
Table 4A.4: Generation of PCBs in Bangladesh 
Sl. No. 
 
Name of PCB Year of Foundation/ 
Denationalisation* 
1 Arab Bangladesh Bank Limited  1982 
2 IFIC Bank Limited  1983 
3 Uttara Bank Limited  1983* 
4 Pubali Bank Limited  1983* 
5 National Bank Limited  1983 
6 Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited  1983 
7 The City Bank Limited  1983 
8  United Commercial Bank Limited  1983 
9 ICB Islami Bank Limited  1987 
10 Eastern Bank Limited  1992 
11 NCC Bank Limited  1993 
12 Prime Bank Limited  1995 
13 Dhaka Bank Limited  1995 
14 Al-Arafah Islami Bank Limited  1995 
15 Southeast Bank Limited  1995 
16 Social Islami Bank Ltd  1995 
17 Dutch-Bangla Bank Limited  1996 
18 Trust Bank Limited  1999 
19 Bank Asia Limited  1999 
20 EXIM Bank Limited  1999 
21 First Security Islami Bank  1999 
22 Mutual Trust Bank  1999 
23 Mercantile Bank Limited  1999 
24 ONE Bank Limited  1999 
25 The Premier Bank Limited  1999 
26 Standard Bank Limited  1999 
27 Bangladesh Commerce Bank  1999 
28 BRAC Bank Limited  2001 
29 Jamuna Bank Limited  2001 
30 Shahjalal Islami Bank Limited  2001 
Source: Bangladesh Bank Annual Report, various issues. 
*Uttara Bank and Pubali Bank were denationalised to operate as private commercial bank. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
134 
 
APPENDIX 4.5: Coding rules for the financial liberalisation index  
 
Coding rules for the financial liberalisation index, in line with the work of 
Abiad et al. (2010), is described below. To construct an index of financial 
liberalisation, codes were assigned along the seven dimensions below. Each 
dimension had various sub-dimensions. Based on the score for each sub-
dimension, each dimension received a ‘raw score.’ The explanations for 
each sub-dimension below indicate how to assign the raw score. 
 
After a ‘raw score’ was assigned, Abiad et al. (2010) normalised to a 0-3 
scale. The normalisation was done on the basis of the classifications listed 
below for each dimension. That is, fully liberalised = 3; partially liberalised 
= 2; partially repressed = 1; fully repressed = 0. 
 
The final scores were used to compute an aggregate index for each year by 
assigning equal weight to each dimension. For example, if the ‘raw score’ 
on credit controls and reserve requirements totals 4 (by assigning a code of 
2 for liberal reserve requirements, 1 for lack of directed credit and 1 for 
lack of subsidised directed credit), this was equivalent to the definition of 
fully liberalised. So, the normalisation would assign a score of 3 on the 0-3 
scale. However, in this study, we avoided the normalisation process as we 
thought that this would reflect the process better. 
 
The questions used by Abiad et al. (2010) are described here. This study 
used the same seven dimensions. These seven dimensionsand the situation 
in Bangladesh in respect to these are given below to explain how each 
dimension was extended.  
 
I. Credit Controls and Reserve Requirements: 
1) Were reserve requirements restrictive? 
  Coded as 0 if reserve requirement was more than 20 per cent. 
  Coded as 1 if reserve requirements were reduced to 10–20 per cent or 
complicated regulations to set reserve requirements were simplified as a 
step toward reducing reserve requirements 
  Coded as 2 if reserve requirements were less than 10 per cent. 
2) Were there minimum amounts of credit that must be channeled to 
certain sectors? 
  Coded as 0 if credit allocations were determined by the central bank or 
mandatory credit allocations to certain sectors exist. 
  Coded as 1 if mandatory credit allocations to certain sectors were 
eliminated or do not exist. 
3) Were there any credits supplied to certain sectors at subsidised rates? 
  Coded as 0 when banks have to supply credits at subsidised rates to 
certain sectors. 
  Coded as 1 when the mandatory requirement of credit allocation at 
subsidised rates was eliminated or banks do not have to supply credits at 
subsidised rates. 
 
II. Aggregate Credit Ceilings 
  Coded as 0 if ceilings on expansion of bank credit were in place. This 
includes bank-specific credit ceilings imposed by the central bank. 
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  Coded as 1 if no restrictions exist on the expansion of bank credit. 
 
 
III. Interest Rate Liberalisation 
Deposit rates and lending rates were separately considered, in coding this 
measure, in order to look at the type of regulations for each set of rates. 
They were coded as being government set or subject to a binding ceiling 
(code=0), fluctuating within a band (code=1) or freely floating (code=2). 
The coding was based on the following description: 
 
FL=4 [2, 2] 
Fully Liberalised if both deposit interest rates and lending interest rates 
were determined at market rates. 
LL = 3 [2, 1] 
Largely Liberalised when either deposit rates or lending rates were freed 
but the other rates were subject to band or only a part of interest rates 
were determined at market rates. 
PR= 2/1 [2, 0] [1, 1][1, 0] 
Partially Repressed when either deposit rates or lending rates were freed 
but the other interest rates were set by government or subject to 
ceiling/floor; or both deposit rates and lending rates were subject to band 
or partially liberalised; or either deposit rates or lending rates were 
subject to band or partially liberalised. 
FR= 0 [0, 0]  
Fully Repressed when both deposit rates and lending rates were set by the 
government or subject to ceiling/floor. 
 
IV. Banking Sector Entry 
The following sub-measures were considered: 
1) To what extent does the government allow foreign banks to enter into a 
domestic market? 
This question was coded to examine whether a country allows the entry of 
foreign banks into a domestic market; whether branching restrictions of 
foreign banks were eased; to what degree the equity ownership of 
domestic banks by nonresidents was allowed. 
  Coded as 0 when no entry of foreign banks was allowed; or tight 
restrictions on the opening of new foreign banks were in place. 
  Coded as 1 when foreign bank entry was allowed, but nonresidents must 
hold less than 50 per cent equity share. 
  Coded as 2 when the majority of share of equity ownership of domestic 
banks by nonresidents was allowed; or equal treatment was ensured for 
both foreign banks and domestic banks; or an unlimited number of 
branching was allowed for foreign banks. 
Three questions look at policies to enhance the competition in the 
domestic banking market. 
2) Does the government allow the entry of new domestic banks? 
  Coded as 0 when the entry of new domestic banks was not allowed or 
strictly regulated. 
  Coded as 1 when the entry of new domestic banks or other financial 
institutions was allowed into the domestic market. 
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3) Were there restrictions on branching? (0/1) 
  Coded as 0 when branching restrictions were in place. 
  Coded as 1 when there were no branching restrictions or if restrictions 
were eased. 
 
4) Does the government allow banks to engage in a wide range of 
activities? (0/1) 
  Coded as 0 when the range of activities that bank can take consists of 
only banking activities. 
  Coded as 1 when banks were allowed to become universal banks. 
 
The dimension of entry barriers was coded by adding the scores of these 
three questions. 
Fully Liberalised= 4 or 5, Largely Liberalised= 3, Partially Repressed= 1 
or 2, Fully Repressed = 0 
 
V. Capital Account Transactions 
1) Was the exchange rate system unified? (0/1) 
  Coded as 0 when a special exchange rate regime for either capital or 
current account transactions exists. 
  Coded as 1 when the exchange rate system was unified. 
 
2) Does a country set restrictions on capital inflow? (0/1) 
  Coded as 0 when significant restrictions exist on capital inflows. 
  Coded as 1 when banks were allowed to borrow from abroad freely 
without restrictions and there were no tight restrictions on other capital 
inflows. 
 
3) Does a country set restrictions on capital outflow? (0/1) 
  Coded as 0 when restrictions exist on capital outflows. 
  Coded as 1 when capital outflows were allowed to flow freely or with 
minimal approval restrictions. 
 
By adding these three items, 
Fully Liberalised = [3], Largely Liberalised = [2], Partially Repressed = 
[1], Fully Repressed= [0] 
 
VI. Privatisation 
Privatisation of banks was coded as follows: 
Fully Liberalised: if no state banks exist or state-owned banks do not 
consist of any significant portion of banks and/or the percentage of public 
bank assets was less than 10 per cent. 
Largely Liberalised: if most banks were privately owned and/or the 
percentage of public bank assets was from 10 per cent to 25 per cent. 
Partially Repressed: if many banks were privately owned but major banks 
were still state-owned and/or the percentage of public bank assets was 25 
per cent to 50 per cent. 
Fully Repressed: if major banks were all state owned banks and/or the 
percentage of public bank assets was from 50 per cent to 100 per cent. 
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VII. Securities Markets 
1) Has a country taken measures to develop securities markets? 
  Coded as 0 if a securities market does not exist. 
  Coded as 1 when a securities market was starting to form with the 
introduction of auctioning of T-bills or the establishment of a security 
commission. 
  Coded as 2 when further measures have been taken to develop securities 
markets (tax exemptions, introduction of medium and long-term 
government bonds in order to build the benchmark of a yield curve, 
policies to develop corporate bond and equity markets, or the introduction 
of a primary dealer system to develop government security markets). 
  Coded as 3 when further policy measures have been taken to develop 
derivative markets or to broaden the institutional investor base by 
deregulating portfolio investments and pension funds, or completing the 
full deregulation of stock exchanges. 
 
2) Was a country’s equity market open to foreign investors? 
  Coded as 0 if no foreign equity ownership was allowed. 
  Coded as 1 when foreign equity ownership was allowed but there was less 
than 50 per cent foreign ownership. 
  Coded as 2 when a majority equity share of foreign ownership was 
allowed. 
 
By adding these two sub-dimensions, 
Fully Liberalised = [4 or 5], Largely Liberalised = [3], Partially Repressed 
= [1, 2], and Fully Repressed = [0] 
 
**NOTE** 
If information on the second sub-dimension was not available (as was the 
case with some low income countries), the measure was coded using 
information on securities market development. When information on 
securities markets were considered, a 0-3 scale was assigned based on the 
score on securities markets. 
 
VIII. Banking Sector Supervision 
1) Has a country adopted a capital adequacy ratio based on the Basel 
standard? (0/1) 
  Coded as 0 if the Basel risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio was not 
implemented. Date of implementation was important, in terms of passing 
legislation to enforce the Basel requirement of 8 per cent CAR. 
  Coded as 1 when Basel CAR was in force. (Note: If the large majority of 
banks meet the prudential requirement of an 8 per cent risk-weighted 
capital adequacy ratio, but this was not a mandatory ratio as in Basel, the 
measure was still classified as 1). Prior to 1993, when the Basel regulations 
were not in place internationally, this measure takes the value of 0. 
 
2) Was the banking supervisory agency independent from executives’ 
influence? (0/1/2) 
A banking supervisory agency’s independence was ensured when the 
banking supervisory agency can resolve banks’ problems without delays. 
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Delays were often caused by the lack of autonomy of the banking 
supervisory agency, which was caused by political interference. For 
example, when the banking supervisory agency has to obtain approval from 
different agencies such as the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in revoking or 
suspending licenses of banks or liquidating banks’ assets, or when the 
ultimate jurisdiction of the banking supervisory agency was the MOF, it 
often causes delays in resolving banking problems. In addition to the 
independence from political interference, the banking supervisory agency 
also has to be given enough power to resolve banks’ problems promptly. 
  Coded as 0 when the banking supervisory agency does not have an 
adequate legal framework to promptly intervene in banks’ activities; 
and/or when there was the lack of legal framework for the independence 
of the supervisory agency such as the appointment and removal of the head 
of the banking supervisory agency; or the ultimate jurisdiction of the 
banking supervision was under the MOF; or when a frequent turnover of the 
head of the supervisory agency was experienced. 
  Coded as 1 when the objective supervisory agency was clearly defined 
and an adequate legal framework to resolve banking problems was 
provided (the revocation and the suspension of authorisation of banks, 
liquidation of banks and the removal of banks’ executives etc.) but 
potential problems remain concerning the independence of the banking 
supervisory agency (for example, when the MOF may intervene into the 
banking supervision in such as case that the board of the banking 
supervisory agency board was chaired by the MOF, although the fixed term 
of the board was ensured by law); or although clear legal objectives and 
legal independence were observed, the adequate legal framework for 
resolving problems was not well articulated. 
  Coded as 2 when a legal framework for the objectives and the resolution 
of troubled banks was set up and if the banking supervisory agency was 
legally independent from the executive branch and actually not interfered 
with by the executive branch. 
 
3) Does a banking supervisory agency conduct effective supervisions 
through on-site and off-site examinations? (0/1/2) 
Conducting on-site and off-site examinations of banks was an important 
way to monitor banks’ balance sheets. 
  Coded as 0 when a country has no legal framework and practices of on-
site and off-site examinations was not provided or when no on-site and off-
site examinations were conducted. 
  Coded as 1 when the legal framework of on-site and off-site examinations 
was set up and the banking supervision agency have conducted 
examinations but in an ineffective or insufficient manner. 
  Coded as 2 when the banking supervisory agency conducts effective and 
sophisticated examinations. 
 
4) Does a country’s banking supervisory agency cover all financial 
institutions without exception? (0/1) 
If some kinds of banks were not exclusively supervised by the banking 
supervisory agency or if offshore intermediaries of banks were excluded 
from the supervision, the effectiveness of the banking supervision was 
seriously undermined. 
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  Coded as 1 when all banks were under supervision by supervisory agencies 
without exception. 
  Coded as 0 if some kinds of financial institutions were not exclusively 
supervised by the banking supervisory or were excluded from banking 
supervisory agency oversights. 
 
Enhancement of banking supervision over the banking sector was coded by 
summing up these four dimensions, which were assigned a degree of reform 
as follows. 
Highly Regulated = [6], Largely Regulated = [4-5], Less Regulated = [2-3], 
Not Regulated = [0-1] 
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Appendix 4.6: Coverage area of this study of the banking sector 
 
During the period of this study (1997-2011), there were altogether 47 banks 
operating in Bangladesh. Of them, 9 were foreign commercial banks. As 
mentioned in footnote 4, they were excluded due to data unavailability. 
For the same reason, one specialised bank, Rajshahi Krishi Unnayan Bank, 
could not be included in this study. With the exception of these 10 banks, 
all the remaining banks were included in this study. These 37 banks 
included in the study, represent the banking sector in Bangladesh very well 
since they account for more than 99 per cent of bank branches. Moreover, 
they had a share of more than 90 per cent of assets and deposits of these 
47 banks (Bangladesh Bank Annual Report, 2013). These are graphically 
presented here with the help of table and pie charts. 
 
Table 4A.5: Coverage area of this study of the banking sector in 2011 
Classification Number of 
branches 
Total assets 
(in billion taka) 
Deposits 
(in billion taka) 
Share of banks 
excluding FCBs 
7898 5482.2 4237.5 
Share of FCBs 63 385.4 272.2 
TOTAL 7961 5867.6 4509.7 
Source: Bangladesh Bank Annual Report 2013. 
 
Figures 4A.1: Coverage area of this study of the banking sector 
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CHAPTER 5 
EXCESS LIQUIDITY ACCORDING TO BANK TYPOLOGY, BUSINESS 
CYCLE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
There were many studies on the lending behaviour with different bank 
ownerships in terms of business cycle. It was observed that different types 
of banks had different lending patterns over the business cycle. Some of 
them were procyclical, some were counter-cyclical while some were 
acyclical. These studies were generally done for public and private banks.  
 
Although it was not true in all cases but generally it was observed that 
private banks’ lending pattern was procyclical whereas public banks lent 
less procyclically in most cases (Davydov, 2013). However, sometimes the 
lending of public banks was found to be even counter-cyclical (Bertay et 
al., 2012). Some other studies found mixed results for different countries 
or regions (Cull and Peria, 2012) while some others did not find any 
significant difference in lending between these two types of banks 
(Iannotta, et al., 2011).  
 
Another interesting and related topic which may also affect the lending 
behavior of banks was crisis time. Generally it was observed that public 
banks were less procyclical than the private banks in non-crisis times. 
During the recent financial crisis of 2008-09, the public banks played a 
positive role for the economy by either acting counter-cyclically or at least 
less procyclically.  
 
In some cross-country studies on non-crisis times, it was commonly found 
that public banks were less efficient, and sometimes led to lower financial 
development, than the private banks (Barth et al., 2004; Bonin et al., 
2005; Duprey, 2013). Micco et al. (2007) observed that this feature of 
higher efficiency of private banks was truer for developing countries than 
the developed countries. However, since public banks had additional 
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agenda to fulfill, this property of efficiency might not be appropriate to 
distinguish between public and private banks. 
 
This view of dissimilarity in lending according to ownership was also 
supported by various country-level studies. For example, Berger et al. 
(2008) observed it for Argentina, Lin and Zhang (2009) found it for China, 
and Omran (2007) witnessed it for Egypt. But in some cases it was observed 
that public banks and private banks were almost equally efficient (Beck et 
al., 2005; Kraft et al., 2006).  
 
Since most of the earlier studies discussed the differences in ownership and 
their effect, this study addressed the issue using some additional typologies 
of banking. This included the most common typology of ownership (public 
versus private banks) along with size (small versus large banks), mode of 
operation (Islamic versus conventional banks) and age (new versus old 
banks). It would be interesting to see if the large banks behaved differently 
from the small banks about their liquid assets while if there was any 
pattern for new banks which separated them from the old banks. The 
growth of Islamic banking worldwide and in Bangladesh made it a very 
worthy effort to investigate if they differed from the conventional banks.  
 
5.1.1 Capitalisation and Excess Liquidity 
After the financial crisis of 2007, a process of recapitalisation started to 
help the banking sector. The Euro area governments announced different 
measures to support these institutions and one of them was recapitalisation 
of the financial institutions in difficulty (Stark, 2009). This phenomenon 
was also observed by Brei and Gadanecz (2012), especially for the G10 
countries. In another paper, the authors mentioned that public 
recapitalisations were almost equal to $500 billions between 2007 and 2010 
(Brei et al., 2013) in the G10 countries. Brei and Gadanecz (2012) observed 
that majority funds were provided during the period of 2008Q4 to 2009Q1 
and most funds were allocated to US, UK, Germany, Netherlands and 
France.  
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Therefore, it was important to see if the process of capitalisation was 
related with excess liquidity. Delechat et al. (2012), in their study of 96 
commercial banks from Central American countries, observed that there 
was significant inverse relationship between capitalisation and excess 
liquidity. According to them, better capitalised banks had easier access to 
markets and thus held less liquidity.  
 
Capitalisation could play a key role in reducing the liquidity risk of the 
banks which in turn could reduce the amount of excess liquidity any bank 
holds. Since the amount of capitalisation could vary according to bank 
typologies, it was important to examine how different bank types were 
affected and how they differed in keeping excess liquidity. For example, 
public banks have the government to back up in case of any emergency and 
hence they will be less worried about the liquidity risk and may end up 
keeping less excess liquidity than the private banks. Similarly, large banks 
would be more capitalised than the smaller ones and therefore small banks 
would keep more excess liquidity than large banks due to the higher 
liquidity risk. 
 
Walker (2012) found evidence that the lending behaviour of less well-
capitalised banks was more sensitive to monetary policy shocks than that of 
better-capitalised banks. Opolot (2013) observed that the interaction term 
between bank capitalisation and monetary policy was positive and 
significant implying that banks with high capitalisation ratio were able to 
offer more loans during a period of monetary policy 31  tightening (also 
supported by Zulkefly et al., 2010). This could be due to the fact that 
banks with higher capitalisation ratio might not be affected that much by a 
contractionary monetary policy stance.   
 
5.1.2 Structural and Cyclical Factors 
Based on the characteristics, the determinants of the involuntary excess 
liquidity could be classified into two types: (i) structural factors – due to 
                                               
31 Monetary policy is one of the policies of central bank involving management of money 
supply mainly using interest rate with the objectives include attaining growth, low 
unemployment and controlling inflation. 
145 
 
macroeconomic and financial development – and (ii) cyclical factors 
(Pontes and Murta, 2012). The first structural determinant of involuntary 
liquidity was low degree of financial development. This was inversely 
related with excess liquidity since an inefficient interbank market and high 
costs of financial operations (e.g. evaluation and monitoring costs) lead 
banks to keep higher level of reserves (Agenor and Aynaoui, 2010). High 
degree of risk aversion was another structural determinant. It was 
positively related with excess liquidity as it caused banks to demand a high 
risk premium and lowered private sector credit demand. The degree of risk 
aversion was related with macroeconomic instability (Agenor and Aynaoui, 
2010). Other structural factors included asymmetric information and lack 
of competition in the banking sector (Saxegaard, 2006).  
 
Among the cyclical factors, inflation was the most mentioned one. This 
was positively related as a rise in inflation caused higher volatility in 
relative prices and higher uncertainty in the risk degree of investment 
projects and in the value of collateral (Agenor and Aynaoui, 2010). 
Therefore, leading banks to demand higher interest rates on loans which 
reduced the credit demand and thereby increasing excess liquidity. 
Another cyclical determinant was capital inflow. This could happen as a 
result of various reasons which include oil commerce receipts, foreign 
direct investment (FDI) associated with liberalisation of capital flows 
and/or foreign aid (Saxegaard, 2006). It was also observed that steps 
removing restrictions on capital inflows for non-residents (maintaining the 
restrictions on capital outflows), along with privatisation of state 
enterprises could lead to large inflows of capital intermediated by banks 
and hence to larger amount of excess liquidity (Agenor and Aynaoui, 2010).  
 
5.1.3 Contribution of this Chapter 
The objective of this research was to fill some of the gaps in this strand of 
literature. The main questions addressed in this study are described below. 
 
(i) Does ownership matter in case of the effect of business cycle? From 
earlier studies, it could be observed that public banks may had less excess 
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liquidity due to the fact that these banks had support from the government 
and therefore would worry less than the private banks about the liquidity 
risk. We would like to test if business cycle affects the excess liquidity 
situation differently between public and private banks. 
 
(ii) Does the effect of business cycle vary with bank size? This study 
examined if business cycle affected differently the excess liquidity 
situation for large and small banks. From the point of capitalisation, it was 
mentioned that large banks were more capitalised and therefore would 
have less excess liquidity than the small banks due to fear of liquidity risk.  
 
(iii) Was there any difference according to age? Another issue was to look 
at whether old banks have more or less excess liquidity than new banks. 
For newer banks, it was easier to raise deposits and relatively difficult to 
identify reliable borrowers. Hence, it was expected that new banks would 
have more excess liquidity than old banks since the old banks usually have 
more information and it becomes easier for them to screen the borrowers.  
 
(iv) Were Islamic banks affected differently? Since Bangladesh is a Muslim 
populated country and the Islamic banking system was flourishing quickly 
and formed a substantial part, therefore it was important to see if the 
Islamic banking system was affected differently in terms of excess liquidity 
situation from the conventional banking system. It was generally observed 
that Islamic banks, due to its inherent restrictions, did not have enough 
instruments like the conventional banks to address the issue of excess 
liquidity and therefore suffered more from this problem. So, it was 
expected that Islamic banks will have more excess liquidity than the 
conventional banks.  
 
(v)  Were financial crisis and excess liquidity related? Financial crisis is a 
time when the banks would not feel very confident to lend and there would 
be less demand from the investors’ side. Hence there was supposed to be a 
positive relationship between the crisis and the excess liquidity. However, 
the period of crisis was normally accompanied by a process of 
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recapitalisation to make the economy move on by increased lending. This 
process might in turn reduce the amount of excess liquidity. Therefore, 
excess liquidity is expected to increase in the short-term and decrease 
later.    
 
(vi) Did the relationship of excess liquidity with financial crisis follow 
the same pattern as business cycle? Finally this study also saw if the 
relationship of different bank typologies (ownership, size, mode of 
operation and age) followed the same pattern of relationship as it did for 
the business cycle bust or did it follow a different pattern. It would be 
interesting to see if all these typologies had a significant impact on excess 
liquidity with the process of business cycle or in time of the financial crisis. 
It could happen that in some cases, they were significant while in some 
other cases, they were not. This indicated differences of the impact on 
these typologies.  
 
5.2 PREVIOUS WORKS 
Most of the studies in this area were cross-country studies. As discussed in 
Section 5.1, the general finding was that public banks lend less 
procyclically in most cases. While sometimes the lending was found to be 
counter-cyclical, some studies also found mixed results for different 
countries or regions and some did not find any significant difference. 
Similarly, different ownerships of banks had different lending patterns 
during the crisis time. In different cross-country studies on non-crisis times, 
it was commonly found that public banks were less efficient and sometimes 
led to lower financial development than the private banks. This feature of 
higher efficiency of private banks was truer for developing countries than 
the developed countries. 
 
Davydov (2013) identified three possible reasons for the comparative 
inefficiency of the public banks. These were: (i) political interference, that 
deviate them from the profit maximisation aims; (ii) incentives structure 
for managers were weaker than the private banks; and (iii) inferior 
incentives for owners leading to poor monitoring.  
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However, as already mentioned, comparing public and private banks in 
terms of efficiency or profitability can be misleading (UNCTAD, 2008) since 
public banks have other agenda (along with that of profitability) and hence 
pursuing solely the profit objective is not their aim. Therefore, they may 
sometime need to sacrifice the objective of profit maximisation and 
become less profitable than the private banks. This (less profitability) does 
not imply that the public banks were less efficient.  
 
During the recent financial crisis of 2008-09, public banks played a positive 
role for the economy by generally acting counter-cyclically (Allen et al., 
2013) or less procyclically (Fungacova et al., 2013). This was crucial and 
helped the economy to stabilise as the domestic private banks acted 
procyclically (Kowalewski and Rybinski, 2011; Cull and Peria, 2012). This 
was also true for earlier financial crises in Asia and Latin America in the 
1990s (Hawkins and Mihaljek, 2001).  
 
Micco and Panizza (2006), in their study of 179 countries, mentioned four 
possible reasons why public banks stabilise credit. These were: 
(i) it was part of their objectives as public banks; 
(ii) generally it was considered by depositors to be a safer place during 
possible bank failures, hence the public banks end up having a 
better deposit base during the crisis and thereby also in a better 
position to smooth credit; 
(iii) sometimes the public banks do not have a proper set of incentives 
and hence the public bank managers can be lazy; 
(iv) politicians might try to influence public bank lending in election 
years. 
 
Bank lending and excess liquidity were very closely related two aspects 
(Alper et al., 2012) of the banking sector and there were many works on 
lending and bank ownership related to the financial crisis and business 
cycle. Interestingly enough, there were very few empirical works on excess 
liquidity directly related to the financial crisis, especially investigating the 
aftermath of the crisis on excess liquidity. Similar was also true for 
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business cycle and excess liquidity. Therefore, this study is trying to fill this 
gap in the existing literature with the following three objectives. Firstly, by 
investigating how excess liquidity was affected when the recent financial 
crisis occurred. Secondly, to see the movement of excess liquidity with the 
business cycle process. Finally, examine if there were any differences in 
excess liquidity situation in terms of ownership, size, mode of operation 
and age.   
 
The boom and bust of the business cycle can have an effect on the excess 
liquidity situation of the banks. During economic boom, there is an increase 
in demand for loans and the probability of loan default decreases. This 
makes banks become softer in lending which may reduce the excess 
liquidity situation. During the bust or downturn, banks become stricter as 
the probability of loan default increases. Moreover, investors also become 
more careful in investing at this time and may deposit more in banks. This 
implies that the relationship between the business cycle and the excess 
liquidity is generally expected to be negative meaning that during the 
boom period of the business cycle, there will be less excess liquidity while 
during the bust period, the excess liquidity will be more (Ruckes, 2004). 
Therefore, an inverse relationship is expected to prevail between business 
cycle and the excess liquidity. 
 
The financial crisis and business cycle can be closely related due to the 
fact that if the downturn or recession of the business cycle goes on for a 
long time, it can lead to crisis. This reasoning was supported by Bordo et 
al. (2001): “crises are an intrinsic part of the business cycle and result from 
shocks to economic fundamentals.” 
 
Heeboll-Christensen (2011) used the US data from 1987 to 2010 and found 
that “mechanisms of credit growth and excess liquidity are found to be 
closely related.” According to this study, housing bubble was created 
initially with a prolonged credit cycle and was fuelled by excess liquidity 
and led to the financial crisis of 2007.  
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The existing works on financial crisis and excess liquidity can broadly be 
divided into two categories. One group discussed how excess liquidity acted 
as one of the factors for the financial crisis (Palma, 2009; Acharya and 
Naqvi, 2012; Brana et al., 2012).  
 
The other group discussed how the crisis situation could affect excess 
liquidity. One of the possible effects of financial crisis was that it increased 
the uncertainty and riskiness in the economy. This made lending riskier for 
the banks. Therefore, banks lend less and thereby increasing the excess 
liquidity situation. This was found in the studies of Agenor et al. (2004) for 
Thailand and Ashcraft et al. (2011) for US. Montoro and Moreno (2011) 
found similar results for Peru. In another study, Murta and Garcia (2010) 
examined the excess liquidity in the banks of the Euro area.  
 
The most direct empirical study till now, to our knowledge, that examined 
the effect of the recent financial crisis on the excess liquidity situation of 
the banking sector was carried out by Pontes and Murta (2012). They 
studied this relationship for the African economy of Cape Verde. Their 
results suggested that the crisis decreased the excess liquidity in the 
economy. The possible reasons included the extreme dependence of the 
economy on the external economic factors (especially remittance) and also 
the underdevelopment of the financial markets.  
 
5.3 THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE BANGLADESH ECONOMY 
The experience of the recent financial crisis showed that not all economies 
were affected at the same time. Some were affected immediately (termed 
as first shockwave), some were after some time (called second shockwave 
through impact on credit), while some were after even some more time 
(named third shockwave through impact on real economy). Like other 
economies, the global financial crisis of 2007 also affected the economy of 
Bangladesh. However, it did not impact the economy immediately but after 
some time. According to Rahman et al. (2009), the crisis started affecting 
the economy of Bangladesh from October 2008. One of the main features of 
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this crisis was that “the crisis has evolved from financial crisis to credit 
contraction to crisis of confidence.”  
 
The lag effect of crisis could be due to the very little exposure of the 
capital market in Bangladesh to the foreign portfolio investment (only 
2.4%). This perhaps led Bangladesh to survive the first shockwave. 
However, it started to feel the impact from the second shockwave. The 
economy was mainly affected through the three channels of exports, 
remittances and foreign investment.  
 
One of the key factors of the impact of these channels depended on the 
economic performance of the main partner countries (Murshid et al., 
2009). As they were unable to perform well, the crisis also affected the 
Bangladesh economy negatively.  
 
Ali and Islam (2010) stated that although the financial crisis did not affect 
the economy very harshly but it still slowed down along with exports and 
remittances. However, they also mentioned that Bangladesh performed 
well in agriculture and in equity markets to counterbalance the effect of 
the financial crisis. Raihan (2010) also mentioned that the crisis affected 
the export sector negatively and some categories had to suffer negative 
growth both in terms of value and volume.  
 
5.4 EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
There were various works on the relationship between bank lending and 
ownership during business cycles. Recently the focus shifted to examine 
the lending pattern of different types of banks during and after the crisis. 
The main reason for this shift of focus of the recent works was mainly due 
to the ‘Great Recession’ that occurred from 2007. Because of this, it 
became important to investigate how it affected the excess liquidity 
situation of banks and recently the focus shifted to address this issue to 
some extent (Micco et al., 2007; Omran 2007; Lin and Zhang, 2009; 
Davydov, 2013; Duprey, 2013). 
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However, these studies mainly examined the effect of ownership of banks 
to see the effect of lending. But our study goes further to see other 
possible and pertinent bank-specific characteristics and their impact on 
excess liquidity via lending. According to our knowledge, the four bank-
specific characteristics used in this study had not been used previously 
together to study excess liquidity. This was done to have a very 
comprehensive picture of how bank typologies affect the excess liquidity 
pattern in the banks.  
 
While many works have already been done on the lending pattern of 
banking sector and also between different types of banks, they were mostly 
cross-country studies. Furthermore, the studies (especially the empirical 
ones) on the relationship between excess liquidity and banking sector and 
its types were very sparse. As mentioned earlier that lending and excess 
liquidity were related (and since this work was on the excess liquidity), 
therefore it would be pertinent to look into how the excess liquidity 
situation of different types of banks varied with the business cycle and also 
with the financial crisis.  
 
5.4.1 Dependent Variable 
From the earlier studies, it was generally observed that during economic 
recession or crisis, there would be more excess liquidity and there would 
be generally an inverse relationship between excess liquidity and the 
business cycle. This relationship would be similar in times of crisis also. 
However, different typologies based on bank-specific characteristics might 
not be related in the same way and for each classification, there could be 
variation in the direction, degree and significance of the relationship 
(discussed in detail in sections 4.3.3 and 5.1.3). To investigate this 
relationship, excess liquidity would be the dependent variable to see how 
it was affected by different typologies of banking. Additionally, business 
cycle and the financial crisis were also included in the analysis to see their 
relationship with excess liquidity.  
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The data was collected from Bankscope. The excess liquidity was 
calculated by summing up: trading securities and at fair value through 
income, loans and advances to banks, reverse repos and cash collateral and 
cash and due from banks. Then mandatory reserves included above were 
deducted. As there were banks of different sizes according to assets, 
therefore growth rate of liquid assets was taken to proxy for the excess 
liquidity to avoid the scale problem. Logarithm values of these were taken 
first and then growth rate was calculated by deducting the log value of the 
previous year. Hence, one observation was lost per series.  
 
5.4.2 Explanatory Variables 
5.4.2.1 Standard Control Variables from Earlier Studies on Lending and 
Excess Liquidity 
Different explanatory variables were used in the studies of lending. Of 
them, some variables may also impact the excess liquidity. These include: 
capital, size, age, economic growth and inflation rate. Of these, the first 
three were bank-specific variables while the last two were macroeconomic. 
Among the macroeconomic variables, a measure similar to GDP growth has 
been used to empirically emulate the business cycle. Therefore, this 
variable was not included.   
 
Different studies captured the effect of macroeconomic variables. Among 
the cross-country studies, Allen et al. (2013) employed GDP growth and 
inflation rate to capture the effect of the macroeconomic variables.  
 
GDP growth rate: GDP growth rate was used extensively in different works 
to see the effect of macroeconomic variables (Micco et al., 2007; Bertay et 
al., 2012; Allen et al., 2013). There could be two possible effects of 
economic growth on excess liquidity. On one hand, economic growth would 
continuously increase the lending opportunities of the banks and reduce 
excess liquidity. On the other hand, there would be higher demand for 
deposits with the improvement in the overall economic condition of the 
people, making banks cautious to keep enough deposits which might lead 
to higher excess liquidity.  
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In their study on 111 countries, Bertay et al. (2012) used constant per 
capita GDP. In an even bigger study of 179 countries, Micco et al. (2007) 
used the GDP growth rate. Following Micco et al. (2007), GDP growth rate 
was used in this study. 
 
Inflation: Inflation could also possibly play a role in excess liquidity 
situation of the banks. This relationship and the logic were very similar to 
that of economic growth.There could be two possible effects of inflation on 
excess liquidity. On one hand, inflation would continuously increase the 
demand for loans of the banks which would reduce excess liquidity. On the 
other hand, there would be higher demand for deposits due to devaluation 
of money because of inflation, forcing banks to keep more deposits which 
may led to higher excess liquidity.  
 
Among the country-specific studies, Akinboade and Makina (2010) used 
inflation as one of the variables in their study on South Africa. Bertay et al. 
(2012), in their study on 111 countries, measured inflation as the 
percentage change in the GDP deflator and used the World Development 
Indicators database of 2011. Bhaumik et al. (2011) used industry growth in 
their study on India as for that particular scenario, which was more 
relevant than the GDP growth (Bhaumik and Piesse, 2008). They also used 
inflation but found insignificant result32.  
 
Reserve requirement: Earlier studies on excess liquidity used various 
factors as the determinants of excess liquidity. One of the most important 
variables of excess liquidity that emerged from the previous studies was 
reserve requirement. With the same amount of deposit available, if the 
reserve requirement was higher in the banking sector then it was expected 
that there would be lower excess liquidity while lower reserve requirement 
(assuming the same amount of deposit) would mean banks have higher 
excess liquidity. Therefore, reserve requirement was expected to have 
negative relationship with the dependent variable.  
                                               
32Our observation was also similar in preliminary estimation. Therefore, inflation was not 
included in the final regression.  
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In their study on Thailand, Agenor et al. (2004) included it as one of the 
explanatory variables and found it to be significant. Aikaeli (2011) also 
studied the excess liquidity problem for Tanzania and found that along with 
other variables, the rate of required reserves was also responsible for 
accumulation of excess liquidity in commercial banks in Tanzania. One 
point that needs to be noted was that the inclusion (and significance) of 
this variable depends on how excess liquidity was measured. If, as many 
studies had done before, excess liquidity was proxied by bank liquidity then 
reserve requirements should be included as an explanatory variable. If, 
however, excess liquidity was measured net of required reserves then it 
should not be included as an explanatory variable. Since this study used the 
second type of definition of excess liquidity, therefore this variable was not 
included in the final regression.  
 
Period of stress: There was also an indication in the literature that excess 
liquidity might vary during periods of stress relative to normal situations, 
leading to greater asset price volatility during the former and so disrupting 
liquidity targets (Cohen and Shin, 2003).  Morrison (1966) did a study on 
banks’ demand for excess reserves in both banks’ panic and non-panic 
periods. He concluded that excess reserves were held as a buffer to avoid 
asset transaction costs emanating from unforeseen and transitory deposit 
shocks. This sort of excess liquidity could also be interpreted as an 
insurance against deposit outflows. Al-Hamidy (2013) found that turbulent 
international markets slowed down domestic credit growth and increased 
excess liquidityfor the economy of Saudi Arabia.  
 
Political motive: One possible reason for changes in excess liquidity 
situation in the banking sector was the political situation. Fielding and 
Shortland (2005) estimated a time-series model of excess liquidity for the 
Egyptian banking sector and observed that political instability increased 
excess liquidity while Micco et al. (2007) found that political consideration 
played a role in lending differences according to bank ownership. This view 
was also found by others like Cole (2009) for India, Khwaja and Mian (2005) 
for Pakistan, Carvalho (2010) for Brazil, Sapienza (2004) for Italy, and Dinc 
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(2005) for a cross-country study. Normally dummy variables for election 
years were used to see this relationship. For example, Micco et al. (2007) 
used a dummy variable for election that was equal to 1 when the country 
was in election year and zero otherwise. 
 
The main reason for this was that sometimes election years had a 
significant impact on bank lending (Dinc, 2005) due to the pressure from 
politicians during that time to win the elections. Khwaja and Mian (2005) 
also found political influence as an important factor for lending by public 
banks in Pakistan. However, this was not true for all cases as Chen and Liu 
(2013) found that lending of public banks do not change during the election 
years and private banks lend more during election years in Taiwan.  
 
An interesting term has been used by Bhattacharya (The News Today, 2013) 
which ascertains that election years can be related with the business cycle. 
According to him:  
“Ahead of the election, the country enters into a ‘political 
business cycle (PBC)’. So, both the opposition and ruling 
leaderships need to deal with the matter so that country’s 
economy does not experience any shock.”  
 
Hence, it was important to see if political motive played any role in the 
excess liquidity situation. As election years were mainly used to see if and 
how the political motive plays any role, therefore dummy was used here 
for this variable where the value was 1 for election years and 0 otherwise. 
The value of 1 was only assigned when the full parliamentary elections 
were held33. 
 
5.4.2.2 Key Variables of Interest 
The main variables of interest in this study were business cycle and the 
financial crisis. Bank typology variables were also included to see if there 
was any pattern among different types of banks in terms of excess liquidity 
                                               
33 This is in line with the work of Chen and Liu (2013) where the value of 1 was given only 
when the Presidential elections took place.  
 
157 
 
due to business cycle and the financial crisis. The main objective was to 
see whether different types of banks vary in their excess liquidity situation 
in relation to business cycle and the financial crisis. It could shed important 
light if it was known that any particular type of banking has procyclical, 
counter-cyclical or acyclical relationship with business cycle and the 
financial crisis.  
 
Some of the standard variables in the literature were also incorporated to 
see the direction and significance of their relationship. Measurement of 
these determinants in the context of bank-level study of excess liquidity 
was also discussed.  
 
Business cycle: Among the explanatory variables, the main variable of 
interest was the business cycle. Business cycle could be defined and 
identified as showing high and low economic growth in an economy. While 
the boom period of the business cycle could lead to higher loan demand, it 
was expected that there will be less excess liquidity in the banks. However, 
banks would also need to keep higher amount of deposits to meet the 
demand of the customers who were expected to spend more during the 
boom periods.  
 
It could be measured in many ways but the most conventional method of 
measuring it was through the GDP growth rate (Micco and Panizza, 2006). It 
was observed that GDP growth at both aggregate (Duprey, 2013) or at 
individual level (i.e. GDP per capita growth rate), was used for this purpose 
(Bertay et al., 2012). While the first one was more relevant to see how the 
expansion of GDP affected the relevant variable, the latter one was more 
related with the development issues. Among these two, the more 
conventional way of estimating business cycle was by measuring with the 
GDP growth rate. However, there were many other sophisticated methods34 
to calculate it and one of the most common one was the Hodrick-Prescott 
(HP) method, proposed by Hodrick and Prescott (1997). Because of its many 
                                               
34 These include the Phase-Average Trend (PAT) method, the Christiano-Fitzgerald (CF) 
filter, the Baxter-King (BK) filter and the Multivariate Direct Filter Approach (MDFA).  
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advantages, the HP filter was used in this study. The advantages include its 
flexibility and its ability to calculate by minimising the gap between the 
actual and trend output and the trend output rate change. Another major 
advantage of the HP filter was that it can be applied even when the data 
was nonstationary.  
 
The HP filtered output trend and the output gap between actual and 
potential GDP was also used (Duprey, 2013). This variable, defined as 
‘MacroShock’ by Duprey (2013), was used in both absolute and interaction 
form. Akinboade and Makina (2010) used coincidental indicators to 
represent the business cycle. The index of coincidental indicators35 was a 
combination of different business cycle indicators which moved along with 
the economy and hence a positive value indicates higher economic growth 
and vice versa.  
 
Stolz and Wedow (2005) used different measures to calculate business 
cycle fluctuations in their study on Germany. These included: i) the real 
GDP growth rate; ii) the real GDP growth rates by state (SGDP); and iii) the 
real output gap (measured by subtracting a non-linear trend from real GDP 
using the HP filter).  
 
As mentioned before, the HP method was proposed by Hodrick and Prescott 
in 1997 (although their original work appeared in the form of a working 
paper in 1980). One major advantage of it was that it may be applied when 
the data was nonstationary. This removed a major problem which was 
faced by researchers when macroeconomic or financial data were used 
(Baum, 2006). It was also flexible and was able to calculate by minimising 
the gap between the actual and trend output and the trend output rate 
                                               
35Coincidental indicators are indicators of the state the economy is in at the present, 
including: number of employees outside of the agriculture sector, personal income less 
transfer payments, industrial production and manufacturing and trade sales. These 
indicators occur at approximately the same time as the conditions they signify. Rather 
than predicting future events, coincidental indicators change at the same time as the 
economy. For instance, personal income is a coincidental indicator for the economy: high 
personal income rates will coincide with a strong economy. 
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change. For these advantages, the HP filter was still used extensively 
(Woitek, 1998; Gyomai and Wildi, 2013).  
 
The HP filter was an algorithm that “smoothes” the original time series ݕ௧ 
to estimate its trend component ߬௧ . The cyclical component ܿ௧  was the 
difference between the original series and its trend, i.e., 
 ݕ௧ = ߬௧ + ܿ௧ (5.1) 
 
Where ߬௧ was constructed to minimise: 
   T T tttttty
1
1
2
2
11
2 )]()[()(   
 
The first term was the sum of the squared deviations of ݕ௧ from the trend 
and the second term, which was the sum of squared second differences in 
the trend, was a penalty for changes in the trend’s growth rate. The larger 
the value of the positive parameter ߣ, the greater the penalty and the 
smoother the resulting trend will be. If, e.g., ߣ = 0 , then ߬௧ = ݕ௧ , ݐ =
1, … , ݐ. If ߣ → ∞, then ߬௧  was the linear trend obtained by fitting ݕ௧  to a 
linear trend model by OLS. 
 
For quarterly data, Hodrick and Prescott suggested a value of q = 1/1600. 
This value was used and referred to as a smoothing constant. For annual 
data, Harvey and Trimbur (2008) commented that a smoothing constant 
value of 6.25 for annual data would be equivalent to 1600 for quarterly 
data. This smoothing parameter of 6.25 for annual data has been applied 
by researchers (e.g. Duprey, 2013; Ravn and Uhlig, 2002) and was also 
applied in this study to estimate the business cycle for Bangladesh.   
 
Although the HP filter still remained a very popular method, there were 
many other filters. Among these other measures of detrending and 
calculating the business cycle, the most prominent ones include the PAT 
method, the CF filter and the BK filter. The PAT method was used in 
combination with the Bry-Boschan turning point detection algorithm. The 
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resulting medium-term cycle was smoothed by the Months for Cyclical 
Dominance (MCD) method to yield the final smooth cycle. Baxter and King 
(1995) constructed the BK filter which was a bandpass filter of finite order 
K which was optimal in the sense that it was an approximate bandpass 
filter with trend-reducing properties and symmetric weights which ensure 
that there was no phase shift in the filter output. The CF random walk 
filter was a band pass filter that was built on the same principles as the BK 
filter. These filters formulate the de-trending and smoothing problem in 
the frequency domain.  
 
Harding and Pagan (2005) stated that cycles can be measured in three main 
ways: i) classical (or business) cycles that were measured by the 
fluctuations in the level of an economic variable; ii) deviation cycles that 
were measured by the differences between the level and permanent 
component of an economic variable; and iii) growth rate cycles that were 
measured by the growth rates of level variables. Egert and Sutherland 
(2012) observed that HP method was a good way to determine the business 
cycle.36 As mentioned earlier, one major advantage of the HP filter was 
that it could be used even if the data was nonstationary which removed a 
major problem generally faced when macroeconomic or financial data were 
used. Therefore, HP filter was used in this study to derive the business 
cycle for Bangladesh. The HP trend value of log of GDP was estimated first 
and then the difference was taken from the actual value to identify the 
business cycle.   
 
Financial crisis: There were very few empirical works on the relationship 
between excess liquidity and the financial crisis. One of the determinants 
of the excess liquidity studies in general, the deposit volatility, was 
included in these works (Pontes and Murta, 2012). This was measured by 
Pontes and Murta (2012) for Cape Verde as the moving average of the 
standard deviation of private sector deposits divided by the moving average 
of the same variable. Fadare (2011) examined the banking sector liquidity 
                                               
36 The cycle can also be measured by the growth rate of customer loans, by GDP growth, 
and by the growth rate of house and share prices (Egert and Sutherland, 2012). 
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for the economy of Nigeria to see the effect of the financial crisis. A 
different approach was taken by him where the basis was to see if the 
actual loan-to-deposit ratio was above or below the predicted value. If the 
actual value was above the predicted value, then it implied less liquid 
assets while less actual value than the predicted value meant more liquid 
assets. This approach reflected the comment made by Moore (2009): 
“If the actual loan-to-deposit ratio is above the predicted value 
this would suggest that commercial banks were less liquid than is 
consistent with fundamentals, while if the actual ratio is below 
the predicted value commercial banks were more liquid than 
what is consistent with economic fundamentals.” 
 
This approach was applied for the specific years of the financial crisis (i.e. 
2007-09) and was found that during the financial crisis, the banks in Nigeria 
became much less liquid and hence more vulnerable to the crisis although 
in normal or non-crisis times, the banks were normally holding excess 
liquidity.  
 
The possible final effect of the financial crisis was also ambiguous since it 
was expected that initially there would be higher excess liquidity in the 
banks due to lower demand and higher risk. However, as governments and 
other organisations recapitalise the banking sector during these periods to 
boost the economy, banks would be able to lend more and thereby reduce 
excess liquidity situation. Again, there can be higher excess liquidity if 
banks lend less than they were recapitalised.  
 
Like the business cycle variable, the financial crisis variable can also be 
used in both absolute and interaction terms. They were generally given 
value of 1 for the crisis dummies in years 2008 and 2009 and 0 for others. 
The interactions of crisis and public bank dummies can show how public 
banks performed in this period relative to private banks. Dummy variable 
for crisis was also used by Allen et al. (2013). Kapan and Minoiu (2013) 
divided the sample period into ‘before’, ‘shock’ and ‘after’ period where 
the shock period was from July 2007 to September 2008, which was the 
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period of US subprime crisis. Davydov (2013) used crisis dummy variable 
that equals one in fiscal years 2008, 2009 and 2010.  
 
Although the financial crisis started in September 2007, the effect of it 
reached Bangladesh in 2008 and the effect continued in the following year. 
Therefore, 2008 and 2009 were the most appropriate years and were given 
value of 1 during these two years. The interactions of crisis and bank 
typology dummies were used to see how the excess liquidity situation 
differed for different types of banks. This was in line with some of the 
earlier studies (Cull and Peria, 2012) that used dummy variables to see the 
lending pattern during and after the financial crisis.  
 
Capital: Of the bank-level variables, capital was measured by bank equity 
as ratio of total assets. If the study was related to the financial crisis (as in 
this case), it would be ideal to include the capital variable as one 
important feature after the financial crisis was to recapitalise the banking 
sector in order to increase the flow of money in the economy. Therefore, it 
was not only interesting but became important to see how, if at all, it 
affected the excess liquidity situation in the banking sector around the 
time of the financial crisis. Since highly capiltalised banks would be able to 
lend more, therefore it was expected to have a negative relationship with 
excess liquidity.   
 
Ownership variable: It was mainly been measured with the help of dummy 
variable. For the ownership dummy, value of 1 was given if it was a public 
bank and 0 otherwise. Bank ownership dummy variable was also been used 
by Van den Heuvel (2002), Gambacorta (2005) and Allen et al. (2013). 
 
Size variable: Another explanatory variable that was used quite often in 
the earlier studies was the size variable (Vihriala, 1997; Allen et al., 2013; 
Davydov, 2013). In most cases, the asset values were taken from 
Bankscope. But it was measured differently in different works. These 
include: (i) banks average total asset divided by the average total asset of 
the country, (ii) asset of the bank relative to top 20, and (iii) growth rate 
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of number. Of all these measures, the first measure showed bank size in 
absolute terms while the rest of them indicated the variable in relative 
term (Cull and Peria, 2012; Duprey, 2013).  
 
Age variable: In country-level studies, similar variables were used (Beck et 
al., 2005; Lin and Zhan, 2009). Beck et al. (2005) also included the age 
variable with the notion that it could have positive effect on its 
performance37 due to the experience of older banks while it also had the 
possibility of negative effect if newer banks gained more rent in foreign 
exchange rate market. According to them, older and smaller banks 
performed poorly than newer and bigger banks.  
 
Of the above two concepts, the size variable was not used separately as 
one of the typologies used in this study was bank size. Similarly, the age 
variable was also not to be used since another typology (old versus new) 
covers the effect of this variable.  
 
5.5 METHODOLOGY 
If time (T) was short and number of observations (N) was large, then a 
surprising amount of difference can happen in the estimates of the 
parameters. The discussion should then not be about the ‘true nature’ of 
the effects ߙ௜ but should be whether the FE approach was conditional upon 
the true values for ߙ௜. Therefore, it essentially considered the distribution 
of ݕ௜௧ given ߙ௜ , where the ߙ௜ s could be estimated. This made sense 
intuitively if the individuals in the sample could not be viewed as a random 
draw from some underlying population. On the other hand, the RE 
approach was not conditional upon the individual ߙ௜s, but integrated them 
out. So the RE approach allowed to make inference with respect to the 
population characteristics (by focusing on arbitrary individuals with certain 
characteristics). To see which one of these was true, Hausman (1978) 
suggested a test for the null hypothesis that ݔ௜௧ and ߙ௜ were uncorrelated. 
                                               
37Performance is one of the five variables measuring the performance of bank ݅ at time ݐ. 
As noted, those variables include return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), and the 
share of total loans that were non-performing. ROE and ROA were both used including and 
excluding foreign exchange revenues. 
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In this test, two estimators were compared where one was consistent under 
both the null and alternative hypothesis while the other estimator was 
consistent under the null hypothesis only. The FE estimator of ߚ was 
consistent irrespective of whether ݔ௜௧  and ߙ௜  were uncorrelated while RE 
estimator of ߚ will be consistent only when ݔ௜௧ and ߙ௜  were uncorrelated. 
Using the covariance matrix of ߚிா and ߚோா, the Hausman test was used to 
check whether the FE or the RE method were significantly different. As 
mentioned above, existence of correlation between ݔ௜௧  and ߙ௜  could be 
crucial on whether the two estimators would be different. For a more 
detailed discussion, see Verbeek (2004: 351-352). A similar approach was 
used by others before (e.g. Duprey, 2013).  
 
In this study, the following two estimation methods of panel regression 
were applied: fixed effects and random effects. The Hausman test was 
applied here to compare the FE and the RE method of panel estimation. 
The null hypothesis was that the individual effects were uncorrelated with 
the other regressors in the model (Hausman, 1978). The null hypothesis was 
also checked to see if both the estimators could be used. So, if the null 
hypothesis was rejected then it implied that RE model would produce 
biased estimators and therefore FE model was preferred. On the other 
hand, if the null hypothesis was accepted, it was standard to use both FE 
and RE methods38 as the null implied that the estimator was indeed an 
efficient (and consistent) estimator of the true parameters, so there should 
be no systematic difference between the two estimators when the null was 
accepted. If the alternative hypothesis was accepted then it meant that FE 
should be used rather than RE and there would be a difference between 
the two sets of coefficients.  
 
This was because the random effects estimator makes an assumption (the 
random effects are orthogonal to the regressors) which the fixed effects 
estimator does not. If this assumption is wrong, the random effects 
                                               
38  Similar approach was applied by Duprey (2013) and Allen et al. (2013). Detailed 
technical explanation was given by Schaffer (2014) in the following link: 
http://www.stata.com/statalist/archive/2003-09/msg00595.html (accessed on 6 August 
2014).  
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estimator will be inconsistent but the fixed effects estimator will remain 
unaffected.  Hence, if the assumption was wrong this will be reflected in a 
difference between the two sets of coefficients. The bigger the difference 
(the less similar were the two sets of coefficients), the bigger will be the 
Hausman statistic. 
 
The reason for not applying GMM here was that this model did not have the 
lagged dependent variable. This was one of the reasons for using GMM 
method since it was advantageous when a lagged dependent variable is 
part of the model (Verbeek, 2004). GMM was also advantageous when there 
was possible endogeneity problem (Gali and Gertler, 1999). In this study, 
the lagged dependent variable was not one of the explanatory variables 
while the business cycle variable was taken at lag level and to avoid any 
possible problem of endogeneity. 
 
5.5.1 The Model 
The FE method examined the relationship within an individual where each 
individual had its own characteristics that could affect the predictor 
variables while the variation across individuals was assumed to be random 
and uncorrelated with the predictor or independent variables in the RE 
model (Torres-Reyna, 2007). According to Greene (2008, p.183):   
“…the crucial distinction between fixed and random effects is 
whether the unobserved individual effect embodies elements 
that are correlated with the regressors in the model, not 
whether these effects are stochastic or not.”  
 
To decide which of these tests should be applied, it is a standard practice 
to use the Hausman test. This test checks whether the unique errors were 
correlated with the regressor with the null hypothesis was that they were 
not (Torres-Reyna, 2007). A large and significant Hausman statistic means 
the null was rejected implying that both the methods would give similar 
results while if the null was accepted then FE should be used and not RE. 
Result of the Hausman test is given below: 
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Table 5.1: The Hausman test result 
ܪ଴ FE and RE estimators do not differ substantially 
ܿℎ݅ଶ(4) 2.86 (0.5818) 
 
The result showed that the null hypothesis was not rejected. Therefore, 
both FE and RE methods were applied. A similar approach has been used by 
others before (Allen et al., 2013; Duprey, 2013). In this study, FE was 
applied first followed by RE. Following Duprey (2013), the model below was 
applied in this study:  
 
ܧܮ௜௧ = ߙ଴ + ߚଵܤܥ௜௧ + ߚଶܤܥ௜௧ ∗ ܤ ௜ܶ௧ + ߚଷܨܥ௜௧ + ߚସܨܥ௜௧ ∗ ܤ ௜ܶ௧ + ߚହܼ௜௧ + ݑ௜௧ (5.2) 
 
Here, ܤܥ represented the business cycle and could be measured with the 
deviation from the HP filtered output trend or the output gap between 
actual and potential GDP. Bank typology variables were represented by ܤܶ 
which include ownership, size, mode of operation and age. The financial 
crisis was showed with ܨܥ and can be measured with the dummy variable 
of 1 when there was financial crisis and 0 otherwise. Here, ܧܮ was excess 
liquidity and ܼ was representing the set of control variables. The subscript 
݅ was representing the banks while ݐ was showing the years. 
 
Whether the banking sector behaved in a procyclical or counter-cyclical 
manner according to ownership can be analysed using bank-level data. The 
main source of data used in this paper was the Bankscope database. For 
bank-level data, Bankscope contained annual income statements and 
balance sheet data for individual banks. Some publications from Bangladesh 
Bank and other government publications were also used.  
 
Although most of the banks had 15 years of data in the Bankscope database 
but there were some banks for which 15 years of data were not available. 
In some cases, there was some missing years inside the series. Out of 38 
banks (excluding the foreign banks), data were available in Bankscope for 
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37 banks (detailed description of data availability were given earlier in 
Appendix 4.1).  
 
Regarding the form of the data available, it was available in both 
consolidated and unconsolidated forms for 18 banks, available only in 
unconsolidated forms for 16 banks and available only in consolidated forms 
for only 3 banks. Since the unconsolidated data availability was more, so 
most of the data were taken from unconsolidated sources. Taking data 
mainly from the unconsolidated sources was in line with Duprey (2013). 
However, taking consolidated data along with unconsolidated ones was also 
in line with some earlier works (Ehrmann et al., 2001; Cihak and Hesse, 
2008).  
 
Among other sources, the treasury bill rate data was collected from various 
issues of annual reports published by the Bangladesh Bank. Some of them 
were taken from the paper of Ahmed and Islam (2004). The GDP growth 
and the inflation rate data were collected from various issues of 
Bangladesh Bank Annual Report.  
 
5.6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Excess liquidity data and its characteristics were presented before in the 
earlier empirical chapter and therefore not repeated here. Here the 
empirical results are described first followed by a discussion of the results.  
 
5.6.1 Empirical Results 
The correlation matrix of the dependent variable and the explanatory 
variables are presented below in Table 5.2. This correlation matrix shows 
that the model was free from the problem of multicollinearity. Observed 
correlations were also found to be significant in almost all cases. This 
confirmed the finding of the correlation matrix. 
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Table 5.2: Correlation matrix of EL, BC, FC and other variables of 
interest 
 Excess 
liquidity 
(EL) 
Capitalisation  Election Business cycle Financial 
Crisis 
EL 1.0000 --- --- --- --- 
CAP  0.0773* 1.0000 --- --- --- 
ELEC 0.0609 0.0021 1.0000 --- --- 
BC 0.0842* -0.1533* -0.0902* 1.0000 --- 
FC -0.0822* 0.1834* 0.4155* -0.5419* 1.0000 
* Significant at 5% level. 
 
The estimation used panel data, which had the advantage of allowing 
controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity that was constant over 
time. Although the simple OLS estimator was unbiased but it was not 
efficient and the standard errors were wrong since those did not take into 
account the independence of the error term within individual over time.  
 
The RE estimator take into account of this correlation structure to estimate 
the parameters efficiently by weighting the observations on the basis of a 
consistent estimate applying the generalised least squares (GLS) estimator. 
However, one shortcoming of the RE estimator was that it assumed that the 
individual effect was uncorrelated with the regressors. This assumption was 
not particularly true and therefore was not very practical to apply because 
of its weakness in assumption.  
 
A more realistic scenario was when the unobserved individual effects were 
correlated with the regressors. In such a situation, OLS and RE estimators 
were biased and inconsistent. A solution to this was to estimate the model 
with a separate intercept for every individual by OLS. This can be done by 
Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator. A computationally 
convenient alternative of this was the FE Estimator.  
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The estimates were done where a baseline equation was estimated first 
followed by interaction terms in the next step. The results are reported in 
the following tables. 
 
Table 5.3: EL estimates applying FE  
Variable Coefficient 
CAP 0.190* (0.105) 
ELEC 0.160*** (0.045) 
BC -3.964*** (0.651) 
FC -0.033 (0.051) 
Asset --- 
Age --- 
F-value 14.15 (0.000) 
No. of banks 35 
Observations 440 
Note 1: Standard errors were in parentheses to the right of the respective estimated 
coefficients.  
Note 2: * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 
1% level. 
 
One of the main variables of interest in this study was business cycle. It can 
be observed from the results that business cycle was negatively affecting 
the excess liquidity situation of the banking sector where the coefficient 
value is -3.964.  
 
Among other key variables of interest, the political motive was found to be 
consistently significant with a positive sign implying that during election 
years, the banks were not more inclined towards lending (coefficient value 
of 0.160). On the positive note, this imply that the politicians do not or 
cannot force the banks for higher lending during this time to influence the 
election result by implementing different development works at that time. 
Conversely, on the negative note, this could imply that the situation 
became uncertain and banks wanted to move carefully about their lending 
decision. This could be particularly true for Bangladesh as election years 
generally remained tense and borrowers as well as banks took a cautious 
approach during this time to gauge the situation and lend less.  
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Capitalisation was found to be positive (0.190) but significant only at 10 
per cent level. Generally it was observed that increased capitalisation 
could lead banks towards more lending. This was a principle that was 
applied during the recent financial crisis to bail out the banking sector. 
However, if increase in lending was less than increase in capitalisation then 
it would lead towards increased excess liquidity. Since the period of study 
was 15 years in which a couple of years were directly related to the 
financial crisis (along with capitalisation), therefore it might have led to 
this positive but not very significant relationship.  
 
The study period of this analysis (1997-2011) covered the recent financial 
crisis of 2007. Moreover, there was an opinion that business cycle and 
financial crisis were related as prolonged period of recession could lead to 
financial crisis. With both the opinion mentioned above, this study 
examined if there was any relationship between the recent financial crisis 
of 2007 and the excess liquidity in the banking sector in Bangladesh.  
 
Unlike the business cycle, the financial crisis was not significant. This 
implied that the banking sector faced the situation very well and had 
withstood the negative effects of the financial crisis.   
 
In earlier studies, it was generally found that bank ownership could play a 
role in terms of lending in times of business cycle with public banks acting 
less procyclically than the private banks. In this study, the aim was to see 
if this also holds for the excess liquidity situation in banks. Moreover, some 
additional typologies of size, mode of operation and age were included to 
see if there were any differences in terms of excess liquidity according to 
these typologies.  
 
The results here showed that the coefficient of the interaction term of BC 
and public ownership was positive. It implied that public banks had higher 
excess liquidity than private banks. One of the reasons for this could be 
lower lending by public banks than their counterparts, showing that public 
banks were less procyclical than private banks. This supported the findings 
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of earlier works where public banks were found to be less procyclical than 
the private banks. This implied that in good economic times, the public 
banks respond less swiftly than their counterpart resulting in higher excess 
liquidity. During times when growth was less than average, then they also 
react slowly to lower their lending. Another reason that plays a role in 
lower liquidity during this time was the fact that government generally 
stepped in to increase investment. This was mainly carried out by public 
banks. The variation in the coefficients of this variable can be due to the 
large standard errors of the coefficients. 
 
Table 5.4: EL estimates applying FE with bank typologies 
Variable Ownership Size Mode of 
operation 
Age 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
CAP 0.129 
(0.100) 
0.239** 
(0.101) 
0.191*  
(0.105) 
0.245** 
(0.101) 
ELEC 0.155*** 
(0.046) 
0.141*** 
(0.043) 
0.159*** 
(0.045) 
0.141*** 
(0.044) 
BC -4.632*** 
(0.603) 
7.213*** 
(2.858) 
-3.307*** 
(1.134) 
6.565** 
(2.644) 
Public* BC 6.473** 
(1.730) 
--- --- --- 
Large* BC --- -3.965*** 
(1.176) 
--- --- 
Islamic* BC --- --- -0.795  
(1.369) 
--- 
New* BC --- --- --- -3.822*** 
(1.117) 
FC -0.048 
(0.053) 
-1.505*** 
(0.302) 
0.013   
(0.103) 
-1.436*** 
(0.283) 
Public* FC 0.063 
(0.119) 
--- --- --- 
Large* FC --- 0.546*** 
(0.116) 
--- --- 
Islamic* FC --- --- -0.056 
(0.116) 
--- 
New* FC --- --- --- 0.534*** 
(0.111) 
F-value 16.35 
(0.000) 
14.69 
(0.000) 
13.01 
(0.000) 
16.31 
(0.000) 
No. of banks 35 35 35 35 
Observations 440 440 440 440 
Note 1: Standard errors were in parentheses to the right of the respective estimated 
coefficients.  
Note 2: * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 
1% level.  
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The large banks39 were found to be acting more procyclically with the 
business cycle as the coefficient of the interaction term of BC term and 
large bank was negative. This showed that large banks were less procyclical 
than small banks. As large banks lent more to large companies, it was 
logical to think that these companies react quickly with the change in the 
economic environment while smaller ones were affected with some delay. 
It was also possible that they were affected to a much lesser extent by the 
business cycle.  
 
Berger and Black (2011), in their study, mentioned that large banks lent 
more to large companies. This was basically due to the advantage in terms 
of hard information that was more available for large companies. The 
authors also mentioned that “Large banks were considered to have 
comparative advantages in hard technologies because they have economies 
of scale in the processing and transmission of hard information, and may be 
better able to quantify and diversify the portfolio risks associated with 
hard-information loans. Conversely, large banks may be disadvantaged in 
processing and transmitting soft information through the communication 
channels of large organisations (e.g. Stein, 2002). Lending based on soft 
information may also be associated with agency problems within the 
financial institution because the loan officer was the main repository of the 
information, giving a comparative advantage to small institutions with 
fewer layers of management (e.g. Berger and Udell, 2002) or less 
hierarchical distance between the loan officer and the manager that 
approves the loans (e.g. Liberti and Mian, 2009).” 
 
However, recently there was a trend for large banks to use hard 
information technology to increase their lending for small firms. For 
example, credit scoring information of small firms was used for lending 
decisions of banks. Different studies confirmed the possibility of banks 
using a hard technology to expand their small business lending or improve 
their information sets about very small customers, depending on how the 
                                               
39In this study, the dummy value of 0 is given for a bank in years when the assets of a bank 
are below the threshold while it is given 1 when it is over the threshold.  
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technology was implemented (e.g. Frame et al., 2001; Berger et al., 2005; 
Berger et al., 2005; DeYoung et al., 2008).  
 
In case of Islamic banking, it was found that the relationship was negative 
and insignificant. This showed that there was no significant difference 
between Islamic and conventional banks in terms of excess liquidity with 
respect to business cycle. This could be due to the judiciousness from 
Islamic banks in competing and surviving with the conventional banks even 
though Islamic banks were generally in a disadvantageous position due to 
the fact that they could not use all instrument of conventional banking due 
to restrictions in Islamic law.  
 
Finally, the age variable was found to be negatively and significantly 
related with the business cycle variable. This implied that newer banks 
were more procyclical in their behaviour with relation to business cycle. 
Since new banks use modern technologies of banking more than others, it 
was easier for them to react quickly with changes in the economy.  
 
Regarding the recent financial crisis and relationship of different bank 
typologies with excess liquidity, the results were again mixed. For 
ownership and mode of operation typologies, the coefficients were 
insignificant. For both size and age typologies, the relationships were 
positive and significant implying that both large and new banks lent 
comparatively less during the financial crisis than small and old banks 
respectively. This could be either due to the fact that they were more 
careful or could afford to lend less and still survive during the time of crisis. 
It could also mean that a higher fraction of their assets was impaired.  
 
Application of RE Method: The relationship between business cycle and 
the financial crisis with excess liquidity was also estimated applying the RE 
method.  
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The result was very robust as the business cycle variable was again found to 
be negatively significant while the relationship of the typologies of 
ownership, size and age were found to be significant. In line with the FE 
results, election was found to be positively significant in all cases while the 
significance level of capitalisation was much lower.  
 
Table 5.5: EL estimates applying RE with bank typologies 
Variable Ownership Size Mode of 
operation 
Age 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
CAP 0.176** 
(0.090) 
0.198** 
(0.080) 
0.190** 
(0.089) 
0.204** 
(0.081) 
ELEC 0.167*** 
(0.048) 
0.148*** 
(0.044) 
0.171*** 
(0.048) 
0.147*** 
(0.045) 
BC -4.085*** 
(0.662) 
7.377*** 
(2.038) 
-2.817*** 
(0.944) 
6.491*** 
(1.912) 
Public* BC 1.734 
(1.468) 
--- --- --- 
Large* BC --- -3.928*** 
(0.806) 
--- --- 
Islamic* BC --- --- -1.242  
(1.240) 
--- 
New* BC --- --- --- -3.699*** 
(0.762) 
FC -0.078 
(0.057) 
-1.444*** 
(0.299) 
-0.070   
(0.107) 
-1.375*** 
(0.282) 
Public* FC 0.210** 
(0.104) 
--- --- --- 
Large* FC --- 0.518*** 
(0.114) 
--- --- 
Islamic* FC --- --- 0.020 
(0.124) 
--- 
New* FC --- --- --- 0.504*** 
(0.110) 
F-value 75.53 
(0.000) 
89.71 
(0.000) 
62.39 
(0.000) 
99.19 
(0.000) 
No. of banks 35 35 35 35 
Observations 440 440 440 440 
Note 1: Standard errors were in parentheses to the right of the respective estimated 
coefficients.  
Note 2: * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 
1% level. 
 
The findings of the financial crisis were also very similar to that obtained 
using FE method. The financial crisis variable was found to be insignificant 
implying the effect of the crisis on excess liquidity was not as 
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comprehensive as of business cycle. Among the typology variables, both 
large and new banks were found to be positively significant again. However, 
as may be noted, the results for public banks were not so robust. 
 
5.6.2 Discussion of Results 
This study analysed how the business cycle affected the excess liquidity 
situation in the banking sector in Bangladesh. Although there were many 
studies on how business cycle affects the lending pattern of the banking 
sector, research on relationship between business cycle and excess 
liquidity was very scarce. The aim of this study was to fill this void in the 
literature.  
 
Since the study period covered the great recession that started in 2007 and 
as the business cycle bust for a sustained period could lead to crisis, 
therefore the financial crisis was also included to see if and how it affected 
the excess liquidity of the banking sector in Bangladesh. The relationship of 
excess liquidity with the financial crisis was found to be different from the 
relationship with business cycle. It showed insignificant relationship which 
supports the strength of the banking sector as well as the economy in 
Bangladesh in facing this crisis.  
 
Significant and positive value of the political motive variable showed that 
banks did not lend excessively during election years. This is a good sign 
since political influence is used in some countries during the elction years. 
Capitalisation was another key variable of interest which was also found to 
be positive but significant at a lower level, confirming the earlier results.  
 
Another contribution of this study was to see if there were any definite 
patterns for different types of banks. To address this, four different 
typologies of banks were included in this study. The results showed that 
business cycle had a significant negative effect on the excess liquidity of 
the banking sector in Bangladesh. 
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Among the typology variables, the results showed that the public banks 
acted less procyclically than the private banks validating earlier general 
findings on lending (Bertay et al., 2012; Davydov, 2013). New and large 
banks were found to behave more procyclically with the business cycle 
than their counterparts. No significant difference could be observed 
between conventional and Islamic banks.  
 
During the financial crisis, among the typology variables, the size and age 
typologies were found to be positive and significant. These relationships 
implied that large and new banks had higher amount of excess liquidity due 
to the financial crisis. For large banks, this could be due to their lack of 
flexibility relative to the small banks and the diseconomies of scale after a 
certain threshold level. For new banks, this could be due to their 
inexperience relative to the older banks. The relationships were 
insignificant for other typologies.  
 
Variation in Capitalisation 
Variations in capitalisation according to different bank-specific 
characteristics can play a significant role in difference in excess liquidity. 
It was observed that there was significant inverse relationship between 
capitalisation and excess liquidity as better capitalised banks had easier 
access to markets and thus held less liquidity (Delechat et al., 2012).  
 
Ownership Typology 
Capitalisation for ownership typology showed that although they were not 
very distant at the beginning of the study period, they gradually diverged 
over time. Although there were years where there was convergence, still a 
substantial gap remained with average capitalisation of the private banks 
which remained significantly higher than the public banks.   
 
This higher capitalisation of private banks could explain why private banks 
generally behaved counter-cyclically. It could be seen that during the 
financial crisis, capitalisation of the public banks increased which led 
public banks to lend more during these times.  
177 
 
Figure 5.1: Capitalisation according to ownership 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on Bankscope database.  
 
Age Typology 
For age typology, gap in capitalisation was relatively small in 1997 but the 
gap increased dramatically in the next year and remained so for most of 
the period of this study.  
 
Figure 5.2: Capitalisation according to age 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on Bankscope database.  
 
It reached the highest point in 2006, it started to decrease until the end of 
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old banks in good times while relatively less during the crisis times where 
large banks experienced higher capitalisation.  
 
Mode of Operation Typology 
When capitalisation for mode of operation typology were analysed, it was 
observed that the differences were very volatile starting with not much 
difference for most of the period. There was a sharp increase in 2005 but it 
decreased in the following year again in 2005 followed by increase in gap in 
the next few years. It reduced again but then the gap increased sharply in 
2011. This volatility and not much difference for majority period led led to 
the insignificant variation in excess liquidity for this bank typology.  
 
Figure 5.3: Capitalisation according to mode of operation 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on Bankscope database.  
 
Size Typology 
Although relatively small, significant gap between large and small banks 
could be observed in terms of capitalisation. The gap was much smaller at 
the beginning but gradually increased overtime. Significant gap between 
large and small banks could be observed from 2002 onwards except in 
2005. This was perhaps the reason why the size typology coefficient was 
significant.  
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For the financial crisis interacted bank typology variables, it was found that 
there was no significant difference between public and private banks. The 
same was true for Islamic and conventional banks. But for the case of size 
and age typologies, it was observed that large banks and new acted less 
procyclically than their counterparts. If Figures 5.1 to 5.4 were carefully 
examined, it can be observed that except for size typology, gap in 
capitalisation decreased during the financial crisis. While for the size 
typology, the gap increased during this period. This showed that 
capitalisation and its difference played a key role in significant (or 
insignificant) difference in behaviour according to bank-specific 
characteristics in times of the financial crisis.  
 
Figure 5.4: Capitalisation according to size 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on Bankscope database.  
 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
This bank-level study provided better understanding about the relationship 
between business cycle and the financial crisis with excess liquidity in 
Bangladesh. The business cycle was quite consistently found to have 
significant impact on the excess liquidity. However, the result showed that 
the banking sector faced the financial crisis very well and, as a result, the 
excess liquidity was not significantly affected. The fact that the banking 
sector did not face any banking crisis during or after the financial crisis 
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supported this finding. This showed the strength and resilience of the 
banking sector in Bangladesh.  
 
The significant positive effect of political motive showed that excess 
liquidity increased during these times. This could be due to the lack of 
demand during this time due to possible political uncertainty. The 
differences in terms of different typology showed that one-size-fits-all 
approach should not be applied. Rather it highlighted the importance of 
addressing the banking sector improvement with a tailor-made-approach. 
In particular, more attention is required for ownership, size and age 
typologies during the business cycle while specific attention required for 
size and age typologies for any crisis time. Combining the above two 
opinions, it could be concluded that the size and age typologies requires 
main attention as they were significant at both times (of business cycle and 
the financial crisis). Further discussion including policy implications is 
provided in the concluding chapter.  
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APPENDIX 5.1: Variable definitions 
Table 5A.1: Variable definitions 
Variable Name 
 
Variable Definition 
 
Comment 
Dependent     
Excess liquidity Liquid assets =summing up trading 
securities and at fair value through 
income + loans and advances to 
banks + reverse repos and cash 
collateral + cash and due from 
banks) - mandatory reserves 
included above.  
 
Explanatory    
Business cycle HP filter applied on the GDP data 
(in billion US dollars) {source of 
GDP data: World Bank} 
log value of GDP taken 
for filter and then 
difference taken from 
actual GDP 
Financial crisis Dummy variable was taken where 
it takes the value of 1 when the 
country was affected by the 
financial crisis and 0 otherwise.  
 
Capital bank equity as ratio of total assets log value taken 
Political motive 
 
1 if the national election has taken 
place on that year, 0 otherwise. Or 
1 if there was no democratic 
government at power on that year, 
0 otherwise 
2008 and 2009 were 
taken as election years 
for Bangladesh 
Ownership dummy 
with BC interaction 
BC* Public (1 if state-owned, 0 
otherwise) 
 
Size dummy with 
BC interaction 
BC* Large (1 if large, 0 otherwise)  
Mode of operation 
dummy with BC 
interaction 
BC* Islamic (1 if Islamic, 0 
otherwise) 
 
Age dummy with 
BC interaction 
BC* New (1 if new {established 
after 1990}, 0 otherwise) 
 
Ownership dummy 
with FC interaction 
FC* Public (1 if state-owned, 0 
otherwise) 
 
Size dummy with 
FC interaction 
FC* Large (1 if large, 0 otherwise)  
Mode of operation 
dummy with FC 
interaction 
FC* Islamic (1 if Islamic, 0 
otherwise) 
 
Age dummy with 
FC interaction 
FC* New (1 if new {established 
after 1990}, 0 otherwise) 
 
Lag of excess 
liquidity 
Lag of initial year data  log value of initial year 
data taken 
Inflation 
 
Annual change in the consumer 
price index {source of GDP growth 
data: BBS} 
log value taken (not 
used in the final 
regression) 
GDP growth rate 
 
GDP growth rate  {source of GDP 
growth data: BB} 
log value taken (not in 
final regression) 
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CHAPTER 6 
BANK LENDING AND FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION:  
IS THERE ANY DEFINITE PATTERN  
FOR DIFFERENT BANK TYPOLOGIES? 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
So far in this study we focussed on effects of various factors, particularly 
financial liberalisation on excess liquidity. Excess liquidity was generally 
taken to be the opposite of lending. In fact, one of the main interests in a 
study of excess liquidity was due to the fact that the existence of excess 
liquidity was a sign of sub-optimal lending. However, there were other 
factors that also came into play, most significantly deposits, which meant 
excess liquidity and lending might not have a definite relationship. This was 
discussed in Section 1.2.3. Therefore, it makes sense to additionally look 
directly at effects on lending itself, i.e. with lending itself as the 
dependent variable. Here this was also done differentiating between banks 
according to the typologies in consideration of ownership, age, mode of 
operation and size. 
 
It was generally believed that availability of bank lending depends, in 
addition to the traditional factors, on the process of financial 
liberalisation. It was expected that with the process of liberalisation, banks 
would be able to lend more due to the fact that entry into the banking 
sector would be easier as well as the expansion of these banks would also 
increase the credit supply and reduce the lending rate (Boissay et al., 
2005; de Haas et al., 2010). 
 
However, the process of liberalisation could also increase the interest rate 
volatility and asset prices. The increase in asset and property prices could 
also trigger a temporary unwarranted credit boom (Bandiera et al., 2000). 
Furthermore, competition among banks could increase as a result of the 
liberalisation process which might end up in a situation where banks lend 
imprudently (Caprio et al., 2006). Imprudent lending could also be due to 
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outright managerial failure (Honohan, 1997). The overall impact of 
financial liberalisation on credit, therefore, mainly leant towards the fact 
that it would increase lending. This was supported by earlier works 
(Cottarelli et al., 2003; Gattin-Turkalj et al., 2007)40.  
 
In this section, cross-country studies on lending are discussed first followed 
by some discussions on banks in Bangladesh. There has been a recent surge 
of cross-country studies in the lending literature. Brzoza-Brzezina (2005) 
studied the new European Union countries and found that lending increased 
in general across countries. However, the degree differed from country to 
country with Hungary and Poland experiencing a very strong growth as well 
as Ireland and Portugal. Similar observations of differing degree of changes 
were observed by Egert et al. (2006) in their study of 11 Central and East 
European countries. They observed that while some countries experienced 
steady growth (e.g. Estonia and Latvia), some others experienced growth 
after initial slowdown (e.g. Hungary and Croatia) while some others 
experienced almost steady decline (e.g. Czech Republic and Bulgaria).  
 
There were quite a few studies on European Countries. For example, Calza 
et al. (2001) studied the lending pattern of the Euro area while Cottarelli 
et al. (2003) studied the Central and East European Countries. They 
observed that although lending as a ratio of GDP increased in most of the 
countries (e.g. Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland and Slovania) but the ratio 
declined for some countries (e.g. Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and 
Macedonia). This sort of mixed findings was also supported by, among 
others, Schadler et al. (2004) and Kiss et al. (2006). 
 
In another work on some of the European countries, excessive growth in 
credit was recognised (IMF, 2005). It was observed that Bulgaria, Romania 
and Ukraine experienced very high credit growth. The paper observed that 
although increase in lending was a good sign but excessive credit growth 
                                               
40However, many earlier studies observed that even with the financial liberalisation, credit 
for firms remained a major problem and this was true for many developing countries 
around the world. For a comprehensive survey, see the works of Aryeetey et al. (1997) and 
Nissanke (2001), among others. 
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could be a matter of concern. In a study of 16 industrialised countries 
across regions, Hofmann (2001) observed that credit as a ratio of GDP 
increased in most of the countries. The author also observed that growth in 
credit and economic growth moved very closely with each other, 
supporting procyclicality of financial development. In another IMF (2004) 
study, it was observed that although lending increased across countries and 
regions, it increased more in Southeast Asian countries.   
 
The analysis of the effect of the liberalisation process on the lending 
pattern started almost immediately after it took place in Bangladesh. Khan 
(1993) observed that banks were not able to efficiently allocate credit, 
mainly due to the problem of imperfect information. However, he also 
pointed out that it ‘might be too early to determine the benefit of the 
liberalisation.’ In another study, Ahmed (1995) observed mixed implications 
of the liberalisation on the banking sector in Bangladesh. Khan et al. (2011) 
observed that lending in Bangladesh increased for all the banks since the 
financial liberalisation started. They examined the lending by the 
traditional categories of banking data as was generally available in 
Bangladesh. According to this, the scheduled banks were classified into 
SCBs, DFIs, PCBs and FCBs. They also analysed lending according to sectors 
and found that loans were gradually moving from agriculture towards 
industrial sector.  
 
Almost all studies on Bangladesh were either done at an aggregate level or 
when they were done at a disaggregated level, the banks were classified 
into the earlier mentioned categories of SCBs, DFI, PCBs and FCBs. This was 
done possibly because of easier data availability as data were available in 
this format. However, these studies missed out the other different bank-
specific characteristics which might have an impact on the lending 
behaviour of banks. Therefore, to investigate if these characteristics 
significantly affect the lending of banks, it was important to include these 
characteristics and study them accordingly. This was attempted in this 
bank-level study for the banks in Bangladesh.  
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Figure 6.1: Total and private credit as a ratio of GDP in Bangladesh 
 
Source: Based on data of the Statistics Department, Bangladesh Bank. 
 
The lending pattern of the banking sector in Bangladesh had experienced a 
very steady growth. In this section, lending in Bangladesh was discussed 
only for the period that was related to this study period. It can be observed 
that both total and private lending (expressed as a ratio of GDP) increased 
significantly. The total lending as ratio of GDP almost doubled increasing 
from 29.38% to 55.05% while the private lending increased more than two-
fold during this time by rising from 21.55% to 43.27%. As this was a ratio of 
GDP, it showed that the magnitude of increase in lending in Bangladesh 
was phenomenal.  
 
In nominal terms, the total lending during this period increased more than 
eight-fold from 1997 to 2011. In 1997, it was 530.86 billion taka and it 
continuously increased to cross the 1,000 billion taka mark in 2002. The 
growth continued over the next 5 years and more than doubled by reaching 
2056.72 billion taka in 2007. Within the next 4 years, it again increased by 
more than two-fold and reached a huge amount of 4335.25 billion taka in 
2011. Similarly, private lending in nominal terms also increased sharply 
during this period.  It was 389.47 billion taka in 1997, increased to reach 
745.54 billion taka in 2002 and 1521.77 billion taka in 2007. Finally, it rose 
to 3407.12 billion taka in 2011.  
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One possible reason of higher lending by banks could be imprudent lending. 
As was known, the liberalisation process increased competition and to 
maximise profit, banks could end up lending to sectors and individuals who 
were not worthy of credit. This may result in higher non-performing loans if 
the borrowers were unable to repay their loans. Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1999) observed that countries where the financial 
liberalisation took place were more likely to face banking crises. But they 
also mentioned that this impact was less if there prevailed a strong 
institutional environment with less corruption and good rule of law.  
 
In Bangladesh, however, it was found that the non-performing loans as a 
ratio of total loans decreased overtime (Iqbal, 2012). Having a closer look 
revealed the fact that it increased after the liberalisation started and 
reached the highest mark of 41.19 per cent in 1999 but then it gradually 
decreased and reached a single-digit mark (Rahman, 2012).      
 
6.2 BANK TYPOLOGY 
It was observed from the earlier empirical chapters that there could be 
significant differences in excess liquidity across bank typologies in respect 
to financial liberalisation, business cycle and the recent financial crisis. 
This chapter aimed to investigate further if these differences persisted in 
terms of lending. To analyse this, lending at bank-level was examined to 
see if there were any significant differences across banks according to 
different typologies. Lending was measured by gross loan in million US 
dollars. It was summed up for the relevant category when a particular 
typology was used. For example, there would be two categories of public 
and private banks for the ownership typology. Following the earlier 
empirical chapters, the same bank typologies were applied here which 
were based on ownership (public and private), size (large and small), mode 
of operation (Islamic and conventional) and age (old and new).  
 
Public and Private Banks 
It was observed that banks differed in their lending behaviour in terms of 
ownership (De Bonis, 1998). Interest rates of public banks were lower than 
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the private banks and public banks lent more to the large firms. Public 
banks also lent more in depressed areas. Although some earlier studies 
concluded that public banks were less efficient and profitable than the 
private banks (Martiny and Salleo, 1997; Sapienza, 2004), these findings 
should not be taken on its own as public banks did not operate with the 
sole objective of profit maximisation but they also had other broader social 
objectives to fulfil. So, it would be interesting to see whether lending 
differed across banks according to ownership.   
 
Figure 6.2: Gross loan according to ownership 
 
  
Sources: Author’s own calculation based on data from Bankscope and Bangladesh 
Economic Review, various issues. 
 
The graph type was selected to show the comparative scenario of lending 
between two different types of banks. Significant difference among public 
and private banks could be observed in terms of direction where share of 
private banks was less than 30 per cent at the beginning of the study period 
but continuously increased and more than doubled in the next 15 years to 
reach almost 70 per cent of the share of lending. The share of public banks 
decreased continuously over this period and experienced an almost 
opposite identical scenario where the share was above 70 per cent in 1997 
while it was around 30 per cent in 2011. The increase of private banks’ 
share was continuous almost throughout the period (and vice versa for 
public banks) except in the first two and the last three years where it 
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remained almost constant. Most importantly, over this period of time, the 
majority share of lending changed from public to private banks.  
 
Large and Small Banks 
It was observed by some earlier studies that large banks mainly relied on 
‘hard’ information such as financial statements and credit scoring (Haynes 
et al., 1999; Cole et al., 2004; Berger et al.,  2005) while small banks 
mainly relied on ‘soft’ information which included borrowers’ 
characteristics and conditions of local market (Park and Pennacchi, 2004). 
Besides, small banks relied on bank-firm relationship as well as depending 
on the behaviour of more informed investors with a lag (Barron and Valev, 
2000). It was also found that smaller banks had comparative advantage in 
lending to smaller organisations due to their extensive use of soft 
information (Kashyap and Stein, 1997). Another interesting observation was 
that small banks did possess some advantage over the large banks due to 
the fact that soft information were not easily transferrable while the hard 
information were (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). However, since large firms 
had more information in record, large banks tended to lend more to large 
firms. This dichotomy of hard and soft information was also respectively 
referred to as ‘transaction-based’ and ‘relationship’ lending (Berger and 
Udell, 2002). According to this, small banks would do better in case of 
‘relationship’ lending while large banks would do better in cases of 
‘transaction-based’ lending. Dependence on hard information was also 
called the ‘cookie cutter’ approach and was supported by empirical studies 
(Cole et al., 2004).  
 
Kashyap and Stein (1995) observed that smaller banks were more 
responsive to monetary policy changes and they lent more to small 
businesses whose demands were procyclical (Peek and Rosengren, 1995; 
Berger et al., 1998). Another finding of the earlier studies was that small 
banks made ‘high powered loans’. This ‘high powered loans’ implied that 
the impact was bigger on the economy 41  when lending of small banks 
                                               
41 This is measured by gross state product, number of employees, number of firms and real 
payroll.  
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declined by a dollar than decline in lending by a dollar of large banks 
(Hancock and Wilcox, 1998).  
 
However if large banks were public banks (as in many cases) then the 
lending of large banks might include the implicit guarantee of not being 
withdrawn. This was mainly related to the hypothesis of ‘too big to fail.’ 
Additionally, large banks were able and lent at a greater distance (Kashyap 
and Stein, 2000; Berger et al., 2005).  
 
As large and small banks were grouped according to their assets, therefore 
it could be observed that there were differences in terms of lending among 
banks according to this criterion. The magnitude of the aggregate effect of 
it on the economy depended on the ratio of small and large firms in the 
economy. However, it was not always true that small banks covered most 
of the small firm lending. For example, Berger and Black (2011) found that 
large banks covered 60% of the small firms lending. Similar findings were 
also observed by de la Torre et al. (2010). 
 
Figure 6.3: Gross loan according to size 
 
 
Sources: Author’s own calculation based on data from Bankscope and Bangladesh 
Economic Review, various issues. 
 
Figure 6.3 showed that if there was any difference in lending between 
large and small banks. It could be observed that share of lending by small 
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banks were less than 30 per cent at the beginning of the study period but 
the share continuously increased, except the last year, and more than 
doubled reaching more than 60 per cent by the end of this study period. On 
the other hand, the share of large banks almost continuously decreased 
throughout this period reaching a share of less than 40 per cent in 2011 
which was more than 70 per cent in 1997. This change of direction and 
amount led the majority of share in lending changing from large to small 
banks.  
 
Islamic and Conventional Banks 
The third category of bank classification was based on their mode of 
banking operation. Islamic banking in Bangladesh flourished significantly 
and this study also aimed to look at whether there was any difference in 
lending between Islamic and conventional banking system.  
 
On one side, it was expected that Islamic banks could be under additional 
pressure to lend due to their mode of operation where profit and loss were 
shared when returns for depositors were calculated (Khan and Ahmed, 
2001). Although it was true that Islamic banks paid according to profit-loss 
sharing and, therefore, were not forced theoretically to pay a specific 
amount on deposit but practically they needed to be competitive to survive 
the competition since there could be loss in some cases which they needed 
to compensate with higher profits42 . The additional pressure could be 
related to screening about whom to lend as Islamic banks could not force 
borrowers to pay original and profit if they make loss.  
 
On the other hand, it was also witnessed that religious feeling played a key 
role in the mind of most of the depositors and there was less chance of 
withdrawal of deposits even if the return was not competitively high. In a 
study by Gerrard and Cunningham (1997), it was observed that over 60% of 
Muslim borrowers declared that they would not withdraw their deposits 
even if there was no return. This probably played a key role during liquidity 
                                               
42 Moreover, due to the fact that Islamic banks were not allowed to carry out all types of 
operations of conventional banking, this had also handicapped them to some extent.   
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crisis when it was found that Islamic banks faced less withdrawal than their 
conventional counterparts (Zaheer and Farooq, 2013). Moreover, it was also 
found in some studies that Islamic banks were better capitalised, had 
superior asset quality and strong liquidity positions. Therefore, it would be 
interesting to see how these two types of banks differed in their lending 
behaviour after and with the process of financial liberalisation.  
 
The lending data for these two types of banks are presented in Figure 6.4. 
This graph showed that lending of conventional banks held the majority of 
share and it remained so throughout the period of this study. It was more 
than 90 per cent at the beginning and though it experienced a fall, it still 
had a share of around 80 per cent by the end of this period. Share of 
lending of Islamic banks were very low (around 5 per cent) but it 
continuously rose, except in 1998, reaching almost 20 per cent of the share 
of lending.  
 
Figure 6.4: Gross loan according to mode of operation  
 
Sources: Author’s own calculation based on data from Bankscope and Bangladesh 
Economic Review, various issues. 
 
New and Old Banks 
Banks could also differ in terms of lending due to their difference in age. It 
was seen that new banks might be in a relatively disadvantageous position 
as they took some time before starting operating at their full capacity. This 
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was known as the ‘learning by doing’ hypothesis (Mester, 1996; DeYoung 
and Hasan, 1998; Kraft and Tirtiroglu, 1998). This time period was found to 
be between three to five years and during that time, there was probability 
of small bank-failure (DeYoung, 1999).  
 
Therefore, it could happen that banks perform better with age. This was 
supported empirically by Staikouras et al. (2007) who found that banks 
established before performed better than the banks established later. 
However, management could become less proactive and prominent 
overtime which might decrease their efficiency (Esho, 2001).  
 
Thus, it would be interesting to see the effect of bank age on lending along 
with the process of the financial liberalisation. Figure 6.5 shows the 
lending of new and old banks.  
 
Figure 6.5: Gross loan according to age 
 Sources: Author’s own calculation based on data from Bankscope and Bangladesh 
Economic Review, various issues. 
 
It could be seen from the graph that there was difference between old and 
new banks. As mentioned earlier, banks established after 1990 were in the 
new bank category while those established before 1990 were in the old 
category. Share of lending of old banks was much higher than the new 
banks but they converged overtime. The share was more than 90 per cent 
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in 1997 but gradually decreased and reached a share of less than 60 per 
cent by 2011. Contrarily, the share of new banks experienced a sharp rise 
in their share from a mere share of less than 5 per cent in 1997 to more 
than 40 per cent in 2011.  
 
6.3 CONTRIBUTION OF THIS CHAPTER 
It could be observed from the above discussion that lending increased in 
the banking sector in Bangladesh after the process of financial 
liberalisation. The data on lending in Bangladesh also supported this view 
that lending increased after the process of financial liberalisation started 
(Figure 6.1). However, when the banks were classified according to 
different bank-specific characteristics, it was observed that there were 
variations in terms of lending, always in magnitude and sometimes also in 
direction (Figures 6.2 to 6.5). The aim of this study was to shed further 
light on this using bank-level data and provide information on whether 
lending significantly differed across banks and, if they did, in which way.  
 
The earlier related works on lending could be broadly divided into three 
categories. The first category of studies investigated the effect of the 
financial liberalisation on lending but they were done at an aggregate level 
and not across banks (Boissey et al., 2005; Egert et al., 2006).  
 
The second category of research used some classifications of banking to see 
how they were related to changes in the monetary policy. For example, 
Lang and Krznar (2004) used the bank characteristics of ownership, 
capitalisation, liquidity and size typologies of the banks to see how they 
differed in their reaction to changes in the monetary policy in Croatia but 
did not see how the process of financial liberalisation affected lending 
according to these characteristics. 
 
The third category of works, which was analogous to this study, used bank-
level data to see the effect of some other phenomenon on lending pattern. 
For instance, Cull and Peria (2012) used bank-level data for some countries 
in Eastern Europe and Latin America but their main aim was to see if the 
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lending changed along with the process of the financial crisis of 2008-09. 
The difference of this study from those earlier studies was that this study 
attempted to examine the effect on bank lending of the financial 
liberalisation while the earlier studies looked at the effect of the financial 
crisis on bank lending.  
 
The aim of this study was to fill these gaps in the existing literature of 
these above categories of studies. Using data at bank-level, lending at 
aggregate level were used for this purpose. Bank-level data of 37 banks for 
a period of 15 years (1997-2011) from the banking sector in Bangladesh 
were applied in this study.  
 
The main contribution of this study was to investigate if there was any 
difference in lending across banks. The bank typologies include bank 
ownership (public versus private), size (large versus small), mode of 
operation (Islamic versus conventional) and age (old versus new).  
 
Specifically, the following questions were addressed in this study:  
(i) Does ownership matter? One of the aims of this study was to see if and 
how the ownership criterion affected lending of the banks in times of 
financial liberalisation. From earlier studies, it was observed that public 
banks had some advantages in lending to larger firms while private banks 
were in a relatively disadvantageous position in this regard. However, 
public banks had social goals in addition to profit maximisation which was 
not part of the objectives of private banks.  
 
(ii) Does bank size vary the effect of financial liberalisation? This study 
also examined if financial liberalisation affected the lending decision for 
large and small banks differently. Some earlier studies found possible 
negative relationship between bank size and lending (Lang and Krznar, 
2004).  
 
(iii) Was Islamic banking affected differently? Mode of operation typology 
(Islamic versus conventional) was also investigated to see if there was any 
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difference among their lending pattern. Since Bangladesh is a Muslim 
populated country and the Islamic banking system flourished and currently 
formed a substantial part of the banking sector, therefore it was important 
to see if the Islamic banking system was affected differently than the 
conventional banking system along with the direction of their relationship.   
 
(iv) Was there any difference according to age? Another typology of banks 
was also studied to find out whether old banks behaved differently than 
new banks in times of financial liberalisation. It was generally observed 
that new banks lent more than the old banks but this study examined how 
this was affected by the process of financial liberalisation.  
 
6.4 STATISTICAL TESTS FOR DIFFERENCE AMONG BANK TYPOLOGIES 
Two types of statistical tests were carried out in addition to the graphical 
representation above: non-parametric and parametric tests. The non-
parametric test applied was the Wilcoxon rank-sum test whereas the t-test 
was applied as the parametric test43. 
 
The results of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test across these bank typologies 
were given below with the null hypothesis that there was no difference 
between two groups. Here, total lending was the ranking variable which 
was measured by the gross loan as a ratio of GDP.  
 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test results showed that the null hypothesis was 
rejected implying that there was difference between public and private 
banks in terms of total lending. Similar findings were observed for both size 
and age typology suggesting that there were differences between large and 
small banks as well as between new and old banks. However, the null for 
the mode of operation typology was not rejected implying that there was 
no significant difference between Islamic and conventional banks in terms 
of total lending.  
 
 
                                               
43 These tests were explained in detail in Section 4.3.3.2.  
196 
 
Table 6.1: Wilcoxon rank-sum test results for bank typologies of 
ownership, size, mode of operation and age 
Typology Ownership Observation Rank 
sum 
Expected H0: no 
difference 
between two 
(unmatched) 
groups 
Ownership 
 
Private 30 500 570 -2.714 
(0.0066) Public 7 203 133 
Size Large 6 207 114 z = -3.832 
(0.0001)  Small 31 496 589 
Mode of 
operation 
Islamic 30 609 570 1.512 
(0.1304) Conventional 7 94 133 
Age New  16 426 304 z = 3.740 
(0.0002) Old 21 277 399 
 
The results of the t-test also supported the findings of the Wilcoxon rank-
sum test, showing that there were differences for most of the bank-specific 
characteristics. The results of this test were provided here. The results 
showed that the coefficient of ownership, size and age typologies were 
significant at 1% level while it was not for the mode of operation.  
 
Table 6.2: t-test results for ownership, size, mode of operation and age 
Gross loan Coefficient Standard 
error 
t p > | t | 95% confidence 
interval 
Ownership 1.665 0.097 17.08 0.000 1.473 1.856 
Size 2.348 0.080 29.32 0.000 2.191 2.505 
Mode of 
operation 
-0.293 0.120 -2.45 0.015 -0.529 -0.579 
Age -1.015 0.084 -12.05 0.000 -1.181 -0.850 
 
6.5 METHODOLOGY 
This study used panel data. It was logical to assume that the lending 
behaviour of banks would be influenced by its past lending and therefore a 
dynamic model specification was more appropriate to use. Based on the 
methodologies used before in this area of research and also because of its 
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advantages over other panel methods (already discussed before), two-step 
system GMM was considered the most appropriate method of estimation for 
this type of model. For robustness, the Hausmann test was applied to see 
whether the fixed effects or the random effects method was more 
appropriate and then the appropriate method was applied.  
 
The main equation of total lending to be estimated in this study could be 
written as:  
 
GLit = α0 + α1GLi,t-1 + β1GDPt + β2INTit + β3(FLt)+ β4(FLtBTit)+ εit (6.1) 
 
The above equation explained effect at bank-level on lending where GL 
was representing gross lending, GDP was showing economic growth, 
interest rate was given by INT, FL was expressing the financial 
liberalisation index and BT was showing different bank typologies 
(ownership, size, mode of operation and age). The interaction terms of FL 
and BT showed bank typologies based on bank-specific characteristics 
interacted with the financial liberalisation index. Banks were represented 
by subscript i and t was showing year. The variables of lagged dependent 
variable, economic growth and interest rate were the most common 
variables applied in most of the earlier studies on lending44.  
 
6.6 DATA 
The data of this study comprised bank-level information of the banking 
sector in Bangladesh with annual data for the period of 1997-2011. Version 
13.1 of STATA (StataCorp, 2013) was used for the estimation of system 
GMM to an original panel dataset of 555 observations (NT = 37  15).  
 
6.6.1 Dependent Variable 
The aim of this study was to examine the effect of bank-specific 
characteristics on lending. The lending in real terms was used in this study 
to reflect the actual scenario. Lending in real terms rather than in nominal 
                                               
44Some studies have also used inflation but this variable is not used in this study due to 
problem of multicollinearity.  
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terms has also been used by others before (Hofmann, 2001; Calza et al., 
2003; Hulsewig et al., 2004; Brzoza-Brzezina, 2005). 
 
6.6.2 Explanatory Variables 
Different studies have used different sets of explanatory variables. Some of 
them were more common while some were used less frequently across 
studies. The three most common explanatory variables used in the earlier 
studies were: economic growth, interest rate and the lagged dependent 
variable. The definition of all these variables and their measurement were 
given in detail in Appendix 6.1.  
 
Economic Growth: It was expected that if there was economic growth, 
there would be higher demand for investment and also increased demand 
for loan. This was mainly due to the fact of favourable economic 
conditions. Therefore, economic growth should affect lending positively. 
This was also observed in earlier empirical studies (Cottarelli et al., 2003; 
Kiss et al., 2006; Kraft, 2006; Gattin-Turkalj et al., 2007; Brissimis et al., 
2014). To capture economic growth, real GDP was used in this study.  
 
Interest Rate: The rate of interest was another variable that was 
frequently employed in studies of lending. It was expected to have a 
negative relationship with lending since lower interest rate should increase 
the demand for credit and vice versa (Egert et al., 2006). In this study, to 
capture the effect of interest rate, interest rate in real terms was taken 
which was calculated by deducting the current inflation from the nominal 
interest rate. To convert interest rate into real terms, both CPI and GDP 
deflator were used. Results using the real interest rate using CPI are 
presented in the main text while the other measure of real interest rate is 
given in the appendix (in Appendix 6.3). 
 
Lagged Dependent Variable: Lag of the dependent variable was included 
in this model with an aim to capture and account for the persistence of 
lending from the earlier period. It was expected to have a positive 
relationship with the dependent variable of lending. This was also 
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employed in earlier studies and was found to be positively affecting lending 
(e.g. Gattin-Turkalj et al., 2007).  
 
Financial Liberalisation: Since financial liberalisation took place in most of 
the economies around the 1990s, the impact of it was part of some of the 
studies of lending. As the liberalisation process was initiated at the 
backdrop of financial repression and was proposed to remove various credit 
restrictions to ensure the free flow of credit, it was expected that there 
would be a positive relationship between liberalisation and lending. Since it 
was a continuous and multi-faceted process (Bandiera et al., 2000), the 
results could be misleading if a dummy variable or only a single variable 
was used to represent this versatile process.  
 
Therefore, as described in the previous chapters, to address the process in 
a more comprehensive way, an index of financial liberalisation was created 
on the basis of the earlier works. The index used in this study was mainly 
based on the work of Abiad et al. (2010). Although most studies had either 
used a dummy or a single indicator of liberalisation, the use of index to 
appropriately capture the process of liberalisation was not uncommon. 
Cottarelli et al. (2003) used a similar index in their study of CEEC 
countries.  
 
Bank-specific Characteristics: Different bank-specific characteristics could 
play a role in lending. These included bank ownership, size, mode of 
operation and age (discussed in detail in section 6.2). Summarily it could 
be said that there could be differences in the lending behaviour of banks 
according to these characteristics and it would be interesting and 
worthwhile to see if and how significantly these characteristics affected 
bank lending.   
 
6.6.3 Sources of Data 
Like the previous empirical chapters, Bankscope was the main source of 
data of this chapter. Data of all banks were not always available for full 15 
years (detailed description of data availability has been given earlier in 
200 
 
Appendix 4.1). Data were available in different forms. Earlier practice from 
the literature was used as a guideline to address this issue (Ehrmann et al., 
2001; Cihak and Hesse, 2008).  
 
6.7 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
To provide some basic idea, summary statistics of the variables used in this 
study are provided below45. The dependent variable of gross lending had an 
average of 3.44 with highest of 23 and lowest of -12. GDP growth rate 
ranged from 4.42 to 6.71 where the average was 5.76. The average interest 
rate was around the same mark with a value of 6.87% but fluctuated much 
more with the highest being 18.88% and the lowest 0.09%. Average of 
financial liberalisation index was -0.72 with values ranging from -0.87 to 
0.54.  
 
Table 6.3: Summary statistics of main regression variables (annual data 
of 1997-2011) 
Variable Description Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
Gross loan 
(GL) 
Real gross loan  3.44 0.04 -12 23 
GDP growth 
(GDP) 
Growth rate of log of 
real GDP 
5.76 0.64 4.42 6.71 
Interest rate 
(INT) 
log of the ratio of 
interest rate and 
inflation 
6.87 1.98 0.09 18.88 
FL Financial liberalisation 
index (using different 
sub-dimensions) 
-0.72 0.12 -0.87 -0.54 
 
Correlations among the variables are shown below to have a primary 
indication of the relationship between them. The correlation matrix 
showed that total lending was positively and highly related with its lag 
implying that lending was highly influenced by its past behaviour. 
 
It was also found to be positively related with economic growth which was 
logical since growth increased demand for loans through increased demand 
for investment as well as the supply of loans due to increased savings. An 
                                               
45These statistics in Table 6.3 were based on the panel data in a yearly format. 
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increase in the interest rate would normally reduce the demand as higher 
costs would be associated (and vice versa) which was supported by the 
negative sign. The positive correlation between financial liberalisation and 
lending supported the theory that lending would increase after the 
liberalisation. This also confirmed with the final evidence of increased 
lending after financial liberalisation took place in Bangladesh and in other 
countries.  
 
Table 6.4: Correlation matrix of total lending and explanatory variables  
 Total 
lending 
(GL) 
Lag of 
total 
lending 
(LagGL) 
Economic 
growth 
(EG) 
Interest 
rate  
(IR) 
Financial 
liberalisation 
(FL)  
GL 1.0000 --- --- --- --- 
LagGL 0.9882* 1.0000 --- --- --- 
EG 0.0979*   0.0988*   1.0000 --- --- 
IR -0.1915* -0.2937* -0.2914* 1.0000 --- 
FL 0.1315* 0.1235* 0.7395* -0.3080* 1.0000 
* Significant at 5% level.  
  
6.7.1 Empirical Estimates 
In this estimation, the lending pattern of the banking system was estimated 
using the two-step system GMM. In Table 6.5, the relationship between 
total lending with liberalisation, different bank-specific characteristics as 
well as the macroeconomic factors were presented. The diagnostics of the 
results were provided at the end of the table.  
 
In the estimated models, the F-test showed that the parameters were 
jointly significant at the 1% level. The overidentifying restriction tests of 
Hansen-J statistic showed that the instruments used in this model were not 
correlated with the residuals, implying that the instruments in this model 
were justified. Both the tests of autocorrelation, tests AR(1) and AR(2), 
showed that the application of the two-step system GMM was appropriate 
since the insignificance of the AR(2) test result showed no second-order 
serial correlation of the error term, implying there was no problem of 
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autocorrelation and the GMM estimates were consistent (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991).  
 
Table 6.5: Gross loan estimates applying two-step system GMM 
Variable Ownership Size Mode of 
operation 
Age 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
LagGL 0.701*** 
(0.226) 
0.705*** 
(0.225) 
0.725*** 
(0.210) 
0.650** 
(0.280) 
GDPgrowth 0.361*** 
(0.124) 
0.360*** 
(0.126) 
0.365*** 
(0.126) 
0.354*** 
(0.119) 
Interest rate -3.101**  
(1.212) 
-2.708**  
(1.269) 
-2.780**  
(1.231) 
-3.216**  
(1.284) 
FL 1.343*** 
(0.475) 
1.239** 
(0.498) 
1.248** 
(0.496) 
1.164** 
(0.490) 
Public* FL -0.186*** 
(0.063) 
--- --- --- 
Large* FL --- -0.033 
(0.047) 
--- --- 
Islamic* FL --- --- 0.031  
(0.048) 
--- 
New* FL --- --- --- 0.211*** 
(0.066) 
Wald chi2 (6) 219.37 
(0.000) 
153.65 
(0.000) 
122.18 
(0.000) 
235.71 
(0.000) 
Hansen-J Test 2.49 (0.477) 2.43 (0.488) 2.50 (0.476) 2.87  
(0.413) 
Test for AR (1) 
errors 
-3.09 
(0.002) 
-3.12 
(0.002) 
-3.32 (0.001) -2.54 
(0.011) 
Test for AR (2) 
errors 
0.31 (0.757) 0.39 (0.699) 0.41 (0.681) 0.23 (0.818) 
No. of banks 37 37 37 37 
No. of 
observations 
403 403 403 403 
Note 1: The FL variable here was constructed following the Abiad et al. index of financial 
liberalisation. Also the dummy variables were taken in actual form in 0-1 scale.  
Note 2: Robust standard errors were in parentheses to the right of the respective 
estimated coefficients. In the lower part of the table, the probability values were given in 
parentheses.  
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
In this study, total lending was estimated by using the growth of the gross 
loan and then taking its logarithm. The gross loan was taken in real form by 
deflating with the consumer price index. The results were then checked for 
robustness using alternative estimators.  
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Among the explanatory variables, both economic growth and interest rate 
were taken in log form with the interest rate taken in real terms using the 
inflation rate represented by CPI as well as GDP deflator. Bank typology 
variables were represented by the dummy variable of typology interacted 
with the financial liberalisation index. Flexibility in taking both actual and 
log values of the explanatory variables were evident from earlier works 
(Levine et al., 2000; Hauk Jr. and Wacziarg, 2009; Roodman, 2009; Jayasuriya 
and Burke, 2013). The typology variables were not taken in a simple form 
but in an interaction form where each typology value was multiplied by the 
value of the financial liberalisation variable.  
 
The result showed that the lagged dependent variable of total lending was 
positive and significant in all cases. This supported the view that banks 
followed their past lending behaviour.  
 
If an economy experienced growth, it improved the economic condition and 
was supposed to increase the demand for further investment. However, 
this effect could take time and therefore lag of economic growth was taken 
here. Using lag of economic growth to capture the effect on lending was 
not uncommon and was used by others before (Fuentes and Maqueira, 
1999). The coefficient in this study was positive and significant which was 
in line with the prior theories.  Similar result was also found earlier by 
others, both in country-specific studies (Gattin-Turkalj et al., 2007; 
Brissimis et al., 2014) as well as in cross-country studies (Hofmann, 2001; 
Calza et al., 2003). 
 
A rise in interest rate increases the cost of borrowing which should reduce 
the demand for borrowing. On the other hand, a reduction in the interest 
rate should increase the demand for loans if all other things remain 
constant. Therefore, lending should be negatively related with the interest 
rate. In line with this theoretical background, the relationship was found to 
be negative and significant46. Similar results were also observed by others 
                                               
46When GDP deflator was used instead of CPI inflation information in calculating the real 
interest rate, the result remained almost same. The result is given in Appendix 6.3.  
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in earlier studies on lending which also found negative relationship 
(Cotarelli et al., 2003; Brzoza and Brzezina, 2005). 
 
As mentioned before, one of the objectives of the financial liberalisation 
was to remove the barriers in terms of lending and increase it which in turn 
would increase investment and economic growth in the economy. 
Therefore it was expected that the process of financial liberalisation would 
increase lending in the economy. In this study, the coefficient of financial 
liberalisation was found to be significantly positive for all bank typologies, 
justifying the theoretical background of the financial liberalisation.  
 
As different types of banks existed in the banking sector of Bangladesh, it 
was important to see if they reacted differently in terms of lending with 
the process of financial liberalisation. To measure this effect, interaction 
variables were taken where the financial liberalisation variable was 
multiplied by the typology dummy variables. For the ownership dummy, 
the value of 1 was given if bank was owned by the government while 0 if it 
was owned privately. For the size dummy, if a bank has an asset over 1 
billion dollars, the bank was categorised as a large bank and was given the 
value of 1 and was 0 when the bank has less than 1 billion dollars asset. 
When the mode of operation dummy was applied, the value of 1 was given 
if it was an Islamic bank and 0 if it was a conventional bank. Finally, the 
value of 1 was attached with a bank if it was established after 1990 while 0 
if it was established before that for the age dummy.  
 
The interaction term for the ‘ownership’ typology variable showed that 
financial liberalisation had lower impact on lending for the public banks. 
This could be due to their disadvantages mentioned in the literature which 
included low lending to smaller firms. It may be noted that objectives of 
public banks were not solely to maximise profits but also to pursue and 
achieve additional social goals. Although these could lead to higher lending 
but might also reduce the incentive to compete in lending with other banks 
in maximising their profit.  
 
205 
 
While the above explanation was based either on Inefficiency of public 
banks or their lack of capacity to lend to small firms, another possible 
explanation (which was partly in contradiction with the earlier one) was 
that financial liberalisation encouraged imprudent behaviour of 
overlending, especially by private banks. For example, private banks might 
have extended their lending disproportionately to consumers, while of 
course public banks would not do that. Indeed private banks had over time 
taken up a greater share of lending as evident from the following graph. 
Whether this was attributable to imprudent lending was not certain. When 
investigated further, it was observed that level of impaired loans were 
greater for public banks than private banks. For example, the ratio of gross 
non-performing loans to total loans was 11.3 per cent for public banks 
while it was only 2.9 per cent for private banks in 2011. Therefore, it is 
more appropriate to say that private banks captured greater share of 
lending because of (a) continued growth of private banking itself and 
(b)better efficiency compared to public banks. 
 
Figure 6.6: Consumer loan according to ownership 
 
Sources: Author’s own calculation based on data from Bankscope and Bangladesh 
Economic Review, various issues. 
 
It can be observed that while the share of public banks reduced to less than 
half during this period of time, the share of private banks more than 
doubled during the same time period. This also meant that the majority 
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share of consumer lending switched from public banks to private banks 
during this period.   
 
However, the coefficient for the ‘size’ typology variable with interaction 
term was insignificant. This implied that bank size did not play any 
significant role in terms of lending and banks followed a similar pattern in 
their lending behaviour (irrespective of their size). While the large banks 
had relative advantages for lending to large firms, small banks’ share of 
consumer loans increased much more than the large banks. These might 
have nullified each other.  
 
The result also did not show any significant dependence on the ‘mode of 
operation’. This meant that Islamic banks did not behave much differently 
in relation to conventional banks in terms of lending. While conventional 
banks were in a more advantageous position due to the availability of more 
instruments to use for lending, Islamic banks had the advantage of the fact 
that in a Muslim populated country like Bangladesh, people prefer to 
engage more in Islamic banking due to religious reasons. These opposite 
effects might have crossed out each other resulting in an insignificant 
relationship for this bank typology. This supported the findings of the 
earlier studies which concluded that Islamic banking did not behave 
differently in relation to other conventional banks and refuted the opposite 
findings or theories which said that Islamic banking was different in their 
behaviour from the conventional banking system. This insignificant 
relationship might also imply that Islamic banks had done quite well to 
perform similarly to the conventional banks.    
 
The ‘age’ typology variable with interaction term was found to be 
significant and positive. This positive relationship implied that the new 
banks lent more relative to the old banks. It was worthwhile to mention 
that banks were classified as first, second and third generation banks along 
the line of when they were established. This was crucial since the later the 
banks were established, they were technologically more advanced. 
Although old banks are also gradually moving towards using modern 
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technological facilities but it takes time. In most cases, it was almost 
impossible to change the earlier infrastructure completely. The results 
above suggested that new banks had used these technological advantages 
in lending more than the old banks.  
 
Another possible interpretation was that new banks needed to grab a 
market share and, to do that, they had to expand lending faster than other 
banks. Their expansion in lending therefore might have little to do with 
superior technology and efficiency. Another possible factor could be the 
fact that banks become less efficient overtime (Esho, 2001). Moreover, 
when the share of consumer lending was examined, it was observed that 
share of this type of loan for new banks have increased dramatically over 
the last few years.  
 
Figure 6.7: Consumer loan according to age 
 
 
Sources: Author’s own calculation based on data from Bankscope and Bangladesh 
Economic Review, various issues. 
 
6.7.2 Robustness Checks 
For robustness, an additional method of estimation was applied to check 
the robustness of the results obtained from the two-step system GMM. The 
FE method is generally considered to be better when T is larger than 30. 
The time period for this study was only 15 years and FE method had its own 
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limitations in respect to estimating the dynamic panel data as was used 
here. Still the results of FE method are presented in Table 6.6.  
 
Table 6.6: Gross loan estimates for bank typologies using FE method 
Variable Ownership Size Islamic Age 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
LagGL 0.344*** 
(0.061) 
0.305*** 
(0.048) 
0.441*** 
(0.075) 
0.291*** 
(0.065) 
GDPgrowth 0.106    
(0.414) 
0.504    
(0.414) 
-0.001   
(0.428) 
0.154    
(0.407) 
Interest rate -0.106***  
(0.032) 
-0.112***  
(0.025) 
-0.156***  
(0.023) 
-0.057*  
(0.032) 
FL 14.365*** 
(1.468) 
9.763*** 
(1.603) 
14.745*** 
(1.528) 
15.344*** 
(1.551) 
Public* FL -1.262*** 
(0.480)    
Large* FL - 1.855*** 
(0.231) 
- 
 
Islamic* FL   0.015 (0.361) 
 
New* FL - - - 1.410*** 
(0.346) 
Wald Chi2(5) 253.23  
(0.000) 
226.45  
(0.000) 
276.51  
(0.000) 
226.83  
(0.000) 
No. of banks 37 37 37 37 
No. of 
observations 
429 429 429 429 
Note 1: The FL variable here was constructed following the Abiad et al. index of financial 
liberalisation. Also the dummy variables were taken in actual form in 0-1 scale.  
Note 2: Robust standard errors were in parentheses to the right of the respective 
estimated coefficients. In the lower part of the table, the probability values were given in 
parentheses.  
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
It could be observed that the results from the two-step system GMM were 
quite robust as in alternative estimation, all the control variables were 
found significant (except one) and in line with the expected theories and 
similar to the results found by the two-step system GMM method. The 
financial liberalisation variable was found to be significant in all cases and 
also positive. For the bank typology variables, results for ownership and 
age typologies were same as the main estimation presented in Table 6.5. 
Insignificant result for mode of operation typology was similar to the 
earlier results. However, results for size typology differed from the main 
estimation.  
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6.8 CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
6.8.1 Conclusion 
It could be concluded that this bank-level study of lending for the banking 
sector in Bangladesh had given further and important insights into the long 
and ongoing debate of the effect of the financial liberalisation. There were 
differences of opinions about the success and the extent of it. The results 
of this study showed that the financial liberalisation increased lending in 
the banking sector. 
 
The relationship was found to be significant in all cases of four types of 
regression using four different bank-specific characteristics. This meant 
that the process of financial liberalisation was able increase credit 
allocation, which was in line with earlier empirical findings (e.g. Cotarelli 
et al., 2003)47. However, as observed from the earlier findings of this study, 
this increase in lending was not large enough to reduce excess liquidity 
problem for the banking sector in Bangladesh. Therefore, findings of this 
chapter (increase of lending with the process of financial liberalisation) in 
relation to the first empirical chapter (Chapter 4) where it was found that 
excess liquidity in the banking sector increased after financial liberalisation 
require some further analysis since lending and excess liquidity were 
generally expected to move in the opposite direction.  
 
It was quite natural that lending would increase after and with the process 
of financial liberalisation in line with one of its chief objectives of 
removing different lending barriers. Similarly, this was also expected to 
remove or reduce excess liquidity in the banking sector. However, with 
deposits increasing, if lending grows but less compared to increase in 
deposit, then lending and EL will both rise. One possible reason for lending 
not keeping pace with growth in deposits could be a more prudent lending 
behaviour of banks. Moreover, a consistent spread between government bill 
and bond rate with the interest rate also helped banks in lending safely 
because of the interest they could earn in government bills and bonds 
                                               
47Though in most cases, authors used different measures of financial liberalisation than 
the one used in this study. 
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without the risk of default. Detailed discussion on this was done in Section 
4.8.1.  
 
Variations in interest rate according to different bank-specific 
characteristics could play a significant role for difference in lending. To 
analyse this, interest rates of banks were averaged for each typology. The 
higher the interest rate, it was expected that the less will be the demand 
for borrowing. Therefore, it would be interesting to see if there were any 
differences in interest rates among the bank-specific characteristics. It was 
discussed in detail in Section 4.8.1 and was observed that differences in 
interest rates above a certain level led to significant differences while if 
the gap was not much than there was no significant difference. This 
highlighted the importance for keeping the interest rate within a 
reasonable band for different banks to avoid too much variation in terms of 
lending.  
 
It was also observed by earlier studies that stages and sequencing of 
liberalisation could have an impact on how banks behave (Bandiera et al., 
2000). Moreover, institutional strength was also mentioned to be critically 
important for the success of it. Caprio et al. (2006) wrote: ‘institutional 
strengthening now widely accepted as being the pre-requisite of a 
successful liberalised financial sector’. If an economy was structurally weak 
then it was difficult to reap the proper benefits of financial liberalisation.  
 
6.8.2 Policy Implications 
This study highlighted the importance of specific policies and its 
implementations based on different bank-specific characteristics. One 
significant feature of this study was that it used bank-level data which 
helped in understanding better the differences at bank-level and also 
assisted in identifying the differences across banks. This was because it was 
easier, with bank-level data, to classify the banks according to different 
typology and examine the effect accordingly.  
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For ownership typology, it is important that public banks step up their 
lending in normal times rather than using the advantage of government 
backing. On the other hand, careful attention is needed so that private 
banks do not lend injudiciously, which may look good in the short-run but 
can prove detrimental in the long-run due to the higher risk associated with 
imprudent lending.  
 
Similarly, for age typology, large banks need to be encouraged to lend 
more using their advantages in lending towards large firms. Since 
Bangladesh is a country with many small firms, large banks also need to 
concentrate in widening their lending scope by increasing lending to small 
firms and consumers. Specific targets need to be set for these types of 
banks by the central bank in this regard as is done by the central bank in 
other cases. For example, specific targets were set for agricultural lending 
by the central bank in Bangladesh. On the other hand, new banks should be 
monitored so that they do not overlend, particularly during the initial years, 
to survive. An initial period of a few years support is therefore suggested to 
help these banks to lend more prudently in this very competitive sector.  
 
Insignificance of size and mode of operation typology suggests that policies 
can be formulated and implemented on a priority basis where the 
characteristics of ownership and age should be addressed first before the 
characteristics of mode of operation and size. Therefore, ‘one size fits all’ 
approach should be avoided and specific policies need to be formulated 
keeping in mind different bank-specific characteristics.  
 
Special attention needs to be given to address the variation in interest 
rates according to bank-specific characteristics. As observed above, rate of 
interest played an important role in lending and variation in interest rates 
could lead to difference in lending. Therefore, steps need to be taken to 
reduce this variation to a certain level across these bank-specific 
characteristics.  
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The financial liberalisation index constructed and applied in this study 
showed that although liberalisation started in Bangladesh in the early 
1990s, it was still far from reaching its completion. Hence, it is very 
important that the remaining process is incorporated and accomplished 
with urgency so that maximum benefit from it can be achieved.  
 
Some earlier studies observed that sequencing of liberalisation played a 
crucial role in achieving the benefit from this process. If a country was in 
at its early stage, then it was very important to keep in mind this process 
of sequencing. However, for countries where the process started much 
earlier and was already in place for years, it would be more useful to work 
on strengthening the institutional factors for its success (Caprio et al., 
2006). 
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APPENDIX 6.1: Variable definitions 
Table 6A.1: Variable definitions 
Variable Name Variable Definition Comment 
Dependent 
Variable   
 
Gross loan Gross loans  log value taken  
Explanatory 
Variables  
 
Lag dependent 
variable 
Lag of initial year data of the 
dependent variable 
 
GDP growth log of GDP growth log value taken 
Interest rate Deposit rate: Interest 
Expense/Average Interest-
bearing Liabilities 
log value taken 
Financial 
liberalisation 
(FL) 
A composite index of seven 
indicators following Abiad et 
al. but constructed by authors 
Actual values taken 
first and then log 
values taken.  
Ownership 
dummy with 
interaction 
FL* Public (1 if state-owned, 0 
otherwise) 
Interacted with the 
financial liberalisation 
Size dummy with 
interaction 
FL* Large (1 if large, 0 
otherwise) 
Interacted with the 
financial liberalisation 
Mode of 
operation 
dummy with 
interaction 
FL* Islamic (1 if Islamic, 0 
otherwise) 
Interacted with the 
financial liberalisation 
Age dummy with 
interaction 
FL* New (1 if new {established 
after 1990}, 0 otherwise) 
Interacted with the 
financial liberalisation 
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APPENDIX 6.2: Data availability  
APPENDIX 6A.2: Data availability of gross loan for banks in Bankscope 
Serial  Name Bank 
Type 
Gross loan Total 
Year 
1 AB Bank PCB 1997-2011 15 
2 Agrani Bank SCB 1997-2011 15 
3 Al-Arafah Islami Bank PCB 1997-2011 15* 
4 Bangladesh Commerce 
Bank 
PCB 2000-2011 12 
5 Bangladesh Development 
Bank 
DFI 1997-2009 12** 
6 Bangladesh Krishi Bank DFI 1997-2011 15 
7 Bank Asia PCB 1999-2011 13 
8 BASIC Bank DFI 1997-2011 15 
9 BRAC Bank PCB 2001-2011 11 
10 City Bank PCB 1997-2011 15 
11 Dhaka Bank PCB 1997-2011 15 
12 Dutch Bangla Bank PCB 1997-2011 15 
13 Eastern Bank PCB 1997-2011 15 
14 EXIM Bank PCB 1999-2011 13 
15 First Security Islami Bank PCB 1999-2011 13 
16 ICB Islamic Bank PCB 1997-2011 15*** 
17 IFIC Bank PCB 1997-2011 15 
18 Islami Bank Bangladesh PCB 1997-2011 15 
19 Jamuna Bank PCB 2001-2011 11 
20 Janata Bank SCB 1997-2011 15 
21 Mercantile Bank PCB 1999-2011 13 
22 Mutual Trust Bank PCB 2000-2011 12 
23 National Bank PCB 1997-2011 15 
24 NCC Bank PCB 1997-2011 15 
25 One Bank PCB 1999-2011 13 
26 Premier Bank PCB 1999-2011 13 
27 Prime Bank Limited PCB 1997-2011 15 
28 Pubali Bank PCB 1997-2011 15 
29 Rupali Bank SCB 1997-2011 15 
30 Shahjalal Islami Bank PCB 2001-2011 11 
31 Social Islami Bank PCB 1998-2011 14 
32 Sonali Bank SCB 1997-2011 15 
33 Southeast Bank PCB 1997-2011 15 
34 Standard Bank PCB 1999-2011 13 
35 Trust Bank PCB 2000-2011 12 
36 United Commercial Bank PCB 1997-2011 15 
37 Uttara Bank PCB 1997-2011 15 
* 2000 missing; ** 2006, 2010, 2011 missing; *** 1998, 2004, 2005 missing. 
SCB = State-owned Commercial Bank, PCB = Private Commercial Bank, DFI = State-owned 
Development Financial Institution. 
215 
 
APPENDIX 6.3: Additional estimates 
Table 6A.3: Gross loan estimates applying two-step system GMM using 
alternative measure of real interest rate (using GDP deflator) 
Variable Ownership Islamic Size Age 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
LagGL 0.732*** 
(0.219) 
0.749*** 
(0.205) 
0.732*** 
(0.218) 
0.681** 
(0.279) 
GDPgrowth 0.317*** 
(0.117) 
0.328*** 
(0.120) 
0.323*** 
(0.119) 
0.298*** 
(0.110) 
Interest rate -3.705***  
(1.395) 
-3.185**  
(1.382) 
-3.136**  
(1.419) 
-4.045***  
(1.547) 
FL 1.637*** 
(0.535) 
1.476*** 
(0.549) 
1.471*** 
(0.553) 
1.499*** 
(0.557) 
Public* FL -0.193*** 
(0.059) 
--- --- --- 
Islamic* FL --- 0.033  
(0.048) 
--- --- 
Large* FL --- --- -0.037 
(0.045) 
--- 
New* FL --- --- --- 0.231*** 
(0.058) 
Wald chi2 (6) 209.36 
(0.000) 
132.02 
(0.000) 
167.81 
(0.000) 
194.71 
(0.000) 
Hansen-J Test 1.65 (0.647) 1.68 (0.641) 1.64 (0.650) 2.44 (0.486) 
Test for AR (1) 
errors 
-3.22 (0.001) -3.42 (0.001) -3.25 
(0.001) 
-2.65 
(0.008) 
Test for AR (2) 
errors 
0.89 (0.372) 0.93 (0.351) 0.89 (0.372) 0.82 (0.410) 
No. of banks 37 37 37 37 
No. of 
observations 
403 403 403 403 
Note 1: The FL variable here was constructed following the Abiad et al. index of financial 
liberalisation. Also the dummy variables were taken in actual form in 0-1 scale.  
Note 2: Robust standard errors were in parentheses to the right of the respective 
estimated coefficients. In the lower part of the table, the probability values were given in 
parentheses.  
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Appendix 6.4: Relationship between excess liquidity and lending 
The main objective of this study was to examine the impact of financial 
liberalisation on excess liquidity and lending. Therefore, the relationship 
between lending and excess liquidity was never tested in this dissertation. 
However, possible relationships between them were discussed in detail in 
Section 1.2.3 to have a clear understanding about how they could be 
related.  
 
Furthermore, the relationship between lending and excess liquidity was 
now tested with a regression where lending was the dependent variable 
and excess liquidity was one of the explanatory variables. The regression 
result showed that excess liquidity and lending were positively related for 
Bangladesh. The relationship between lending and excess liquidity was 
tested with the following equation of total lending: 
 
ܩܮ௜௧ = ߙ଴ + ߚଵܧܮ௜௧ + ߚଶܩܦ ௧ܲ + ߚଷܫܰ ௜ܶ௧ + ߚସܫܰܨ + ߝ௜௧ 
 
The above equation explained effect at bank-level on lending where ܩܮ 
representing total lending, ܧܮ showed excess liquidity, ܩܦܲ  was for 
economic growth, interest rate was given by ܫܰܶ  and ܫܰܨ expressed 
inflation. Banks were represented by subscript ݅ while ݐ was showing year. 
The variables of lagged dependent variable, economic growth, inflation and 
interest rate were the most common variables applied in most of the 
earlier studies on lending.  
 
Table 6A.4: Relationship between lending and excess liquidity  
(Dependent variable: Gross loan) 
Explanatory variables Coefficient 
Excess liquidity  10.42*** (1.665)    
GDP growth 208.57 (210.676)   
Interest rate 179.37 (117.978)    
Inflation 57.30 (59.221)        
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The regression result showed that lending and excess liquidity was 
positively related. In addition, correlation between excess liquidity and 
lending was estimated. 
 
Table6A.5: EL and Lending Correlation 
Variable EL (nominal) EL (real) 
Total domestic credit 0.9351* 0.9027* 
Private credit 0.9353* 0.9006* 
* Significant at 5% level.  
 
The results showed that they were positively correlated with each other. 
This positive relationship between lending and excess liquidity was 
observed across different definitions of both of them. Moreover, they were 
found significant in all cases. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study investigated the effect of financial liberalisation on excess 
liquidity and lending along with analysing the impact of business cycle and 
the recent financial crisis on excess liquidity across banks. Bank-level data 
of 37 (nearly all) banks for the economy of Bangladesh were used for the 
period of 1997-2011 in this study. Along with the standard control 
variables, some other key variables of interest were considered using panel 
estimation methods. Since Bangladesh is a developing country like most 
other countries where financial liberalisation took place and the process of 
liberalisation in Bangladesh started around the same time like in most 
economies, the findings and policy implications of this study are relevant 
and applicable for many other countries, particularly developing ones.  
 
One of the main aims of financial liberalisation, which was proposed more 
than fifty years back, was to increase banking sector competition. Different 
policies were prescribed for this with the ultimate objective that banks 
would be able to lend without any constraint. If banks were able and 
choose to lend without any restriction, then this would have led to a 
situation of very low or zero excess liquidity in the banking sector.  On the 
other hand, financial liberalisationcan increase uncertainty in the 
economy, leading banks to careful lending and ultimately increase the 
excess liquidity. 
 
Now, it is observed that though the process of financial liberalisation 
started in early 1990s for most of the developing economies, still there is 
substantial excess liquidity problem in the banking sector in these 
countries, including Bangladesh. Since it is generally observed that there is 
sufficient demand from borrowers, therefore lending decisions lie mainly 
with the banks. Thus it was pertinent to study what affected EL and 
lending and how at bank-level. 
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7.2 CONTRIBUTION TO LITERATURE AND SUMMARY FINDINGS 
According to our knowledge, there has not been any study at bank-level to 
explore the relationship between excess liquidity and financial 
liberalisation. This study aimed to fill this gap in the literature by using the 
bank-level data of the Bangladesh economy.  
 
As the process of liberalisation is a composite process of many steps and 
sectors, use of a dummy or a single variable to proxy this process has some 
limitations. To address this difficulty to capture this complex process 
adequately, an index of liberalisation was used in this study to measure its 
effect accurately. This index was constructed with seven indicators 
following the work of Abiad et al. (2010)48. The main indicators were: 
credit controls and excessively high reserve requirements, interest rate 
controls, entry barriers, state ownership in the banking sector, capital 
account restrictions, prudential regulations and supervision of the banking 
sector and securities market policy. 
 
Contrary to the expectation that the liberalisation process would reduce 
excess liquidity, it was found that in spite of the financial liberalisation in 
Bangladesh, the excess liquidity for all types of banks has continued to 
grow. This means that even after the financial liberalisation, banks were 
either not able to or chose not to lend sufficiently to remove or even 
reduce excess liquidity problem in the banking sector. As generally there is 
enough demand from borrowers, the second possible scenario of banks not 
choosing to lend is more applicable. Increased uncertainty due to 
liberalisation is found to be a key factor as it led to higher loan default, 
followed by subsequent prudent lending in response by the banking sector 
(Figure 4.6). Significant positive impact of impaired loan and deposit 
volatility variables further supported the effect of economic uncertainty in 
increasing excess liquidity in the banking sector. 
 
                                               
48A more detailed discussion about this index was provided in Section 4.3.2.2 and in 
Appendix 4.5.  
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Another key contribution of this study to the existing literature was to 
examine the effect of various bank-specific characteristics. It was observed 
from previous studies that these characteristics could play a differential 
role among the banks. However no study till now, according to our 
knowledge, had investigated if banks behaved differently in terms of 
excess liquidity due to these characteristics with the financial 
liberalisation. Therefore, to see if banks behaved differently according to 
these characteristics, four bank-specific characteristics were used in this 
study for the banking sector in Bangladesh. These were ownership, size, 
mode of operation and age.  
 
The results showed that the public banks had higher growth of excess 
liquidity than the private banks. However, it should be explained carefully 
as the objectives of public banks include various social objectives which 
make them less aggressive to lend competitively with other banks whose 
only aim is profit maximisation.  
 
Lower growth of excess liquidity for the new banks than the old banks 
support the fact that new banks performed better in terms of managing 
uncertainty brought along with the financial liberalisation. It also meant 
that they were engaged inhigher amount of lending to get a reasonable 
share in this competitive market of banking sector quickly.  
 
No definite patterns could be observed for mode of operation bank 
typology. Unlike the conventional banks, the Islamic banks are unable to 
use all instruments of lending due to Islamic rules related to interest. But 
strategically they are in a more advantageous position in a Muslim 
populated country like Bangladesh as many Muslim actively engage with 
Islamic banking without worrying much about interest.  
 
No significant difference is observed between large and small banks. Large 
banks are in a better position where hard information is required but small 
banks do better when soft information is important. All these opposite 
221 
 
effects have nullified each other and led to an insignificant difference 
between them.   
 
Careful examination of these bank typologies showed that significant 
variations in interest rate played a key role in difference in excess 
liquidity. It was observed that banks with higher interest rate had lower 
excess liquidity while banks with lower interest rate had higher excess 
liquidity. Moreover, when the spread of interest rates between two groups 
were considerably large, significant relationship was observed for that 
typology (Figures 4.8 to 4.11).  
 
Although previous studies had examined how lending was related to 
business cycle and if they differed according to ownership (and some other 
bank-specific characteristics), there has been no study to see how business 
cycle affected excess liquidity. The second empirical chapter analysed how 
excess liquidity was related to business cycle in Bangladesh. Applying same 
bank-specific characteristics of the earlier chapter, an effort was made to 
see if there were any variations in excess liquidity according to this. It was 
observed that business cycle had a significant negative impact on excess 
liquidity of the banking sector in Bangladesh. The results also showed that 
the public banks acted less procyclically than the private banks validating 
the earlier similar general findings on lending. However, it was observed 
that the large and the new banks acted more procyclically than their 
counterparts. The difference in behaviour by banks according to these 
bank-specific characteristics during business cycle was explained by the 
variation in capitalisation. These variations across banks not only explained 
the reasoning for difference in relation to business cycle but also with the 
recent financial crisis (Figures 5.1 to 5.4).  
 
Since business cycle bust for a sustained period can lead to crisis and the 
recent financial crisis falls under the period of this study, this crisis was 
also included to see if and how it was related with excess liquidity. On the 
one hand, financial crisis is likely to lead to higher excess liquidity as a 
crisis period would lower the demand of borrowers as well as making banks 
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skeptic towards lending due to higher chance of default. Yet, the process 
of capitalisation during this period can lead banks towards higher lending 
and lower excess liquidity.  
 
Furthermore, if the economy and the banking sector are strong enough to 
face the financial crisis, then banks can still continue to lend at a higher 
level. It was observed that the relationship of excess liquidity with the 
financial crisis was different from the relationship with business cycle. 
Factual evidence suggested that all these possible scenarios (careful 
lending, lower demand, capitalisation and resilience of the banking sector 
and the economy) and their possible effects, acting in opposite directions 
to each other, had generally nullified each other during the crisis period. 
For the typology variables, significant difference was found for size and age 
typologies where it was observed that the large and new banks acted more 
procyclically than the small and old banks respectively. As mentioned 
before, variation in the process of capitalisation was important for this 
significant difference as higher capitalisation leads to higher lending and 
thereby lower excess liquidity. This was observed to be true for public and 
large banks.  
 
Previous studies on lending had either looked at the effect of lending on 
financial liberalisation at country level or at cross-country levels. Where 
bank-level data of lending were used, the relationship of lending was 
analysed for some other phenomena (and not financial liberalisation). 
Therefore, to fill the gap in the existing literature, relationship between 
financial liberalisation and lending at bank-level was examined in the third 
empirical chapter. In line with the earlier two empirical chapters, an effort 
was made to see if there were any variations in lending among different 
types of banks. It was found that the financial liberalisation variable had a 
significant positive relationship with lending across all types of banks. This 
supported the factual evidence of continuous increase in lending after the 
process of financial liberalisation. The results relating to the different 
typologies of banks showed that public banks had lower lending than 
private banks while large and new banks experienced higher lending than 
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small and old banks respectively. The remaining typologies of mode of 
operation did not show any significant variation. Differences in consumer 
lending was found to play an important role in the variation in lending 
(Figures 6.6 and 6.7 and discussions thereof).  
 
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, part of the motivation of this study was 
to understand the banks’ behaviour regarding excess liquidity. Some of the 
questions mentioned there included: What factors affected their lending 
pattern and hence excess liquidity? How did they respond to policy actions 
such as financial liberalisation, or other external factors such as financial 
crises, business cycles etc.? How did these responses vary across the 
various types of banks that existed?  These were some of the questions that 
were addressed in this work and discussed in detail in the result section of 
each chapter. Summarily, the findings showed that the lagged dependent 
variable affected lending while impaired loan, interest rate and financial 
liberalisation were found to affect excess liquidity. It is also found that 
policy actions like financial liberalisation affected both lending and excess 
liquidity. When the impact of business cycle and the recent financial crisis 
were analysed, it was seen that business cycle had a more direct impact 
while the financial crisis had much less effect. One of the key findings of 
this thesis is that in several cases, banks behaved differently according to 
the bank typologies applied in this research49.  
 
7.3 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
This study highlighted a number of policy issues related to financial 
liberalisation with excess liquidity and lending as well as the relationship 
between excess liquidity with business cycle and the financial crisis. These 
are described below in the following paragraphs. 
 
(i) Tailor-made approach for different bank typologies: In this bank-level 
study, it is observed that a 1 per cent increase in financial 
liberalisation led to an increase of 1.170 for private banks, while it was 
even higher for public banks (1.411). Similarly, small, conventional and 
                                               
49With the exception of ‘mode of operation’ typology. 
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old banks also experienced significant increase of 1.278, 1.147 and 
1.157 respectively for a 1 per cent rise in financial liberalisation. New 
banks differed significantly from old banks and had lower percentage 
change (1.272) in excess liquidity. Large and Islamic banks did not 
experience significant difference to small and conventional banks 
respectively. 
 
Based on these findings, it is recommended that ‘one size fits all’ 
approach should not be applied. These results suggest that policies 
should be bank typology specific and have orders of priority where age 
criterion will come first followed by ownership and size typology.50.  
 
(ii) Observing risky lending: Consumer lending is found to play an 
important role in difference in lending. While the private banks were 
found to rapidly increase their share of consumer lending, the opposite 
was found for the public banks. Similar to the private banks, the new 
banks were also observed to increase their share of consumer lending 
while the share of the old banks decreased. Although increased lending 
is generally believed to be good, unnecessary increase in lending can 
lead to risky behaviour. For the private banks, this is due to their aim 
for profit maximisation while for the new banks, this is to get a 
reasonable market share in their early period of establishment.  
 
Additionally, non-performing loans are found to be affecting the excess 
liquidity situation. Hence, close monitoring of loan default situation is 
recommended in this regard. A specific gestation period at the 
beginning for new banks is also suggested to avoid any untoward 
lending. 
 
(iii) Reduction of political uncertainty in the economy: Although it was 
expected that financial liberalisation would reduce excess liquidity 
through increased lending, it had failed to achieve reduction in excess 
                                               
50 Similar recommendations have emerged from earlier studies of financial liberalisation 
on different countries (Griffith-Jones et al., 2003). The difference between those studies 
and this study is that those were not done at bank-level. 
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liquidity. In this study, political motive was found to be positive and 
significant. Therefore, political and other uncertainties need to be 
especially taken care of to address the problem of excess liquidity.   
 
This is also observed by others. For example, one of the reasons 
mentioned for excess liquidity in Bangladesh is political uncertainty 
(Dhaka Tribune, 7 November 2013).  
 
(iv) Strengthening of the monetary policy: In addition to political 
uncertainty, this study also observed that deposit volatility and 
impaired loan had significant positive impact on excess liquidity. To 
remove uncertainties in the economy, it is therefore recommended 
that monetary policy should be strengthened and made more 
predictable. This is in line with earlier suggestion by IMF (2009) to 
address the problem of excess liquidity in Bangladesh.  
 
(v) Making capitalisation process symmetric: This study has observed that 
when there are differences in capitalisation among banks (according to 
typologies), there are differences in their in terms of excess liquidity. 
To avoid this variation, special attention is recommended so that all 
banks are capitalised in a similar way.  
 
7.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This bank-level study on the banking sector in Bangladesh has given further 
insight into the ongoing debate on the effect of financial liberalisation. 
Various aspects of excess liquidity and lending with financial liberalisation 
are analysed in this study. Moreover, impacts of business cycle and the 
recent financial crisis on excess liquidity are also analysed. Although it is 
found that financial liberalisation affected lending positively, it is also 
observed that financial liberalisation has not been able to reduce excess 
liquidity problem in the banking sector which is contrary to the general 
expectation. Business cycle is found to be affecting excess liquidity while 
the financial crisis showed a less conclusive relationship.  
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Significant relationship of deposit volatility and impaired loans with excess 
liquidity has shown that uncertain environment (both economic and 
political) had an impact on excess liquidity situation. This is due to the 
uncertainty that financial liberalisation brings in with it. Capitalisation 
showed mixed effect on excess liquidity while political motive is found to 
positively affect the situation. For lending, it was observed that economic 
growth was positively related.  
 
Inverse relationship of interest rate with excess liquidity and lending 
(positive with excess liquidity and negative with lending) supported the 
generally assumed opposite relationship between lending and excess 
liquidity. However, positive relationship of financial liberalisation with 
both excess liquidity and lending led to further analysis and conclusion that 
prudent lending from banks in the face of uncertain situation to avoid risky 
lending had kept lending within a certain level.  
 
Variations in behaviour for different bank typologies shed important light 
on the need for different policies for different banks. It is recommended 
that significant differences in interest rate, capitalisation and consumer 
lending among banks with different ownership and age need prior attention 
while capitalisation of banks with different size and ownership needs to be 
addressed in times of crisis. However, mode of operation typology requires 
least attention as Islamic banks, despite its limitations in scopes and 
instruments related to lending, were generally found to perform similar to 
the conventional banks.  
 
Overall the results suggested that increased uncertainty due to financial 
liberalisation had significant impact on the banking sector. It is 
recommended that institutional and other necessary reforms are carried 
out to get the maximum benefit from liberalisation rather than imposing 
this process on a general basis. Since liberalisation is a multi-dimensional 
process of various phases, sequencing of it also needs to be kept in mind as 
improper sequencing is an obstacle in getting the maximum benefit unless 
the process of liberalisation is already on for too long.  
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Significant impact of deposit volatility, impaired loan and political motive 
showed that uncertainty in the economy was a very important aspect for 
the behaviour in the banking sector. This was particularly important due to 
the fact that financial liberalisation was found to have significant impact 
on the banking sector and liberalisation can also bring in uncertainty. 
However, the significant impact of capitalisation highlighted the fact that 
government or central bank can play a role in addressing issues related to 
the banking sector. It is recommended that the central bank step in 
whenever banks behave significantly differently according to their different 
characteristics.  
 
Variations across bank typologies in this study showed the importance of 
bank-level study. Bank-level data enabled us to investigate closely how 
banks behaved differently. It also highlighted the importance of applying 
bank-level study in other aspects related to the banking sector. After the 
recent surge of cross-country studies, this new dimension of bank-level 
study can be a new type of future research area.  
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